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Abstract 
Secure payment is the basis of electronic commerce (e-commerce). A large 
amount of electronic payments are made via POS (point of sale) terminals using smart 
cards and legitimate users are usually authenticated by PIN. The security design of 
POS terminals and authentication methods are increasingly becoming concerns of e-
business. The major aims and objectives of this industrially oriented research are to 
investigate a new solution at system level to improve the security of current POS 
. payment systems. The contributions of this thesis include several aspects: 1) An in-
depth literature survey has been undertaken. The security threats of current POS 
terminals and available countermeasures have been systematically investigated. The 
main existing problems have been identified. 2) An innovative scheme, the so-called 
Supercard, which integrates PIN pad, biometrics and the smartcard, has been proposed. 
Approaches based on this scheme can meet security challenges posed by attacks such 
as visual and channel PIN attacks, display attacks, and fake-machine attacks. The 
scheme also has advantages to prevent the cryptographic key being disclosed by 
channel or side channel attacks. 3) The Supercard scheme has been examined 
specifically to improve fingerprint biometrics security. The Capture & Match on Card 
scheme and corresponding authentication protocol has been designed with the 
advantage of preventing biometric channel attacks. Biohash is adopted to protect the 
biometric template. 4) Keystroke dynamics, as a behaviour biometric to strengthen 
PIN authentication, has been investigated under the specific conditions of a highly 
limited number of keystrokes. 5) The multimodal signals of PIN, fingerprint and 
keystroke dynamics have been studied through fuzzy-logic-based information fusion. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This chapter provides the project background, general information and 
summarises the contributions of this thesis. 
1.1 Background 
Electronic commerce, commonly known as e-commerce or eCommerce, 
consists of the buying and selling of products or services over electronic systems such 
as the Internet and other computer networks. The amount of trade conducted 
. electronically has grown extraordinarily with the increase in eCommerce. Meanwhile, 
card payment devices are rapidly evolving and becoming ubiquitous as a method of e-
payment to support eCommerce. Security is more important than ever with the need 
to ensure the integrity of the payment process and protect the privacy of individuals 
using Point of Sale (POS) devices. The card (magnetic card or smart card) and PIN 
(Personal Identification Number) play important roles in payment. Magnetic cards 
use magnetic material to store some information for machine-identification, but it 
cannot prevent data copy or manipulation. Therefore, magnetic cards no longer meet 
today's security challenge, and they are gradually being replaced by IC cards, also 
known as smart cards [1][2]. The smart card, a French invention, has an embedded 
CPU and memory. The smart card has the capability to record and modify 
information in its own non-volatile memory and the security data can be well 
protected by the operation system and hardware measures. These features make the 
smart card a powerful and practical tool against unauthorised data access and copying 
[3]. 
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(a) Separate Terminal and PIN pad (b) Integrated Terminal and PIN pad 
Machines that accept card payments at the Point of Sale are called POS 
terminals. They are widely used in shops, hotels or even in taxis. A typical secure 
POS system diagram is illustrated in Figure 1 and a corresponding product in market 
from Ingenico [4] is shown in Figure 2. The secure POS system consists of a terminal 
and a PIN pad (PIN Entry Device). In many cases, the terminal and the PIN pad are 
combined into one physical machine body. The terminal normally has the functions 
of entering the payment amount, printing receipts, etc. It has various communication 
modules and plays the role of a communication bridge between the bank system and 
the PIN pad. Normally there is no high security requirement on the terminal because 
all sensitive data passing through the terminal have been encrypted in advance, either 
in the PIN pad or in a remote server. The PIN pad typically has slots to accept smart 
2 
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cards and magnetic cards, and a keypad for PIN input. The PIN pad authenticates 
both the card and the cardholder using cryptography communication with remote 
bank systems, i.e. online mode or offline mode with the local smart card. The PIN 
pad also includes a sophisticated detection system against tampering, and a security 
core inside controls the entire security system. Therefore, the main security of the 
POS system lies in the PIN pad, Increasingly, the terminal and PIN pad are integrated 
into one physical body, as illustrated in Figure 2 (b). Thereafter, in this thesis we use 
the word "terminal" to represent the general integrated device of the terminal and PIN 
pad. 
In the POS system, before starting the transaction, three authentications must 
be done, namely the legitimacies of the cardholder, the card and the payment terminal. 
The cardholder authentication can be done by PIN or biometrics. The PIN is known 
only by the cardholder and can be input through terminal keypad and sent for 
approval to the card issuer. Instead of by PIN, more recently the cardholder can also 
be authenticated by providing a fingerprint or other biometrics. The legitimacy of the 
card can be proven by checking the unique card number and its corresponding 
encrypted secret data, which is stored by the card issuers (banks). Similar to the card 
authentication, the legitimacy and integrity of the· terminal can be decided by 
. checking the unique number and its corresponding encrypted data, which is stored by 
payment network providers (acquirers). Obviously, if the cryptographic keys are 
disclosed, all encrypted data are no longer secure. 
In short, two types of security information need to be especially well protected: 
the cardholder PINlbiometrics and the cryptographic keys. The keys used in 
information encryption/decryption are stored in the SRAM or registers inside the 
terminal. The cryptographic algorithms used in the payment system must be public 
3 
and well known such as the RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) [5] or DES (Data 
Encryption Standard) [6]. The only confidentiality involved in the 
encryption/decryption process is the key. Therefore, common attacks as well as 
countermeasures primarily target the cryptographic keys and user PINs. The terminal 
must be able to protect the PIN and detect attacks by adversaries. Any penetration or 
unauthorised modification shall cause an immediate and automatic erasure of all keys 
and other sensitive data [7]. 
There are two cardholder authentication methods in POS systems, i.e., PIN-
based authentication and biometric-based authentication. The PIN-based method is 
the most popular one. The approach of PIN authentication has many advantages, e.g. 
it is simple, stable and easy to update or revoke. Nevertheless, security can be easily 
breached in these systems when a PIN is divulged to an unauthorised user or an 
impostor steals a card; furthermore, simple PINs are easy to guess by an impostor and 
difficult PINs may be hard to recall by a legitimate user [8]. Meanwhile there are 
many attacks, which can disclose the PIN. For example, a PIN can be disclosed by 
visual observation (eyes or a camera) at the time the cardholder is keying the PIN 
numbers on a PINpad, or by monitoring different characteristics that change during 
the transaction, e.g. using electromagnetic radiation noise, beep sounds produced by 
the different keys or fluctuations of the power consumption [9]. Instead of non-
intrusive attacks, there are many intrusive attacks which can disclose' the PIN by 
accessing the inside of the PINpad, e.g. by installation of a tapping bug connected to 
the keyboard matrix and recording the communication via a smart card reader [10]. 
Currently, the visual PIN leakage is commonly prevented by building a physical 
visual shield around the keypad. A higher visual shield is more secure, but it makes 
the PIN input more inconvenient. In the field of preventing penetration attacks, some 
4 
security mechanisms are harder to implement, because a standard PINpad case cannot 
be built from very hard materials like steel, nor can it be built as a closed system, 
because although this would resist penetration, an open slot is required for smart card 
insertion. Common countermeasures which deploy micro open-alarm switches 
against the. unauthorised opening could be defeated by methods of bypassing, e.g., 
silver ink injection. 
For a long time, people have tried to find a new method to replace the PIN-
based authentication technology. The emergence of biometric methods has addressed 
the problems that plague traditional verification methods. Biometrics refers to the 
automatic verification of a claimed identity by using certain physiological or 
behavioural traits associated with the person [8]. By using biometrics, it is possible to 
establish a verification based on 'who you are', rather than by 'what you possess' 
(e.g., a smart card) or 'what you remember' (e.g., a PIN). As illustrated in Figure 3, 
biometric systems make use of fingerprints, hand geometry, iris, retina, face, hand 
vein, facial thermo grams, signature, voiceprint, gait, palm print, etc. to establish a 
person's identity [8][11]. Although biometric systems have their limitations [13], they 
have an edge over traditional security methods in that it is much more difficult to lose, 
steal or forge biometric traits; furthermore, they facilitate human recognition at a 
distance (e.g., face and gait) [14]. 
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Figure 3: Examples of some of the biometric traits used for authentication 
Figure 4: Example of a POS terminal with a fingerprint sensor 
Biometrics cannot replace the PIN method completely as it has its innate 
disadvantages; for example, it is hard to revoke, is susceptible to impersonation 
attacks and it cannot currently provide 100% correct identification rate [13]. For 
example, a fake finger can be created without great difficulty to fool many fingerprint 
sensors [15]. Currently, biometric sensors are designed and installed with a payment 
terminal (machine). Security risks exist in this kind of configuration. For instance, 
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after the machine case is accessed without triggering security alarms, attackers can 
apply channel attacks, like line taping, interception and signal replacement, to disclose 
the security biometric information. Furthermore, some advanced crypto-analytical 
techniques, like so-called side channel attacks [16], and in particular, power and 
timing analysis, can be applied to disclose the secret biometric information without 
machine penetration. 
Therefore, using PIN or biometrics alone for authentication systems may not 
be particularly high security from the view of technical implementation. Meanwhile, 
the location of keypad and biometric sensors on payment terminals has a higher risk 
of being attacked. Previous research [17] has indicated that biometric methods can be 
combined with PIN and smart card technology to improve security. The payment 
industry is seeking new solutions to improve the security. In this thesis, we want to 
extend such research. 
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
The research was initiated and partially funded by Ingenico Group, one of the 
leading providers of payment solutions. For over 25 years, it has delivered over 15 
million POS terminals that have been deployed across 125 countries. Ingenico [4] 
wants a prospective study to understand the future development of payment devices. 
The author, who was a senior research engineer in the Advanced Technology 
Department of Ingenico Group, initiated this work. The aim of the work was to gain 
an in-depth understanding of POS terminal security and to investigate potential 
advanced solutions which can enhance that security. The study results will be used as 
a reference for R&D development, as well as for marketing strategies. 
The major aims and objectives of this research are: 
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• To identify the major security problems ofthe current POS systems. 
• To propose a new framework for enhancing security, especially 
preventing the PIN visual leakage and fake terminal attacks which for a 
long time have been recognised as fundamental threats. 
• To investigate the integration of biometric technology in POS systems. 
To determine which types of biometrics are useful and how they can be 
integrated together to improve the user authentication process. 
• To evaluate the new system through experimental tests. 
With the nature of industrially oriented research in mind, the following 
requirements need to be taken into account: 
• User convenience. e-payment is part of daily life for millions of people 
of different ages, educational backgrounds, etc. The proposed security 
solution shall not be detrimental to user convenience. 
• Cost-effective. Payment terminals are massive products. The new 
solution to reinforce the current payment security should be affordable. 
1.3 Thesis Contributions 
A few of the challenges presented in the earlier section will be addressed later. 
In this thesis, new proposed schemes are presented to improve the security of e-
payment. Threats, which have been addressed by our proposed approaches, are listed 
in Table 8-1 of Chapter 8. 
The major contributions of this thesis are as below. 
• An in-depth literature survey on POS terminals has been undertaken. 
The security threats and available countermeasures have been 
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systematically reviewed. The main existing problems have been 
identified. 
• A novel scheme, the so-called Super~ard, which integrates PIN pad, 
biometrics and smartcard, has been proposed to provide a new system-
level solution. This scheme is able to solve fundamental challenges 
such as visual and channel PIN attacks, display attacks, and fake-
machine attacks. 
• The security of fingerprint biometrics has been reinforced by a new 
Capture & Match on Card (CMOC) scheme based on Supercard. The 
corresponding authentication protocol is investigated. Biohash is 
adopted to protect the biometric template. 
• Studies on keystroke dynamics as behaviour biometrics to strengthen 
the PIN authentication has been done under the specific conditions of 
highly limited numbers of keystrokes. The research results can be 
applied to the Supercard or a conventional POS. The experimental and 
evaluation results are presented. 
• Based on the Supercard platform, fuzzy-logic-based information fusion 
has been studied in an effort to integrate the multimodal signals of PIN, 
fingerprint and keystroke dynamics to make a comprehensive 
authentication. 
• A potential vulnerability of electromagnetic attack has been discovered. 
In terms of hardware implementation, preliminary investigations have 
been conducted on how to protect the key store unit. New approaches 
are proposed which exploit the features of BOA packages, or features 
of ceramic fragility, hardness and electric isolation. 
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The results of this research can be applied not only to POS systems, but also to 
internet security applications, e.g. user login and online payment. 
Publications of research through journals, conferences and patent applications 
are detailed in the list of PUBLICATIONS. 
1.4 Thesis outline 
In the subsequent chapters, a detailed description of each of these 
contributions is provided. The thesis structure is outlined below. 
Chapter 2 is a systematic survey of the current research in the area of POS 
security, mainly on aspects of hardware and systems. Attacks and countermeasures 
around PIN and key disclosures are also reviewed. 
Chapter 3 presents the research methodologies. Based on the analysis of the 
identified problems, a new scheme known as Supercard is proposed. System 
cryptography algorithms are selected using comparison studies. The novelties and 
advantages of the Supercard are elaborated with application scenarios. Proposals are 
given on improving the tamperproof package of the key store unit through a BOA 
solution and ceramic solution. Major problems are identified including the new 
potential electromagnetic attack. 
In Chapter 4, the Supercard is further studied in the domain of how to improve 
the security of fingerprint biometrics. Advantages and disadvantages of different 
biometrics are compared with application, and the CMOC structure is proposed to 
improve the security. 
In Chapter 5, the Supercard investigation is extended by applying the 
keystroke dynamics as behaviour biometrics to strengthen the PIN authentication. 
The theoretical background and experimental results are presented. 
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Chapter 6 describes how to fuse the multimodal signals from fingerprints, 
keystroke dynamics, and the risk level of transactions. The fuzzy-logic-based 
information fusion is applied and experimented. At the end, a flexible and adaptive 
decision system is investigated. 
Chapter 7 describes the development of a Supercard demonstration system. 
The software design and implementation are also presented. 
Chapter 8 is the summary and plan for further work. The threats that have 
been addressed by our proposed approaches are listed in Table 8-1. 
The documentation of Supercard's industrial implementation is attached as an 
appendix. 
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Chapter 2. Literature Survey 
This chapter conducts a comprehensive literature survey on the security of 
POS products. Threats and available countermeasures are investigated with the target 
of identifying the major problems. 
2.1 Introduction of POS Security 
Security is more important than ever to ensure the security of e-commence. 
As introduced in the previous chapter, in the POS payment system, two types of 
security information need to be especially well protected: the cardholder 
PINlbiometrics and the cryptographic keys. The PIN is entered using a keypad. The 
keys used in information encryption/decryption are stored in the SRAM or registers 
inside the terminal. Common attacks as well as countermeasures target primarily the 
cryptographic keys and user PINs. The terminal must be able to protect the PIN and 
detect adversary attacks. Any penetration or unauthorised modification shall cause an 
immediate and automatic erasure of all keys and other sensitive data [7]. 
The security of a POS system has its own specialties. Firstly, POS devices are 
embedded systems [17]. Implementing security in embedded systems is dramatically 
different from that of full-featured personal computers. Even with today's advanced 
technology, embedded systems have severely limited resources: embedded CPU 
speed is much slower than that of a personal computer, for example, and volatile and 
non-volatile storage is usually much smaller. For example, a POS payment device 
has a 40MHz processor, 1M RAM and 2M Flash memory. Meanwhile, embedded 
systems often perform periodic computations to run control loops in real time. A 
delay of a fraction of a second can cause a loss of control-loop stability, hence 
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embedded systems become vulnerable to attackers designed to disrupt system timing 
[19]. Another feature of embedded systems is cost sensitivity; several dollars can 
make a big difference for mass productipn in the market. Consequently, some 
security approaches with computational requirements, which can be implemented in 
personal computers, will be too complex to implement in an embedded system. 
Secondly, the POS devices directly involve a high volume of financial 
transactions. They have far higher risks than other civilian secure apparatuses such as 
pay-TV decoders and mobile phones. POS security devices must be compliant with 
many strict bank transaction standards and industry security specifications. Not only 
is the communication protocol far more complicated, but also the hardware and the 
physical design have higher demands. For instance, according to new security 
regulations in the POS industry [7][20], peripherals like the smart card, display and 
keypad must be controlled directly by a security core. Triple-DES and RSA 
cryptographic algorithms, which require high computation power, shall be supported 
[21]. The shape, design and the position of the smart card reader in the POS device 
are included in the security spectrum with specific requirements. Meanwhile, a 
comprehensive and sophisticated tamper-proof system must be carefully implemented. 
With more and more sophisticated attack methods being developed [24][25][26], the 
security design becomes the most challenging job of the POS system. 
Thirdly, compared with the security implementation of a smart card [24], 
which has been widely studied in depth, implementations in POS devices have 
specific constraints. (1) The production' volume of smart cards is huge and the card is 
held by each cardholder, so the average cost of security development for each card is 
relatively low. In contrast, the POS devices are only deployed on sites where 
transactions occur. Meanwhile, the security standards and marketing requirements 
13 
vary from country to country and from bank to bank. Consequently, the production 
volume of POS devices with a specific configuration is far less than that of smart 
cards; it ranges typically from several thousand to one hundred thousand for each 
batch and type. (2) In a smart card, the whole. control system is integrated into one 
small chip, the size of which is only several square millimetres. Many modem 
semiconductor technologies and measures can be applied to protect it, such as 
scrambling the memory and bus or covering a protective layer over the whole chip, 
for example [24]. However, it is not easy to implement such measures to protect the 
POS security. In the POS system, the security requirements evolve quickly, and for 
reasons of flexibility and cost, most of the POS providers still use generic CPU core, 
memory chips and other discrete components. It is not always practical to build the 
whole security system into one ASIC (Application Specific Integrated Circuit). 
Additionally ~ the POS security system requires more physical space for powerful 
processors, more memory and various peripheral components; as a result, the secure 
area in a POS system is much larger than that of a smart card. (3) The smart card is 
held by cardholders personally and carefully while the POS system is deployed in 
public locations. The adversary can get far more potential benefits from 
compromising a POS device than compromising a card. This is because one 
compromised card will affect only one user, but one compromised POS system will 
jeopardise all of its users. 
Therefore, in terms of security, the POS device has its own unique set of 
difficulties and specialities .. Nevertheless, it has not drawn as much attention as it 
should have. Very few papers focus on POS security, especially in the physical and 
hardware implementation spectrum. This research attempts to give a systematic 
security study of POS devices by identifying weak points, introducing some practical 
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implementations and proposing further research. It focuses on the hardware and 
physical security fields, primarily, although logic security is also referred to. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 
elaborate the security issues of the terminal peripherals and the security core unit. 
Practical implementations are presented in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 overviews some 
standards related to POS security, cryptographic algorithms, and physical approval 
programs. 
2.2 Peripherals Security 
Terminal security means to effectively prevent the disclosure of PIN, keys and 
sensitive data. Referring to Figure 5, according to the different security requirement 
levels, the terminal entity can be defined and divided into two parts, or two layers. 
The first layer is the peripheral layer. It includes the case and peripherals such as 
keypad, smart card reader and biometric sensors if present. The second layer is the 
core security layer, as illustrated within the dashed line in Figure 5. The security 
measures deployed in the peripheral layer primarily prevent the disclosure of the PIN. 
The peripheral layer also constitutes the first defence for the second layer, i.e. core 
security, while the security measures deployed in the core security layer primarily 
prevent the disclosure of the keys. Therefore, the security requirements in the core 
security layer are higher than that in the peripheral layer. For the purpose of clarity, 
peripheral security and core security will be investigated separately. The rest of this 
section focuses on common attacks, measures and existing problems of peripheral 
security. The next section investigates attacks, measures and problems of core 
security. 
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Figure 5: Terminal structure illustration 
2.2.1 Attacks on Peripherals 
The terminal has peripherals such as the keypad, the smart card reader and the 
display (recently it may also include biometric sensors), all of which belong to 
members of the security system and need to be protected. According to whether the 
terminal cases need to be accessed, the attacks can be classified into two categories: 
non-intrusive attacks and intrusive attacks. 
2.2.1.1 Non-intrusive Attacks 
It is evident that the PIN can be disclosed by visual (eyes/camera) observation 
while the cardholder is inputting the PIN numbers in a payment device. Even at a 
distance from the PIN keypad, the keying PIN can be observed by simply using 
binoculars or a telescope [27]. It is important to emphasise the threat of visual 
observation attack, because it is a very common means of PIN leakage that is hard to 
prevent. Moreover, this is not a highly demanding type of attack, technically, thus 
adversaries who have no prior knowledge of security can carry it out. 
A PIN can also be remotely disclosed by monitoring physical signals during a 
transaction, e.g. electromagnetic radiation (with the help of a radio device with an 
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antenna), noise, beep sounds produced by different keys or fluctuations of power 
consumption, etc. In the case of membrane keyboards or touch screens, for fraudulent 
PIN capture purposes, a flexible and transparent touch panel can be stuck over it. 
Another well-known way to deceive the cardholder is a fake machine attack; a 
forged payment machine with the appearance of a real payment machine can be built 
and put in place to cheat cardholders. If the customer inserts his card and enters his 
PIN in a fake machine, it will record the PIN and some user information. 
Most computer devices and systems, output devices (e.g. LCD display) and 
input devices share the same data bus. This means that if a connector or display 
signal lines are easily accessible to an attacker from outside, then the PIN or other 
data from the input device can be recorded from the output device. 
2.2.1.2 Intrusive Attacks 
If an attacker can access the inside of devices, by installing a tapping bug that 
is connected to the keyboard matrix or cable, they can record the communications and 
get the PIN which can then be used in replay attacks. Meanwhile, since many smart 
cards have no ability to make decryption computation, for such cards, the PIN that is 
inputted from the keypad cannot be encrypted before it is sent to the smart card for 
authentication; consequently, the plaintext PIN can be obtained from the 110 lines of 
the smart card reader. 
Provided the attacker can imitate the display message either from the outside 
or the inside, by an attack method where the terminal is not visibly damaged, it is 
dangerous. The reason is that the cardholder will not realise that the terminal has 
been manipulated and the cardholder will be falsely instructed. Performing a 
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sensitive task such as entering a PIN during an unsafe running mode [20] will cause a 
PIN disclosure. 
2.2.2 Countermeasure for Peripherals Attacks 
Corresponding to the non-intrusive and intrusive attacks, there are two 
protection types. 
2.2.2.1 Non-intrusive PIN Leakage Protection 
The most effective way (or the only available way currently) to prevent visual 
PIN leakage is to build a non-transparent physical barrier, or a so-called privacy 
shield around the keypad [27]. Obviously, a higher privacy shield can better prevent 
disclosure. Also PIN keypads should be designed without flat surface keyboards (e.g. 
a membrane) as these are susceptible to attacks like adding a flexible and transparent 
capture layer. 
In addition, hardware designers should aim to protect the activity on the 
keyboard matrix, the I/O line of the IC card interface or any associated hardware, as 
the PIN information can be revealed by electromagnetic radiation monitoring [20]. If 
the PIN entry is accompanied by audible tones, then the tone for each entered PIN 
digit must be indistinguishable from the tone of any other entered PIN digit. 
2.2.2.2 Intrusive Attack Protection 
Theoretically, if the device case is strong and hard enough to resist attacks, it 
is a tamper-resistant device. Unfortunately, this category countermeasure is hard to 
implement in a terminal device due to practical constraints of weight and cost. The 
majority of terminal cases are made of plastic materials such as ABS (Acrylonitrile 
Butadiene Styrene) or PC (Polycarbonate). To detect attempts to open the case, 
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sensors are needed to issue open-alarm signals. Once an open alarm is triggered, the 
security system will stop the terminal service automatically. Afterwards, unless the 
terminal is returned to the manufacturer and resumed under security control, it will no 
longer be able to work properly. Correspondingly, it would not be able to instruct the 
cardholder to input the PIN. 
However, in reality, the detect sensors cannot be deployed everywhere and 
normal micro open-alarm switches can also be bypassed. To always keep the keys 
and the security detective system in an active state during a normal transportation and 
storage period, an internal battery supplies the power of the terminal security system. 
As a result, the limitation of the battery supply is that strict, active techniques of 
ultrasonic or infrared space detectors cannot be exploited [28]. The terminal case 
cannot be similar to a closure, although this would be more effective at resisting 
penetrations, because there has to be an open slot for smart card insertion. A skilled 
attacker will not try to open the case because they know it will easily trigger the open 
alarm. They cut or drill through the case from the bottom plastic part or the rear part 
to avoid opening the case directly, or by injecting silver ink (electric conductive) to 
bypass the open-alarm switches so that they can access the device without triggering 
the security alarm. In such a case, customers will still use this device and give their 
PIN. 
2.2.3 Problem Analysis 
As we have just discussed, anti-penetration of terminal peripherals is very 
difficult in practice. A reasonable anti-penetration system can only be realised by a 
comprehensive and careful design of a sensor detecting system, a proper layout of 
components, dedicated PCBs, etc. Some practical implementation examples will be 
presented later in Section 2.4. 
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The problems are concentrated on the PIN keypad and the PIN transmission 
channel, i.e. from the keypad to the core security package., If we can find a solution to 
physically remove the keypad and correspondingly the transmission channel out of 
the terminal, the security can be improved dramatically. This is the basic idea of our 
proposed Supercard solution, which will be elaborated in the next chapter. 
2.3 Core Security 
This section provides an overview of a typical core security unit. Attacks are 
described in sections 2.3 .1. Countermeasures are explained in section 2.3 .2. 
2.3.1 Attacks of Key Disclosure 
One disclosed PIN would put an individual cardholder at risk. However, the 
disclosure of cryptographic keys, which are stored in the core security unit of the 
terminal, can put all transactions via this terminal at risk, even in a DUKPT (Derived 
Unique Key Per Transaction) based system. Therefore, key attacks are much more 
dangerous than PIN attacks. Consequently, the protection requirement of core 
security is much higher than that of peripherals. 
A typical structure of a core security part in a terminal is illustrated in Figure 6. 
The whole core security area is encapsulated in a small package (shown in the dashed 
line closure) and filled with epoxy resin. Inside the device, there are sensitive 
components such as CPU, SRAM and Flash. It also includes tamper detection circuits. 
The power supply is backed up with a battery to keep the keys in the volatile memory 
and to ensure that the tamper detective circuit is always active. 
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According to whether the protection package or security chip needs to be 
accessed, the attacks can be classified into two categories: non-intrusive attacks and 
intrusive attacks. 
Figure 6: Illustration of core security structure and attacks 
2.3.1.1 Non-intrusive Attack 
When a cryptographic system is runrung, accompanying the data 
transformation, some physical signals, l.e. time, power consumption or 
electromagnetic signals, change correspondingly and are often used as leakage 
sources to detect security information. These signals can be measured from outside of 
the cryptographic chip rather than from its communication channel, and non-intrusive 
and powerful attacks based on these methods are also called side channel 
cryptanalysis. Typical non-intrusive attacks including Differential Power Analysis 
(DPA), electromagnetic analysis, timing attacks, Differential Fault Analysis (DF A), 
and condition changing attacks will be investigated below. 
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(1) DPA Attack 
Differential power analysis (DP A) is a class of attack discovered by 
Cryptography Research Inc [29]. This attack is able to extract secret keys and 
compromise the security of smart cards or other cryptographic devices by analysing 
their power consumption. It measures the instantaneous power consumption of a 
device while it runs a cryptographic algorithm: a different power consumption when 
operating on logical "1" compared to operating on logical "0" [30]. The power 
consumption is first determined with help of oscilloscope during the processing of 
known key and it is then measured during the processing of unknown key. The 
measuring is usually repeated many times and the mean value is calculated to 
eliminate the noise. After measuring is complete, the difference is determined and 
hence the unknown key can be deduced [29]. 
(2) Electromagnetic Analysis 
Theoretically, electromagnetic analysis is a process similar to a DPA attack. 
, By measuring the electromagnetic radiation of the CPU, conclusions can be drawn 
about the internal sequence of events taking place on the microcontroller. 
Superconducting quantum interference devices (SQUIDs) can be used to measure 
magnetic fields of low extension and strength. The evaluation can be carried out in a 
manner that is analogous to DP A. Karine Gandolfi et al. [31] experimentally 
attempted such an attack. They tried to analyse the electromagnetism conducted on 
three different CMOS chips, which have different hardware protections and 
cryptographic algorithms of a DES, an alleged COMP128 and a RSA. In all cases, 
the complete key material was successfully retrieved. 
(3) Timing Attacks 
The performance characteristics of a cryptosystem typically depend on both the 
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encryption key and the input data (e.g., plaintext or ciphertext). Cryptosystems often 
take slightly different amounts of time to process different inputs. By carefully 
measuring the amount of time required to perform key operations, attackers may be 
able to find the key. 
Paul Kocher described this type of attack in a 1996 pUblication [32] that 
focussed particularly on time dependencies of RSA and DSS. Even today, it is still a 
powerful attack. The 2003 paper [33] by Brumley and Boneh presented that they can 
use "timing attacks" remotely (three routers and multiple switches distant from the 
server) and extract a 1024-bit RSA private key from an OpenSSL 0.9.7 server. Their 
experiment broke the common beliefs that timing attacks are only applied in the 
context of poor computation hardware tokens such as a smart card. 
(4) DFA Attack 
In September 1996, Boneh et al. announced a new type of cryptanalytic attack 
against RSA public key cryptosystems on tamperproof devices. Later, Biham and 
Shamir published their new attack, called DFA, which can get a secret key from DES 
cryptosystems [34]. More details on how this attack works were revealed in [35]. 
The basic idea is to give certain physical effects (e.g., ionising or microwave 
radiation) to a sealed tamperproof device; one can induce, with reasonable probability, 
faults at random bit locations in a tamperproof device at some random intermediate 
stage in the cryptographic computation. The faults in the random bit locations do not 
influence the code itself, i.e., the program itself does not crash, and only some of the 
values it operates upon are affected. It is further assumed that the attacker is in 
physical possession of the tamperproof device and that he/she can repeat the 
experiment with the same private key by applying external physical effects to obtain 
23 
outputs due to faults. By analysing a series of different fault results, the key can be 
disclosed [36] . 
There are many variations of such attacks, one example being the Optical 
Fault Induction Attacks, described by Sergei Skorobogatov and Ross Anderson in 
2003 [38]. In such an attack, a regular flashlight is flanged to the camera adapter of a 
conventional light microscope, then it is used to flash a very limited area of the RAM 
of a microcontroller and cause faults. The background of such attack is that the 
semiconductor transistor is sensitive to ionizing radiation - whether caused by nuclear 
explosions, radioactiveisotopes, X-rays or even intensive light. By depackaging the 
chip to get access to the chip surface (but the passivation layer of the chip remains 
intact, no require electrical contact to the metal surface) such 'semi-invasive' attack 
can be conducted. Refer to Figure 7. 
Figure 7: Depacaged microcontroller to apply optical DFA 
(5) Condition Changing Attacks (temperature, voltage, frequency, EMIIRFI) 
The majority of electronic components perform within specific conditions of 
voltage, temperature, EMI, etc. Moving outside of such required ranges can cause the 
system to malfunction. If the intruders can make security circuits inactive by giving 
extreme conditions, they can access sensitive data without triggering the alarm. For 
example, immersing the device in liquid nitrogen can cause the temperature to 
suddenly reach -195°C [28]. Likewise, if an attacker can control the system frequency, 
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conclusions can be drawn regarding the RAM frequency content by halting the clock 
frequency and analysing the RAM with the help of electron beam testers. 
2.3.1.2 Intrusive Attacks 
If the attack has the ability to successfully access the core security area, the 
main goal will no longer be to record the PIN (of course it is easy to do), but the keys. 
Usually the keys and the secret data are kept in the volatile memory (e.g. SRAM) 
inside a tamper-responsive enclosure. On detection of a tampering event, the volatile 
memory chips will be powered down or even shorted to ground [37][38], then the 
stored data will be erased. 
Obviously if the adversary can access key storage chips without triggering the 
security alarm, the intact key remains in memory and it can be obtained easily using 
the read-out circuitry provided for that purpose [38]. 
The security components like SRAM and CPU are normally protected by an 
epoxy-resin-encapsulated package. The common method to access the sensitive 
components is to drill, mill, and grind or plane the potted area until it i~ sufficiently 
close enough to the target and then by proceeding more carefully using fine tools. For 
instance, the data bus can be bugged with microprobe needles. In order to successfully 
attack in these ways, knowledge of the layout of the PCB and the associated 
components is desirable, and this can be accomplished using X-Rays, so that the 
drilling procedure may then be undertaken more accurately [28]. 
A more serious problem is that data in volatile memory will not really 
disappear immediately after power down [28] [37][38] due to some characteristics of 
the semiconductor. Even if the data have been "erased" after triggering an alarm 
signal, there are still some possibilities of restoring it. If the time that the data remains 
after powering down exceeds the time required by an opponent to open the device and 
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power up the memory, then the protection mechanisms will fail. More details about 
remaining data are as follows: 
(1) Data Remanence in Semiconductor Devices 
Taking the advantages of some effects of a semiconductor, there is a variety of 
ways in which stored data can leave traces of its existence [38]. These include the 
effects of electrical stress on ionic contaminants (electromigration) and hot-carrier 
effects, which can be used to recover overwritten data or data from memory from 
which the power has been removed. Electromigration effects, which can be used to 
determine, after indefinite periods of time, which type of signal was most commonly 
carried by a particular part of a circuit. The latter is useful in recovering information 
such as the bit patterns of keys stored in special-purpose cryptographic devices. Since 
the physical device is modified, the bits can be recovered in an arbitrary amount of 
time, even if the memory cells they were stored in have been successfully erased and 
trapped charges have bled away. 
(2) Low Temperature Data Remanence 
In the 1980s, it was found that low temperatures could increase the data 
retention time of SRAM up to many seconds or even minutes. With the devices 
available at that time, it was found that increased data retention started at about -20°C 
and increased as temperatures fell further [40]. This means that at temperatures below 
-20°C, the contents of SRAM can be 'frozen'. 
Sergei Skorobogatov repeated some experiments to establish the temperature 
dependency of data retention time in modem SRAM devices in 2002 [37]. The results 
indicated that data remanence for dangerous periods and the phenomenon of part of 
data remanence are widespread, even at temperatures above 20°C . It is important to 
note that parts of the sensitive data that remain can also lead to a security catastrophe 
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because the attacker can get the remaining part by attacking it with brute force. 
Obviously, the more data that remain, the higher the probability is of the system being 
attacked by brute force. 
Without direct contact to Ie pins electrically, there are still some techniques 
that can extract data from the semiconductor's memory (ranging from registers 
through RAM to FLASH). What these techniques have in common is the use of semi-
invasive probing methods to induce measurable changes in the analogue 
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characteristics of the memory cells of interest [41]. The basic idea is that when a 
memory cell, or read-out amplifier, is scanned appropriately with a laser, the reSUlting 
increase in leakage current depends on its state; the same happens when we induce an 
eddy current in a cell. Researchers have demonstrated their practicality by reading out 
DES keys stored in RAM without using the normal read-out circuits. 
2.3.2 Countermeasures for Key Disclosure Attacks 
Following the identified attacks on the core security above, the 
countermeasures and existing problems will be explored here. 
To deter attacks, one basic strategy of security countermeasures is to make 
attackers feel that the risks far outweigh the benefits of the attack. No single 
countermeasure can meet all of the challenges, and securing a system requires more 
than simply adding encryption processors and a hard physical case. The security 
design must be treated as a system design and it needs integrated approaches [43][44]. 
2.3.2.1 Common Countermeasures 
To prevent condition-changing attacks, appropriate sensors such as 
temperature, voltage and frequency can be employed to detect the changes. Once the 
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predefined ranges have been exceeded, the transaction system will be ~hut down in a 
controlled way. The sensors, however, must be carefully protected to avoid being 
disabled easily by adversaries. 
DP A attacks, from a hardware point of view, can be prevented by power 
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randomisation, which adds a random noise artificially, or an active power filter to get 
steady power or detachable power supplies [45]. Unfortunately, such reductions 
generally cannot reduce the signal size to zero, as an attacker with an infinite number 
of samples will still be able to perform DPA on the (heavily degraded) signal [29]. 
From a software point of view, DPA c.an be prevented by introducing random waiting 
periods to the processor, by using a constant execution path code, or by choosing 
operations that leak less information in their power consumption and state transitions 
[24]. 
To prevent the data remanence attacks, complete data destruction is required. 
All storage cells can be actively purged by overwriting with all 'l's, and then all 'O's, 
at least three times in rapid succession, followed by shorting of the power supply 
input pins of the device to ground. 
In cases of extreme sensitivity, it is possible that the only acceptable method of 
destroying the data is by non-reversible physical destruction of the storage devices 
themselves [28]. Measures which can effectively prevent timing attacks include using 
noise-free cryptographic algorithms, i.e. the time for encrypting and decrypting is 
independent of the input values, or adding a cryptographic coprocessor to 
dramatically shorten the encryption/decryption time [24][38]. 
The basic principle of DF A is to give certain physical effects, e.g., ionising or 
flashlight, microwave radiation, to induce faults by individual key bit modification. 
Therefore cutting the physical attack paths with a physical shield, which is able to 
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withstand radiation and ionising, can effectively increase the security. Some 
precautionary measures can be implemented in the cryptographic algorithms. For 
instance, attacking a random number in front of the plaintext that is to be encrypted 
[24] results in the encryption of different data by the crypto-algorithm and therefore 
causes different results. Another example is to calculate the crypto-algorithm twice 
and compare the two results. If the results are identical, no attempt was made to 
corrupt any bits from the outside. 
2.3.2.2 Using Commercial CryptoProcessors 
Some security systems utilise commercial CryptoProcessors to improve 
security. There are several popular products on the market. For example, Dallas 
DS5002 series from MAXIM have hardware encryption functions and use encrypted 
external memories. They are designed to meet the physical security requirements of 
FIPS140 (Federal Information Processing Standards) and Common Criteria 
certifications. They detect intrusion of the chip's cryptographic boundary and the 
CRC-16/32 generator provides strong error detection of memory contents [46][47]. 
Another popular CryptoProcessor comes from IBM. The IBM 4758 was the first 
device to obtain a FIPS 140-1 Level 4 validation, the highest level of commercial 
cryptographic certification currently available. Dyer and colleagues [48] presented a 
design retrospective of IBM's 4758 physically secure coprocessor for protecting both 
data and computation in potentially hostile environments. In addition to providing 
physical protection, it encompasses the equally challenging problems of securely 
downloading applications into the secure environment and remotely identifying and 
authenticating the embedded device. 
However, having a cryptoprocessor does not mean that the system is safe. 
Work in [49] reported a protocol attack on the Dallas OS5002 series processors, 
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which use encrypted external memory. The attack can search through the range of 
encrypted instructions until an output instruction is recognised by its effects. This is 
then used to tabulate the encryption function. Bond and Anderson's paper [50] 
describes protocol flaws in the IBM 4758 secure coprocessor. These flaws make it 
possible to extract application secrets without actually opening the tightly sealed, 
FIPS-certified device. It demonstrated that a certified, physically secure device is not 
a security panacea. The article also pointed out attacks that exploit the mathematical 
properties of protocol flaws instead of the protocol implementation flaws. 
Meanwhile, the ever-evolving pas security leads to a higher integration and 
flexibility trend of security systems: more and more peripherals, e.g. smart card 
readers and displays, need to be directly controlled by the core security unit, and their 
interfaces become part of the core security unit. However, the generic commercial 
CryptoProcessors are expensive and lack flexibility, e.g., most generic security 
processors lack smart card driving support, and in many cases, display driving support 
as well. Normally flexibility regarding the key size was not offered either. 
2.3.2.3 Using FPGA to Improve Security 
Many hardware security researchers have started to use FPGA (Field-
Programmable Gate Arrays) [51][52]. FPGAs are hardware programmable platforms; 
they typically use program languages like Verilog or VHDL. Users can define a 
special hardware structure of CPU, memory and control circuits. Therefore, FPGA is 
a flexible platform to provide hardware arithmetic acceleration in many cryptographic 
applications. Their re-configurability means that they can be re-programmed to 
perform the more computationally intensive operations of a range of ciphers 
depending on security and application requirements. 
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Based on FPGAs, most of the published cryptography algorithms have been 
successfully implemented into hardware. The paper from Saggese et al. [53] detailed 
a tamper-resistant hardware accelerator for RSA. They successfully integrated an 
RSA processor and an RSA key-store on a Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
programmable board. (Xilinx Virtex-E 2000 FPGA is mounted). Work in [54] 
showed how to implement Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC) into Xilinx 
XC4085XLA FPGA. 
FPGAs, however, are more suitable for applications that are still in the 
prototype phase [25]. Compared to general embedded CPU or ASICs, they are still 
too expensive for mass production. FPGAs can improve the flexibility and can be a 
coprocessor to improve the security performance. Nevertheless, it is not suitable to 
create the generic core because the final size of the silicon is too large and the cost is 
too high. Tamper-detection sensors, like temperature sensors or X-ray sensors, cannot 
be embedded. Hence, the whole security system still needs an extra security package 
to protect the system. 
2.3.2.4 Using Self-defined Core Security Architecture 
In the current market, many payment device providers such as Ingenico and 
VeriFone have their own secure platforms including specific hardware architectures 
and corresponding operation systems in order to get more flexibility, higher security 
and reduced costs. Security platforms such as the Unicapt 32 of Ingenico and the 
Veri Shield of VeriFone [55] belong to the core expertise of the companies. The 
generic RISC processor and memories are usually employed in these systems. A 
number of security protections are designed to thwart physical and logical attacks on 
the system. This may further include a coprocessor to remove the burden of 
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processing cryptographic operations from the main processor to improve the 
performance. The security system is packed in a security package to constitute a core 
security unit 
The typical structure of the core security unit consists of one (or more) printed 
circuit boards containing a processor, memories, a tamper-detective system and 
peripheral interfaces, among other components. All these security elements are 
placed together in an area covered by a flexible protection circuit The protection 
circuit is made of a plastic foil with two-sided silver ink tracks; any break in the tracks 
will activate self-destruction. The whole core security unit is finally placed into a 
plastic package and filled with epoxy resin to ward off physical attacks. 
The tamper-detective system embedded in the core security unit comprises 
several detectors to thwart various attacks. The normal monitored parameters are: (l) 
Low temperature (e.g. -50°C) and high temperature (e.g. 100°C). This is to prevent 
attackers from disabling the protection mechanisms by freezing or heating this unit 
(2) Low battery voltage and high battery voltage. These measures can prevent the 
attacker disabling the protection mechanism by cutting or increasing the voltage. (3) 
External attacks, i.e. the signal from open-alarm switches. (4) Low frequency 
detector, etc. 
Since the solution, which covers the core security ,components with an extra 
package, has the advantages of flexibility and relatively low cost, it would exist for 
quite some time before other revolutionary measures can be invented. 
2.4 Implementation of Countermeasures 
The security in a commercial terminal device design is a trade-off between the 
risk of fraud and the cost of security. In this section, some practical implementation 
of terminal security will be presented. 
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2.4.1 Hardware Implementation of Countermeasures 
Two categories of protection are commonly used in the terminal, namely 
tamper-evident and tamper-responsive [57]. If a protective method can provide 
obvious evidence that an attack has been attempted, this method can be regarded as a 
tamper-evident countermeasure. A seal label of a carton is a common example of this, 
because the label will be damaged after the carton has been opened. As the label can 
be easily covered by another label or removed under very cold temperatures, it is not 
suitable for terminal security. It is important to note that both merchants and 
cardholders are not trained to identify tamper evidence, and it is not expected that 
there will be frequent inspections by a trained inspector. Therefore, only evidence 
that is very strong and obvious can be called tamper-evident. Merchants and 
cardholders can stop making further transactions after they recognise tamper evidence 
at the terminal. Another category of protection, i.e. tamper-responsive, involves 
actively detecting any penetration or unauthorised modification; this causes an 
immediate erasure of all keys and other sensitive data. Tamper-responsive protection 
must be triggered by direct attacks (penetration) and by equipment failure due to 
environmental conditions (extreme temperatures, power), whether deliberate or 
accidental. Both tamper-evident and tamper-responsive methods can be jointly 
implemented to protect the terminal. 
Generally, in practice, physical damage to the top cover of the terminal case 
can be regarded as tamper-evident. Any damage to the case sides can be considered 
as tamper-evident too, if it was obserVable to the cardholder in its normal operation 
position. Applying this rule in design can save costs because it means less security 
countermeasures need to be implemented against the physical attacks from the top and 
two sides of the case. However, the top cover of the terminal cannot always be 
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regarded as tamper-evident. For example, if a terminal is covered with an extra 
decorative layer (a plastic piece printed with colour, text, etc.) over the top surface for 
product aesthetics or customisation, it poses security problems, because the adversary 
can remove the decorative layer and then cut the top case to access the inside of the 
terminal. After the attack, the adversary can put back the decorative layer on the 
terminal surface, and there will be no tamper evidence visible. Therefore, it is more 
prudent to avoid designs that put any extra layer over the keypad and display. If such 
a design is inevitable, the removal of the surface layer shall be made detectable, e.g. 
by adding a sensor. 
Obviously any damage to the bottom part of the case cannot be considered as 
tamper-evident since cardholders cannot observe it. As a result, the attacks on the 
bottom sides must be prevented by tamper-response measures rather than tamper-
evident measures. 
Figure 8: Lateral view of a classic terminal layout 
Figure 8 is an example of the classic architecture of a terminal. The main PCB 
is deployed near the bottom of the case. There is an electric mesh hidden in the inner 
layer of the main PCB. Any drill or cut penetration will break the electric mesh 
which will cause a security alarm (tamper-responsive). Thus, the main PCB with 
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mesh constitutes a safe space over it. All security-relative components, including 
smart card reader, display and their corresponding connectors and cables, are located 
in this space. Furthermore, the connection of the cables is detectable. Removing 
cables from connectors will cause a security alarm. 
Parts of the display signal lines are relatively easy for an attacker to access, e.g. 
accessing from the rear side, so the PIN can be recorded, since the keyboard signals 
and the display signals use the same bus lines. To prevent this attack, a bus controller 
(switch) is implemented to control the connection of the display data bus. With the 
help of this controller, the firmware can select whether those display signal lines are 
active or not during the PIN entry process. 
There are several guidelines to be followed during terminal security 
implementation, as given in [20]. First, the shape of the case used to house the 
device's electronic components shall not be similar to commonly available products 
or commercially available components. This rule can increase the difficulty for the 
attacker to construct a duplicate terminal form to cheat cardholders. Visa also gives 
requirements. The slot of the smart card reader into which the smart card is inserted 
shall not have sufficient space to hold a PIN-disclosing "bug" when a card is inserted. 
The opening for insertion of the smart card is in full view of the cardholder so that 
any untoward obstructions or suspicious objects at the opening are detectable, e.g. any 
wires running out of the slot of the smart card reader to a recorder or a transmitter can 
be observed by the cardholder. 
Second, inside the terminal, sensors must be properly deployed to detect the 
attack attempt of opening the case. For implementation, a wide range of sensors is 
available, including simple mechanical micro-switches, magnetic reed switches and 
permanent magnet actuators on mating surfaces, or rubber switches. Integrating the 
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open-alarm switches with a rubber keypad is the most popular solution. It is cost-
effective and able to detect removal of external case screws or case opening. 
An example is illustrated in Figure 8. On the reverse of the rubber keypad, 
apart from normal electric conductive tabs for numerical keys, there is an extra tab for 
security (which may be made of metallic materials to improve the stability). 
Correspondingly, several contact switches made up of copper tracks are on the keypad 
PCB. The security tab is pressed by the plastic case after the case is closed and the 
track switch is normally connected. Once the case is opened or the keypad is 
removed from the keypad's PCB, the security switch will be disconnected, and, in 
turn, it triggers a security alarm. However, such a detective switch is susceptible to 
short-circuiting by injecting silver ink through the rubber keypad with a needle. To 
prevent this kind of attack, the security switch on the PCB is surrounded with another 
circular track switch, which is normally open. The injected silver ink will overflow 
and connect the circular track switch, and then trigger a security alarm. 
Figure 9: Integration of a tamper-detective sensor with a rubber keypad 
If mechanical micro-switches are used to detect and trigger an alarm once the 
PCB is removed. Refer to Fig.8. Such alarm switches shall be placed far from the 
edges of the PCB as far as possible to increase the difficulty for attackers which may 
try to access and disenable the switches. A protective wall surrounding the switch 
shall be built to increase the difficulty of bypassing the switch. 
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All security components and routes must be limited to a small area on the top 
layer or inner layer of the PCB so that the sensitive signals cannot be measured from 
the bottom layer. Thus, it is a challenging job for PCB designers. The security 
system shall consist of SMD (surface-mounted device) components. For the multiple-
. layer PCB, different layers and the track routing techniques use vias to connect tracks 
in different layers. These vias have security risks, because the standard vias cross the 
PCB completely from the top layer to the bottom layer (unless using a non-standard 
and expensive PCB manufacturing process). T,herefore, they are accessible at the 
bottom of the PCB. In order to decrease this risk, the vias can be hidden under IC 
packages at the bottom of the PCB so that the IC must be removed before the attacker 
can access the vias. Another solution is to create a track switch on the bottom layer of 
the PCB and hide the vias within the switch area, which is normally covered by 
conductive rubber. As a result, the rubber must be removed before the attacker can 
access the vias; nevertheless, the removal of the rubber will cause a security alarm. 
Meanwhile, this switch can be used as the case-opening alarm sensor. 
Stability is another important issue regarding the tamper-response device. The 
phenomenon of the security system triggered by factors other than a real attack is 
called false tamper detection. There are many possible causes of false tamper 
detections: neutrinos, gamma ray or ESD; shocks in excess, poor design quality; 
quality problems during manufacturing. Any tamper-response device has the risk of 
false detections; they cause the terminal to be returned to the manufacturer and 
increase the cost. Hence, attention needs to be paid to how to reduce the occurrence 
of false alarms and improve the reliability of the tamper-detecting mechanisms. 
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2.4.2 Software Implementation of Countermeasures 
Software security is as important as the hardware security measures. If 
untrustworthy software can be downloaded into the terminal and executed, the 
hardware and physical protections become useless. 
Applications loaded into terminals are highly sensitive as they control most of 
the functionality of the terminal. Even in terminals where the majority of the security 
functionality is performed at the firmware level, certain application functions are 
inevitably security sensitive as well. These generally include prompting, selection of 
keys and protection against PIN-exhaustion attacks, etc. The software security 
control can be divided into two phases. The first phase is software development. The 
security is controlled by careful inspection and test during this phase. The second 
phase is to download the software into the terminal and execute it. During this phase, 
digital signature technology is employed. 
As the terminal industry moves toward online security, software downloads 
and updates, and multi-application environments with payment, payment-related and 
non-payment applications are increasingly likely to run in the terminal, thus a 
systematic and flexible software authentication is required. For example, a chain of 
trust needs to be established, whereby the digital certificate that is used to verify the 
file is itself verified by the next digital certificate in the chain. This process continues 
all the way up to the "trusted root" certificate that is securely loaded into the terminal 
at its manufacturing facility. 
The following describes an example of the software security control for the 
terminal prompt [56][57]. One characteristic of the software development in a secure 
terminal device is that the display message must be strictly controlled. Otherwise, the 
customer can be misled. The terminal prompt is a message appearing on the display 
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of a terminal that instructs the user of the terminal to perform a task. In particular, the 
PIN-entry message, e.g. "Please input PIN", is vitally important, because the 
cardholder will be instructed to input the PIN. This message can only be displayed 
when the terminal is in safe mode where all numeric digits are formatted into a PIN 
block that is then encrypted. To prevent unwanted messages from being displayed, 
prompt messages shall be encrypted and stored in advance and then be authenticated 
during calling. Furthermore, the highly sensitive PIN-entry prompts and other 
prompts (non,;,PIN-entry prompts) shall be encrypted using two different 
cryptographic keys. In this way, the non-PIN-entry prompts cannot be mixed with the 
PIN-entry prompt at the time of the PIN-entry process. Meanwhile, the non-PIN-
entry prompt shall not contain a message that would ,cause a reasonable person to 
believe that it is appropriate to enter their PIN, e.g., "type PIN", "PIN Please", "Enter 
Secret Code". 
Reviewers other than software developers shall carry out internal source code 
inspections. The reviewer shall verify that all required security functionality is 
implemented and that no unauthorised or fraudulent functionality is included. 
Examples of such functionality include back door access methods to code or data in 
the terminal, and disabling of security features such as PIN-exhaustion protection if 
the terminal receives a specific keystroke or input. The reviewer must also look for 
coding errors that can lead to problems. This includes buffer and stack overflows, and 
type checking. Once the software development process has been concluded, it is 
common that independent test institutes within the scope of a software evaluation 
examine the complete developed source code. The major reason for these timely and 
cost-intensive examinations is to exclude software faults. They also make it 
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impossible for a developer, for instance, to hide a Trojan horse in the application 
software. 
Once the inspection of the submitted prompts is completed and any offending 
prompts are removed or suitably modified, the reviewer shall approve the set of 
prompts for signature, which will be verified by the terminal prior to execution of the 
application. Typically, two custodians (dual control) separately hold the signature 
key. Custodians shall verify the results again before they enter their key components 
into the signing tool for the prompts signature. 
2.5 Cryptography Algorithms and Security Standards 
Cryptography refers to encryption and decryption. Encryption is the process 
of converting ordinary plain information (plaintext) into unintelligible cipher text. 
Decryption is the reverse; in other words, it involves moving from the unintelligible 
cipher text back to plaintext. Cryptography is fundamental for secure communication, 
as well as for POS secure payment. In principle, all sensitive information between 
smart card, POS terminals and remote server shall be exchanged in an encrypted way, 
to prevent information disclosure. In this section, we review the implemented 
cryptography algorithms in a POS terminal. The applicable standards concerning 
POS terminal security are also investigated. 
2.5.1 Cryptography Algorithms Used in POS 
There are two types of algorithm used in cryptography: symmetric algorithm 
and asymmetric algorithm. Symmetric algorithm has the same key for both encryption 
and decryption. The calculation speed of symmetric algorithm is fast but it is difficult 
to exchange the key safely between communication parties. DES is the best-known 
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and most widely used symmetric algorithm in the world. The DES has a 64-bit block 
size and uses a 56-bit key during execution (8 parity bits are stripped off from the full 
64-bit key) [60]. However, with ever-increasing computer power, 56-bit keys are too 
short and vulnerable to do an exhaustive search. To improve the DES security, it has 
become common practice to use Triple-DES with a double-length (16-byte) secret key. 
The double-length-key Triple-DES encipherment algorithm (see ISO/IEC 
18033-3) is the approved cryptographic algorithm to be used in the encipherment and 
MAC mechanisms. The algorithm is based on the (single) DES algorithm 
standardised in ISO 16609. Triple-DES encipherment involves enciphering an 8-byte 
plaintext block in an 8-byte ciphertext block with a double-length (16-byte) secret key 
K = (KL " KR) as Equation 2-1 : 
Y = DES3(K)[X] = DES(KL)[DES-l(KR)[DES(KL)[X]]] (2-1) 
Decipherment takes place as Equation 2-2: 
x = DES-l(KL)[DES(KR)[DES-l(KL)[Y]]] (2-2) 
The successor to DES can be AES (Advanced Encryption Standard). The 
" AES algorithm based on the Rijndael algorithm was selected by NIST in October 
2001 and the standard was published in November 2002. AES supports key sizes of 
128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits [61][62]. In most circumstances, AES is faster than 
DES and about 2.5 times faster than Triple-DES [63][64]. The short AES key set-up 
time and its very low memory requirements make it well suited to restricted-space 
environments. More details of AES will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
The asymmetric algorithm has a key pair (private key and public key). The 
encrypted information by one key can only be decrypted by the other, and vice versa. 
The most commonly used asymmetric algorithm is RSA. RSA's security hinges on the 
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difficulty of factoring an integer into primes [65]. The asymmetric algorithm is 
securer and easier for key exchange but the calculation is slower than the symmetric 
algorithm. In practice, asymmetric and symmetric encryptions are often jointly used. 
Following we briefly introduce the principle of the RSA algorithm [76]. 
The RSA key pair generation algorithm can be concisely presented as Table 
2-1. 
Table 2-1: Algorithm ofRSA key pair generation: 
Input: Security parameter I . 
Output: RSA public key (n,e) and private key d. 
I. Randomly select two primes prime! and prime 2 of the same bitlength 
112 . 
2. Compute n = prime!prime2 and rp = (prime! -1)(prime2 -1). 
3. Select an arbitrary integer ewith 1 < e < rp and gcd(e,rp) = 1. 
4. Compute the integer d satisfying 1 < d < rp and ed == 1 (modrp). 
5. Return (n,e,d). 
RSA encryption use the fact that 
m
ed 
= m (modn) (2-3) 
for integers m,e,d. 
Decryption works because of 
(2-4) 
Therefore, the algorithm of RSA encryption and decryption can be presented 
as Table 2-2. 
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A digital signature or digital signature scheme is a mathematical scheme for 
demonstrating the authenticity of a digital message or document. A valid digital 
signature gives a recipient reason to believe that the message was created by a known 
sender, and that it was not altered in transit. Digital signatures are commonly used for 
software distribution, financial transactions, and in other cases where it is important to 
detect forgery or tampering. RSA is also the base of digital signature [65][67][72]. 
Table 2-2: Algorithms of RSA encryption and decryption 
RSA basic encryption RSA basic decryption 
Input: RSA public key (n,e) , plaintext Input: RSA public key (n,e) , RSA 
me [O,n -1]. private key d , ciphertext c. 
Output: Ciphertext c. Output: Plaintext m . 
1. Compute c = me modn. 1. Compute m = Cd modn. 
2. Return (c). 2. Return (m). 
The algorithms of RSA signature and verification are presented in. The signer 
of a message m first computes its message digest h = H (m) using a cryptographic 
hash function H, where h serves as a short fingperprint of m . Then, the signer uses 
his private key d to compute the eth root s of h modulo n: s=1I mOl n. The signer 
tranmits the message m and its signature s to verifying party. This party then 
recomputes the message digest h=H(m), revovers a message digest H=I mOl n from s, 
and accepts the signature as being valid for m provided that h=H. The security relies 
on the inability of a forger to compute eth roots modulo n [65][76]. 
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Table 2-3: Signature generation and verification algorithms 
Basic RSA signature generation Basic RSA signature verification 
Input: public key (n,e), private key d, Input: public key (n,e) , message m, 
message m. signature s. 
Output: Signature s Output: true or false of the signature. 
1. Compute h=H(m) where H is a 1. Compute h=H(1ri). 
hash function. 2. Compute Ii=i mod n. 
2. Compute s=1I mod n. 3. If h=1i then true Else false. 
3. Return (s). 
Another public-key method is Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), which is 
based on a discrete logarithm. It has gained popularity recently [54]. Compared with 
RSA, it appears faster and it uses smaller keys, while providing an equivalent level of 
security, for example, the encryption strength of 160 bit key ECC is equal to 1024 bit 
RSA. More details of ECC will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
However, in the latest payment transaction specification EMV 4.2 [7], only 
" RSA, DES/Triple-DES and SHA-l are recommended as proven algorithms. Thus, 
they are the most common cryptographic algorithms used in the terminal. 
Smart card transaction procedures can be outlined below according to EMV: 
(1) Insert the card, select the application if multiple applications are supported. 
(2) Authenticate the card (to check if the card has been manipulated). 
(3) Verify the cardholder by checking the inputted PIN. 
(4) Applications, Checks (Action Analysis, terminal risk management, 
possible issuer authentication). 
(5) Close the transaction. 
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RSA is used in the step of card authentication and cardholder verification, if 
both the card and the terminal can support RSA. To prove that a card has not been 
modified after it has been issued, during the card manufacture, the card issuer takes 
some of the important data such as cardholder name and primary account number. 
The data are then encrypted using the private key of the card issuer [73]. The original 
and encrypted data are then stored on the card while the corresponding public key is 
released to banks/terminal manufacturers. During a transaction, the terminal reads the 
original data together with encrypted data from the card. Using the corresponding 
public key, the terminal decrypts the card data and compares it with the original data 
to make the decision. In this way, the fake and modified card can be detected. 
As a further security measure, the public key is issued with hash values and an 
expiry date. The former is used to validate its accuracy while the latter is used to set 
an expiry date with the encrypted data. In case key validity fails, the transaction will 
be cancelled. Meanwhile, the length of the key will be increased periodically to meet 
the challenge of ever-increasing computer power. According to the key migration 
plan from Visa, currently a 1024 bits key is regarded as sufficient; after 2012, 
however, an 1152 bits key will be required and after 2016, a 1984 bits key will be 
required, and so on. Thus, the terminal security design must also consider the 
flexibility of key length and how to replace and update them in the field. 
After the card authentication and the cardholder authentication have passed 
and a trusted channel is established, symmetric cryptographic algorithms are mainly 
employed to speed up the transaction. Data confidentiality is achieved using Triple-
DES encryption of the data field. Triple-DES is also used in the encryption key 
derivation. Data integrity and issuer authentication are achieved by adding a MAC 
(message authentication code) to each message. . 
45 
2.5.2 Security Standards related with POS Security 
The smart card is becoming the number one payment card. In order to ensure 
that smart cards, smart card readers and smart card applications are interoperable, 
international standards are essential. Smart card standards originated from 
international standards organisations (ISO, CEN etc.). The basis is the ISO 7816 
standard, which specifies physical and electrical characteristics as well as formats and 
protocols for information exchange between the smart card and the reader. The 
Comite Europeen de Normalisation (CEN) is a European standard organisation. This 
organisation defines the CEN 726 standard - requirements for IC cards and terminals 
for telecommunications use [74][75]. Many standards have been developed, for 
financial security, especially. The government, private industry, and other 
organisations contribute to the vast collection of security standards. Standards related 
to the security of the POS terminal are listed in Table 2-4. 
Table 2-4: Standards related to POS terminal security 
Standards Description 
,-
ISO 13491 Banking -- Secure cryptographic devices 
ISO 9564 Banking -- Personal Identification Number (PIN) 
management and security 
ISO 9596 Information technology -- Open Systems 
Interconnection -- Common management information 
protocol 
ISO/lEC 9797 Information technology -- Security techniques --
Message Authentication Codes (MACs) 
ISO 11568 Banking - Key management 
FIPS 140 Federal Information Processing Standard 
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/ 
ANSI X3.92-FIPS 46 
and ISO 16609 
ANSI X3.106-FIPS 81 
ANSIX9.52 
ANSIX9.9 
Data Encryption Algorithm 
Data Encryption Algorithm - Modes of Operation 
Triple Data Encryption Algorithm Modes of Operation 
Financial Institution Message Authentication 
Based on international standards, many national and industry standards have 
been developed such as EMV, OpenCard Framework and JavaCard. EMV 
specification is a cooperative work of Europay, MasterCard and Visa, to offer 
common standards ensuring global interoperability between smart cards and payment 
terminals, regardless of the manllfacturer, the financial institution, or where the card is 
used. Since 1992, the EMV has been continuously updated, and the latest version 
EMV 4.2 [7] was published in June 2008. Today it is one of the most important 
specifications in the POS payment industry. Now the global payment system is 
carrying out EMV immigration, which updates from the magnetic card to the smart 
card. From 2005 onwards, in order to stimulate the EMV implementation, schemes 
such as Visa and MasterCard no longer assume liabilities for fraudulent transactions if 
the payment devices are not EMV compliant. 
2.5.3 Hardware Security Approval and Specifications 
The history of the e-payment terminal is still less than 20 years old and there 
were no forced security certification requirements for terminal devices for a very long 
time. The security was determined and examined by the payment device 
manufacturers. Since security has become a crucial problem, today the situation has 
changed dramatically. Security approval and certification from authorised 
laboratories is now mandatory. 
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However, there are still no globally accepted physical security approvals for 
terminals. EMV standards and the above-mentioned security standards address very 
little about hardware security and terminal security. As a result, the security approval 
of the terminal is still left to card schemes (Visa, MasterCard, etc) and national 
organisations. Visa has a security approval program called Visa PED, which has a 
significant impact on terminal industries. Many countries have their own approval 
organisations such as ZKA in Germany, APACS in UK, and Interplay in the 
Netherlands. Among them, the ZKA is regarded as the strictest approval organisation 
in the field of payment device security. 
In 2003, Visa announced that a terminal that accepts Visa cards must be 
approved and listed on its Visa ~IN Entry Device Approval List after January 1 st 
2004. At the end of 2004, MasterCard and Visa jointly announced new aligned 
requirements for terminal devices: the brand new Payment Card Industry (PCI) 
program. The PCI program is similar in concept to the Visa PED program. However, 
there are significant hardware security requirements in addition to the Visa PED. The 
hardware security requirements for the PCI PED are similar to the ZKA requirements 
in Germany. From October 1 st 2004, terminal device vendors must meet the PCI PIN 
pad security requirements. To date, the test laboratories evaluate the terminal 
according to the PCI requirements. 
2.6 Summary and Identified Problems 
This chapter has systematically undertaken a literature survey for the security 
system of POS payment devices. According to the different security requirement 
levels, we categorise attacks into two types: 1) PIN disclosure. This occurs in the 
peripheral layer consisting of terminal case, keypad, smart card reader and biometric 
sensors. These attacks are most common. 2) Key disclosure. The aim of such attacks 
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is to compromise the core security layer. Attacks and countermeasures around PIN 
and key disclosure, from simple to most sophisticated methods, are reviewed. 
After investigation, we have identified several of the main challenges of the 
POS security system, which are outlined below: 
• Two well-known but hard-to-solve threats: 1) inputting a PIN on a POS 
terminal can be peeked or recorded by a camera of adversary; 2) the 
cardholder can be easily misled by the information on a compromised 
or fake POS terminal. 
• The most common attacks take place in the data-transferring channels 
of peripheral devices, such as the connecting cable of the PIN pad, the 
cable of the display, or the cable of the fingerprint sensor. The smart 
card reader and its cable are susceptible to line-tapping attacks. 
• The traditional PIN authentication is gradually becoming out of date. 
Biometrics like fingerprints can address some of the problems that 
exist in traditional PIN authentication, but it causes new challenges that 
the tradition system does not have. More biometrics need to be 
investigated to answer these challenges. For example, what kind of 
biometrics is suitable for a POS system? Can a multimodaI biometrics 
be set up to enhance security? Can they been integrated with traditional 
PIN authentication? 
• The key is the most sensitive information of cryptography. Most 
critical problems arise from the weak design of the tamperproof store 
unit of encryption keys. The high-intensive electromagnetic attack is a 
potential vulnerability. 
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• It is a challenging task to combine the advantages of different 
authentication methods comprehensively. A new, sophisticated 
information fusion and expert decision system need to be developed to 
meet the challenges of complex input information like fingerprints, 
PIN, stroke dynamics and risk level. 
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Chapter 3. The Proposed Supercard Scheme, 
Cryptography Algorithm and Key Unit Protection 
Following the literature survey in Chapter 2, this chapter studies the new 
schemes and approaches to strengthen POS security. Research methodologies to 
address the identified problems are discussed. The Supercard scheme and security 
approaches based on the scheme will be illustrated. Their subsystems, i.e. PIN 
enhanced with biometrics and information fusion, will be further investigated in 
subsequent chapters. 
3.1 Analysis of the identified problems 
There are many challenges to solve the problems which have been identified in 
the previous chapter. 
(1) Using a non-transparent privacy shield is probably the most popular 
method of preventing PIN disclosure through observations. However, all PINpad 
designers are being plagued by a dilemma: a lower visual shield is easier for operation 
and design, but it is not secure enough. A higher visual shield is more secure, but it 
makes the PIN input more difficult. Recently, for security reasons, the height of the 
privacy shield suggested by authorities has been constantly increasing. The latest 
suggestions are extremely strict. For example, refer to Figure 10, the privacy shield 
should build 2700 horizontal and 450 vertical protection space which is measured 
from the middle of the keypad to the edge of privacy shield [56]. However, the 
manufacturers are struggling to keep up with user operation convenience and 
aesthetics. Meanwhile, this solution cannot eradicate many risks, such as line-tapping 
attack, for example. So today the question of" how to prevent PIN disclosure by 
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observation has already become an Impasse, and a new approach needs to be 
developed in the future. 
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Figure 10: Guideline of building a privacy shield 
More fundamentally, the risk of a physical replacement attack still exists. No 
matter how sophisticated the terminal security design is, a fake payment machine with 
the appearance of a real payment machine can be built and positioned by the attacker 
to cheat cardholders. If the customer inserts the card, the fake terminal will ask the 
cardholder to input the PIN. Since there is no signal to alert the cardholder, the 
common cardholder will follow the instruction and input the PIN. Straightforwardly, 
the PIN and some user information will be recorded by fake machines easily. 
(2) To enhance the PIN or fingerprint security, a multi modal biometrics 
system can be setup. The comprehensive information can be processed based on the 
research results of information fusion. 
(3) Due to the limitation of materials and cost, building a more sophisticated 
security package to protect the encryption keys in the terminal is becoming a very 
tough task for electronic and mechanical security engineers. An investigation needs 
to be carried out in the direction of new materials and mechanism. 
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Industrial and academic researchers have been trying to solve such problems. 
Visa, MasterCard and the leading POS providers, e.g. Ingenico, VeriFone, all have 
their own security research teams. Much work has been proposed on hardware or 
system solutions. In the Computer Laboratory of the University of Cambridge, a team 
led by Professor Ross Anderson is working on POS security through hardware and 
algorithms. Their work [58] referred to our work [10] and supported our conclusion 
that POS security can only be achieved by good integration of hardware and software 
at system level. They proposed to enhance the security through improved design and 
evaluation processes [58]. Killourhy et. al from Carnegie Mellon University tried to 
improve security through keystroke dynamics [59]. Besides the key typing rhythm, 
they also used cameras to analyse the finger motion. We try to solve such problems 
by integrating a PIN pad and biometrics with smartcard technologies. 
3.2 Research Methodology 
In order to address the identified problems, based on understanding the 
-
industrial and academic approaches and advanced technology available, a series of 
theoretical and experimental investigations are proposed. 
• Study from system level all the possibilities to protect or shorten the 
signal-transferring channels. 
• Investigate what kind of biometrics can be applied in POS and evaluate 
the performance individually. We have finally selected the fingerprint 
and keystroke dynamics as the two most suitable types of biometrics. 
• Integrate different information to build a multimodal system, to check 
if the overall performance has been improved compared with the single 
modal system. 
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• Continual experimental assessments of system performance were made 
throughout the design process. 
Principally and fundamentally, we have identified the radical problems of PIN 
disclosure that arose from two factors: the keypad is physically fixed with the 
terminal and the PIN is plaintext before it can be encrypted inside the core security 
unit. Thus, the whole PIN transmission channel has high probabilities of being 
attacked. In other words, if the PIN has already been encrypted before it is sent to the 
terminal, such problems can be prevented. Similarly, if the fingerprint sensor can be 
deployed elsewhere where it is more secure and easier to maintain, the biometric 
security can be enhanced. The above observations lead to the conclusion that the 
existing security structure can hardly meet the challenges it faces, and a novel security 
structure is expected. 
Key attacks 
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Figure 11: Supercard scheme and key unit protection 
Thus, we designed a new scheme, called Supercard (as shown in Figure 11), to 
prevent attacks. This is based on a smart card, integrating biometrics and PIN pads. 
The Supercard scheme is devised to mainly defeat peripheral attacks and PIN 
disclosures. Meanwhile, approaches are proposed as key unit protections to defence 
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attacks on key and sensitive information. In the following sections, the Supercard 
scheme and key unit protections will be discussed. 
3.3 The proposed Supercard Scheme 
Based on the analysis results of the previous section and considering the aims 
and objectives of this research, the configuration of the proposed system is discussed 
as follows. 
The main diagram of Supercard is illustrated in Figure 12. A PIN pad, a 
display and a fingerprint sensor are embedded together in the physical body of the 
smart card. Additionally, there is a slim battery embedded as a power supply. From a 
functional point of view, it is a miniature POS terminal. 
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Figure 12: Main diagram of Supercard 
For the simplicity of description, the system can be divided into three channels 
according to the different types of information. The first one is the fingerprint 
channel, consisting of a fingerprint sensor and the feature extraction of the fingerprint. 
The second one is the PIN channel, consisting of PIN pad and PIN match unit. The 
third is the keystroke dynamic channel, consisting of PIN pad and the keystroke 
dynamic match. The PIN channel and the keystroke dynamic channel have the same 
input device, i.e., a PIN pad. Each channel can be evaluated and experimented 
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individually. All signals from the different channels will be fused together through a 
comprehensive fuzzy-logic-based solution. More details of the channels will be 
investigated in the coming chapters. The fingerprint channel will be studied in 
Chapter 4. The PIN channel and keystroke dynamic channel will be investigated 
together in Chapter 5. The fuzzy-logic-based information fusion and decision-making 
will be studied in Chapter 6. 
From a systematic point of view, the Supercard scheme encapsulates the 
traditional susceptible peripheral devices, such as keypad, display, sensor and all the 
connecting cables between them, into one closed mini smart card body. 
Correspondingly, such traditional "external" devices become the "internal" devices of 
a smart card. All communication between them can be done internally - for example, 
inputting the PIN, sending messages to the display, capturing the fingerprint and the 
data process, etc. 
The advantages of the Supercard scheme are far beyond mere encapsulation. 
The major benefits of this proposal are listed as follows: 
(1) Sensitive information (e.g. PIN, fingerprint) can be input through the 
integrated keypad or fingerprint sensor on the Supercard. Such information can be 
kept, encrypted, inside of the card temporarily. Meanwhile,' the display on ,the 
Supercard can be used as a reliable interface to communicate with the cardholder. 
Such features can be used to find new methods in security applications. We will 
elaborate on these by way of case studies in Section 3.4. 
(2) It increases the difficulty for channel and side channel attackers. In 
practice, most of the channel attacks are conducted by attackers through the 
installation of an electric bug or apparatus to the attacked object. A POS machine 
" 
normally has a spacious plastic housing, which contains many PCBs, electric 
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components, etc. The wires linking the system components to each other can become 
potentially passive or active penetration routes. It is not difficult to find a small space 
in the terminal for installing an electric bug inside. In the Supercard, such typical 
channel threats can be eliminated. Meanwhile, the risk of being compromised 
through side channel attacks (crypto-analytical techniques through power, 
electromagnetic and timing analysis) is much lower because the power consumption 
and electromagnetic radiation of the Supercard is much less than the system of a 
conventional POS terminal. 
(3) It distributes the security risk. The conventional POS terminal is fixed in 
one place. Once one terminal is compromised, all transactions through this terminal 
will be jeopardised. The Supercard scheme converts the fixed terminal into thousands 
or millions of "mini terminals" (Supercards) one of which is held by each cardholder 
privately. In a situation where one Supercard is compromised, other cardholders will 
be not affected. 
(4) Better privacy protection. Nowadays, th~ fingerprint sensor is installed 
with the terminal machine. Although the terminal providers as well as the merchants 
declare, "We don't take your fingerprint images - only features", customers are 
unlikely to believe that when they see their fingerprints scanned by the terminal, In 
the Supercard, customers can input their fingerprints through their own card and the 
information can be pre-processed. 
(5) Increased flexibility. A comprehensive authentication can be made as 
depicted in Figure 13. Principally, we can first classify different applications into 
several predefined levels according to various security requirements and transaction 
values. To easier the memorize of a PIN and maximum the user convenience, the 
,. 
author even thinks to bring the concept of PIN fuzzy match in future research. For 
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example if the user wants to pay a small amount of transaction like park fee, if 70% 
PIN numbers are matched correctly (instead of traditional 100% PIN match), the 
transaction can be still completed. Finally, the system will select authentication 
factors and set varies threshold values of the similarity degree to make the final 
decision. Details of this topic will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
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Figure 13: Supercard multiple authentication scheme 
58 
N 
3.4 Supercard Case Studies 
To better understand the advantages of the Supercard scheme which are 
outlined in Section 3.3 , several case studies will be presented in this section, namely 
the PIN Medium, the Message Verifier, the Detector of Fake or Compromised 
Terminals, and the Tool with Multimodal Authentication. The Supercard can work in 
different applications and meet different security requirements, 
One simulation image of the Supercard scheme is referred to in Figure 14. 
The keypad and the display on the card are deployed vertically to make it easier to 
hold. The fingers and palm can be used as a privacy shield to break the view line of 
other people. 
Figure 14: The embodiment of the Supercard 
3.4.1 Case Study: PIN Medium 
This case is envisaged to show the ability of using the Supercard to replace the 
conventional method of PIN inputting through the terminal PIN pad. The scenario is 
as follows : before the transaction occurs, the cardholder can input the PIN through the 
keypad on the Supercard in any place he/she feels safe; in turn, the PIN will be 
59 
encrypted and temporarily kept in the card. As additional security measures against 
PIN disclosure in a stolen Supercard, after the PIN is inputted and activated, if the 
PIN data is not read by the POS terminal, it will be deleted automatically in a 
predetermined time (e.g. 20 minutes). After the user brings the Supercard to the POS 
terminal location and inserts the card into the terminal, the encrypted PIN can be sent 
out for authentication [22][23]. 
This method can solve several fundamental security challenges in the 
traditional POS terminal. First, it can avoid the inputting of the PIN on a fixed POS 
device being observed or recorded by a camera of adversary. This is a traditional 
security issue but one that is but very difficult to solve. The feature of mobility of the 
Supercard scheme enables the cardholder to input hislher PIN on the Supercard in a 
safer and private space other than the fixed payment machine location. Secondly, 
since the keypad and the crypto unit are located together in the Supercard scheme, the 
connection cable between them is very short and protected by the very slim body of 
the Supercard «0,8mm). It can prevent most P~ attacks, which normally can 
happen on a traditional POS PIN pad. Thirdly, the Supercard is normally always in 
the possession of the cardholder, so the cardholder will be aware of physical attacks 
on his card. Thus, to some extent, the Supercard is also a tamper-evidence device in 
this case. 
Another big advantage of this proposed approach is that it can be implemented 
into a current POS system by modifying the authentication protocol and some 
software. All current POS terminals can still be used. 
3.4.2 Case Study: Message Verifier 
In a POS terminal, all messages shown on the display must be strictly 
examined and controlled, especially messages such as PIN prompt, transaction 
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amount, transaction results as these contain very sensitive information. Otherwise, 
the cardholder can be easily misled. For example, once the display of the POS device 
is compromised, the adversary can manipulate the message and give a message of 
"please input your PIN" at an unsecure stage, then he can record the PIN. 
Alternatively, the adversary can falsify the transaction amount, which is shown in the 
terminal display. 
Therefore, in a POS terminal, the display belongs to Important peripherals, 
which must be protected by hardware and software measures. The message contents 
are filtered and checked by the security unit. Although many efforts have been made 
regarding security design, as we explained in Section 2.2.1, such traditional protection 
measures are still not strong enough to defeat attackers. Display message protection 
is one of the weak points of terminal security. 
The Supercard can be used as a "verifier" to solve the difficulty of display 
message protection. One example is illustrated in Figure IS. Let us assume the 
display of the terminal is manipulated by an attacker. The attacker sets 28.S0EUR as 
the transaction amount. However, the display shows a fake message, e.g. "S.21EUR". 
The user will believe everything is normal and correspondingly give the PIN and 
confirm this transaction. Thus, this transaction will be done as 28.S0EUR instead of 
S.21EUR, and the user will be cheated. If similar scenarios take place with Supercard 
users, the Supercard will be able to check the real amount because the security unit in 
the Supercard will check and show the messag~ on the card display as "28.S0EUR". 
Once the user sees the different messages (for example, the terminal display shows 
"S.21EUR" but the Supercard display shows 28.S0EUR), he/she will not continue this 
transaction. 
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Meanwhile, once the Supercard has detected that the communicating tenninal 
was compromised, it will show a warning message on the card display to suggest that 
the user stops the transaction. 
Figure 15: Message verifier and how it adapts to different insertions 
3.4.3 Case Study: Detector of Fake or Compromised POS 
Terminals 
There is one type of replacement attack on POS terminals, and it is called a 
fake terminal. This means that the adversary can build a fake device, which looks like 
a POS terminal, and put it in some locations. The display shows something like 
"Welcome to use card payment". After the cardholder inserts the card, the display 
will show "please input your PIN" etc. Since this terminal is actually fully under the 
control of the adversary, the inputted PIN or other infonnation of the card can be 
stolen. Similar scenarios can also happen to compromised POS terminals. 
Building such fake terminals does not require high technology and deep 
understanding of security technologies. Many common adversaries can build them 
with low costs. However, so far there are no effective technical measures to prevent 
such attacks. The card issuers or banks can only give warnings such as "do not use 
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your card on unsecured terminals". However, the cardholders cannot distinguish 
whether this terminal is a fake one. 
The Supercard scheme can address this security vulnerability. Because the 
Supercard has its own crypto unit, it can authenticate the legitimacy of the POS 
terminal that the Supercard is inserted into. As illustrated in Figure 15, once the 
Supercard has determined a fake terminal, it gives a warning message on its display 
immediately. The cardholder cannot be fooled any longer and he can report the 
incident to the police. So far, we believe this is the most effective action against fake 
terminal attacks or other hardware replacement attacks. 
3.4.4 Case Study: Tool with Multimodal Authentication Enhanced 
with Biometrics 
Security systems can be categorised by factors or the number of different ways 
that a user is authenticated before being allowed access. As a well-known principle in 
security, two-factor security relies on something you alone have (e.g. a card) and 
~ 
something you alone know (e.g. a PIN), which is more secure than just one factor. 
You already use it when you get cash from an ATM machine, where the combination 
of the bankcard and your PIN identifies you in two ways. Security companies are also 
keen to promote an even more secure system known as three-factor security, which 
includes biometric identification to check something related to who you are, alongside 
what you have and know. 
Actually, different applications request different authentication levels. For 
example, in payment application of a car parking fee, which typically amounts to 
several Euros, fingerprint verification is sufficient. In the case of payment for a 
€1000 computer, the fingerprint and the PIN need to be verified together. 
63 
In the Supercard scheme, keypad and fingerprint sensors are embedded 
together. Furthermore, a multi-biometrics authentication can be conducted in the 
Supercard scheme. Moreover, the fingerprint and the keystroke pattern (how the 
cardholder inputs the PIN) can also be authenticated as a behaviour biometrics factor. 
This is known as keystroke dynamics. There are many combination possibilities: 
fingerprint alone, PIN alone, fingerprint and PIN, PIN and keystroke dynamic, etc. 
Details will be investigated in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
The typical scenario for fingerprint verification is: during the transaction, the 
cardholder swipes the finger through the sensor, which is embedded in the Supercard. 
In turn, the fingerprint can be processed and authenticated directly inside the 
Supercard. Alternatively, depending on the implemented CPU and memory in the 
Supercard, if such hardware sources are limited, the fingerprint can be temporarily 
kept in the card. The encrypted fingerprint information can be sent out to the card 
reader or the remote server for minutiae extraction. The details will be encrypted 
again and sent back to the Supercard for authentication. 
The Supercard authentication protocol can be described as Table 3-1. The 
Supercard issues a fresh nonce Nsc and sends the certificate for server authentication. 
The server sends back the agreed session key. The server can' extract a fingerprint 
template, Template/ive' from the received image before sending it to the Supercard for 
match. The keys Ksv and Ksv -\ are the public key and private key of the remote 
server respectively. 
Table 3-1: The proposed Supercard authentication protocol 
Supercard ~ Server: {N sc, Certificate $V }K sv 
Server ~ Supercard: 
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Supercard ~ Server: ~ N sc. Fingerprintimage I}Ksess 
Server ~ Supercard: ~Hash(Templatelive I}Ksess 
Supercard ~ Server: Accept / Deny 
3.5 Selection of Cryptography Algorithms 
Cryptography is the base of POS security. The objective in this section is to 
identify cryptography algorithms, which are more suitable for the Supercard scheme. 
In Section 3.3, we have briefly described the authentication involved with 
encryption/decryption. Currently, two cryptography algorithms are widely used in 
POS terminals. RSA is used as an asymmetric algorithm and DES as a symmetric 
algorithm for encryption/decryption. However, they are gradually beco~ing less able 
to meet today's security challenges. In this section, we investigate the cryptographies 
of ECC and AES, which could be more suitable for the Supercard scheme: First, we 
provide some background information on these two cryptography ~gorithms, and 
later a comparison will be conducted. 
3.5.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
Let p be a prime number, and let F p denote the field of integers modulo p. An 
elliptic curve E over F p is defined by an equation of the form 
(3-1) 
where a,b E Fp satify 4a3 + 27b 2 lJ1!;O (mod p). A pair (x,y), where x,y E Fp, is a point 
on the curve if (x, y) satisfies the equation (3-1). The point at infinity, denoted by 00, 
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is also said to be on the curve [65]. The set of all the points on E is denoted by E(Fp). 
Figure 16 shows two examples of elliptic curves [76]. 
The assumed difficulty of several problems related to the discrete logarithm in 
the subgroup of E(Fp) allows cryptographic use of elliptic curves [77]. Most of the 
elliptic curve cryptographic schemes are related to the discrete logarithm schemes, 
which were originally formulated for the usual modular arithmetic. The most popular 
is the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement scheme which is ba~ed 
on the Diffie-Hellman scheme. ECDH is a key agreement protocol that allows two 
parties, each having an elliptic curve public-private key pair, to establish a shared 
secret over an insecure channel. 
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The key pair of elliptic curve cryptography can be generated as following. Let 
P be a point in E(Fp), and suppose the P has prime order n. Then the cyclic subgroup 
of E(Fp) generated by Pis 
< P >= {ex:>, P,2P,3P, ... , (n -1)P } (3-2) 
A private key is a integer d that is selected uniformly at random from the 
interval [1, n -1], and the corresponding public key is Q = dP . 
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The elliptic curve encryption scheme can be briefly presented as following 
[65]. A plaintext m is first represented as a point M, and then encrypted by adding it 
to kQ where k is a randomly selected integer, and Q is the intended recipient's public 
key. The sender transmits the points CI=kp and C2=M+kQ to the recipient who use 
her private key d to compute 
dCI=d~P)=k(dP)=kQ (3-3) 
and thereafter recovers M=C2-kQ. 
Table 3-2: Algorithms of elliptic curve encryption and decryption 
Encryption Decryption 
Input: Elliptic curve domain parameters Input: Domain parameters (p, E, P,n), 
(p, E, P,n), publick key Q, plaintext m. private key d, ciphertext (C I, C 2). 
Output: Ciphertext (Cl. C2). Output: Plaintext m. 
1. Represent the message m as a 1. Compute M=C2-dCI. 
point Min E(Fp). 2. Extract m from M 
2. Select k ER [1,n-lJ 3. Return (m) 
~ 
3. C]=kP, C2=M+kQ. 
~ 
4. Return (C], ClY. 
3.5.2 AES Cryptography 
Each AES cipher has a 128-bit block size, with key sizes of 128, 192 and 256 
. bits, respectively. Considering the limitation of the computer power in the Supercard, 
we will only take the key sizes of 128 bits in our system [122]. 
The AES algorithm is divided into four different phases, namely SubBytes, 
ShiftRow, MixColumn and AddRoundKey, which are executed in a sequential way 
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forming rounds. The encryption is achieved by passing the plain text through an 
initial round, nine equal rounds and a final round. In all the phases of each round, the 
algorithm operates on a 4 x4 array of bytes (called the State). In Figure 17 we can see 
the structure of this algorithm [78] . 
r 
Figure 17: Structure of the AES algorithm 
The first is a SubBytes process. The inputted plaintext will be separated into 
128 bytes segments, each segment is arranged in a rectangular array known as a State. 
The SubBytes transformation is a non-linear byte substitution that operates 
independently on each byte of the State using a substitution-predefined table known 
as an S-box. The S-box is constructed by composing two transformations. First, take 
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the multiplicative inverse in the finite field GF(28), and the element {~O} is mapped to 
itself. Then, apply the following affine transformation over GF(2) [122]: 
bj = bj E9 b(j+4) mod 8 E9 b(j+S)mod8 E9 b(i+6)mod8 E9 b(j+7)mod8 E9 Cj (3-4) 
For 0 ~ i < 8, where bj is the i1h bit of the byte b, and Cj is the i1h bit of a 
byte C with the value {01100011}. Here and elsewhere, a prime on a variable 
indicates that the variable is to be updated with the value on the right. 
In matrix form, the affine transformation element of the S-box can be 
expressed as [78]: 
b' 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 bo 1 
b' I 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 bI 1 
b' 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 b2 0 
b' 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 b3 0 3 
= + (3-5) b' 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 b4 0 4 
b' 5 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 bs 1 
b' 6 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 b6 1 
b' 7 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 b7 0 
In the ShiftRows transformation, the bytes in the last three rows of the 
State are cyclically shifted over different numbers of bytes (offs.ets). The first row, r 
= 0, is not shifted. Specifically, the ShiftRows transformation proceeds as follows: 
Sr.c = Sr(c+shift(r.Nb»)modNb I for 0 < r < 4 and 0 ~ C < Nb, (3-6) 
Where the shift value shift(r, Nb) depends on the row number, r, as follows 
(recall that Nb=4): shift(1 ,4)=1; shift(2,4)=2; shift(3,4)=3. 
The MixColumns transformation operates on the State column by column, 
treating each column as a four-term polynomial. The columns are considered as 
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polynomials over GF(28) and multiplied modulo r + 1 with a fixed polynomial a(x), 
given by: 
a(x) = {03}x3 + {01}x2 + {02} (3-7) 
This can be written as a matrix multiplication. Let s'(x) = a(x) ® s(x): 
, 
S o,e 02 03 01 01 so,e 
, 01 02 03 01 sl,e S I,e 
for·O ~ c < Nb = (3-8) , 01 01 02 03 s2,e S 2,e 
, 
S 3,e 03 01 01 02 s3,e 
Because of this multiplication, the four bytes in a column are replaced by the 
following: 
s'o,e = ({02}. so,e> E9 ({03}. sl,e) E9 s2,e E9 s3,e 
s\,e = sO,e E9 ({02}. Sl,e> E9 ({03}. S 2,e) E9 s3,e 
s'2e=SOe ESSie ES({02}.S2JES({03}.s ) 
, " , 3.c 
S'3,e = ({03}. So,e) ES Sl,e E9 S2,e E9 ({02}. S3,e) (3-9) 
In the AddRound transformation, a Round Key is added to the State by a 
simple bitwise XOR operation. Each Round Key consists of Nb words from the key 
p 
schedule. Those Nb words are each added into the columns of the State, such that 
where [Wi] are the key schedule words and round is a value in the range 
O~ round ~ Nr. In the Cipher, the initial Round Key addition occurs when round = 0, 
prior to the first application of the round function. The application of the 
AddRoundKey transformation to the Nr rounds of the Cipher occurs when 1~ round 
~Nr [122] . 
For the key length of 128 bits, 10 rounds need to be done andeach round uses 
a different key, which is expanded. The final round does not include the MixColumns. 
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3.5.3 Algorithm Comparison 
Compared with RSA and Triple-DES algorithms, the ECC and AES 
algorithms have advanced features, which can be outlined as below. 
• Less Memory and space requirement. 
Both ECC and AES have advantages in terms of resource requirements. The 
ECDLP (elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem) algorithm, of ECC leads to a very 
strong security with relatively small keys. When the key becomes smaller, the 
memory needed to store the keys is smaller. 
An RSA chip designed to do modular multiplication of 512-bit numbers has 
about 50,000 transistors, while a chip designed to perform arithmetic has about 
100,000 transistors [34]. With the current technology, these devices are too large to 
be placed on a smart card. By comparison, a chip designed to do arithmetic in F2m 
(the basement of ECC), where m is about 200, would have less than 15,000 transistors, 
and would occupy about 15% of the 25 mm2 area assigned for the processor. Another 
advantage to be gained by using elliptic curves is that each user may select a different 
" curve E, even though all users use the same underlying field K [106]. Table 3-1 is 
-
from Certicom [107], and compares the size of the system parameters and selected 
key pairs for the different systems. 
Table 3-3: Space requirement of RSA and ECC key 
$~It:m pam~eL'5 tlbit1l!lJ Pullll.k by JlbiltlsJ Pri,:alti£' ~r ~mftilB) 
l024-bilt RSA mila ltf.~ 2M8 
1.6D .. lbit EOC 4il 1161 1.1i@ 
• Higher Security Level 
ECC is becoming more popular because of the reduced number of key bits 
required in comparison to other cryptosystems (for example, a 160-bit ECC has 
roughly the same security strength as 1024 bit RSA). Meanwhile the AES uses 
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128/192/256 bits keys, so it is much harder to crack than its predecessor DES that is 
only 56 bits. Table 3-2 compares the different key size in RSA and ECC. 
Table 3-4: Key size: Equivalent strength comparison 
Tiuue !to bre.ak RSA keysme ECC key sire RSA,flECC key 
tin. ltUPS YE"'4J:S} ~iu biilts) iin. biits) sire ratio 
U.4 5B2 100 5: 1 
IO'S 168 132 6: 1 
1011 UJ24 100·· 1: 1 
lO!IiJ 2{}418 2110 10 : 1 
10:r-8 210(j){) rOOO 35: 1 
• Lower Computing Processing Required 
ECC reduces the processing times very much because of the nature of actual 
computations (especially in the case ofGF(2k) where there are no modular operations). 
Other systems normally need a dedicated crypto coprocessor to do the computations. 
The coprocessor has the problem of increasing both the area and the cost. In the case . 
of ECC, the algorithm can be implemented in the available CPU with no additional 
hardware. 
Therefore, we decided to use ECC and AES cryptographies in the Supercard 
applications. In the applications, as illustrated in Figure 18 [107], ECC is used as the 
key agreement between the Supercard and remote server through the communication 
model of the POS terminal, or it is used in the key generation. AES is employed as 
the symmetric key cryptography for fast secure data communication, after the key is 
determined by the ECC. 
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POS Terminal 
Remote Server 
Supercard 
r---' __ -'-------,Key Agreement --ECC 
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Data transf r-- AES I RAM I 
Figure 18: ECC and AES cryptography in the Supercard 
3.6 Approaches to Protect the Key Unit 
As identified in Chapter 2, the hardware design of a tamper-proof key store 
unit is the weakness of the current POS terminal. The key is the most sensitive 
information in cryptography. The Supercard scheme presented in this chapter mainly 
protects against peripheral attacks and PIN disclosure. In order to enable the mutual 
authentication between the POS terminal and the Supercard, the POS terminal still 
needs a crypto-unit to conduct the encryption and decryption. That means the crypto-
key store unit in the traditional POS terminal still needs to be protected, even in the 
Supercard scheme. As investigated in Section 2.3, most critical problems arise from 
the weak design of the tamperproof store unit of encryption keys. Differing from the 
common current countermeasures, which have been investigated in Section 2.3.2, in 
this section, we suggest several practical methods on how to improve the security of 
key store units from a hardware point of view. 
3.6.1 Security Chips Built with BGA Package 
More and more large-scale integrated circuits use the BGA (Ball Grid Array) 
package. Unlike common IC packages such as SOP (Small Outline Package) and 
QFP (Quad Flat Package) where pins are deployed along the chip boundaries only, 
BGA packages layout the pins in a grid format on the back of the package. The BGA 
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package can be made with a large number of high-density pins, thus it offers dramatic 
board area savings. 
Figure 19: JlIustration of a DGA package 
We suggest applying the concept of BGA to protect the crypto-processor and 
key unit. For security applications, the more interesting BGA feature is that some 
security-sensitive pins can be "hidden" in the central area under the chip (refer to 
Figure 20). The crypto-processor and the key unit are integrated together and 
encapsulated into one BGA package. In the package, one protective layer can be built 
by utilising some available semiconductor technologies. The most security-sensitive 
pins are deployed in the central area. Meanwhile, in the multiple-layer printed circuit 
board side, a protective layer (detective mesh as described in S~ction 2.3.2) is 
integrated to protect penetration from beneath. All security-sensitive lines are 
deployed under the PCB protective layer. Finally, after the BGA package is soldered 
with the top side of PCB, the security sensitive pins and lines become very difficult to 
access from outside. Thus, many intrusive attacks on key disclosure can be prevented 
by this scheme. 
74 
BGA 
package 
Protective <':oncot; •. /O pins are hidden in middle 
Figure 20: The suggested BGA-based security package 
3.6.2 Ceramic-based Tamperproof Package 
The construction of a suitable security package to protect sensitive data is a 
long-term expectation in the security device industry. In 1996, Clark [28] also 
explicitly emphasised the necessity for new security package research and this was his 
major conclusion after his security survey. The explosive growth ofPOS schemes has 
led to research in the area of low-cost tamper resistant modules but with high security. 
Either the unit cost is so low that the secure components can be thrown away if they 
fail, or the tamper resistant mechanisms are reusable, allowing their return to the 
factory for maintenance. Unfortunately, so far there is still no breakthrough in this 
field. The research on a new electromechanical tamperproof package is still quite a 
meaningful job. 
The security of the core unit can be improved by putting all high security 
components into one chip (an all-in-one solution) and protecting this chip by using the 
latest microelectronic technologies, e.g. the BGA package, as presented in the last 
section. However, from another side, the one-chip solution means inevitably losing 
much flexibility. It can be hard to synchronise with ever-evolving security 
requirements as well as various customer demands. The huge R&D cost of the large 
ASIC is not affordable for small terminal providers. 
In the current POS design (refer to Se~tion 2.3.2), usually the epoxy resin is 
used to fill in the security package. This epoxy method has big disadvantages: first, 
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the manufacturing procedures are irreversible; after resin is filled into the core 
security unit, even terminal manufacturers themselves cannot open it again for 
inspection or repair. Second, the labour cost in the corresponding manufacture 
procedures is expensive. Third, this solution is not very secure [28]. This type of 
package cannot stand X-ray, electromagnetic attack, and the epoxy resin can be 
melted or removed by some chemical methods or advanced tools. 
To address the challenges of the security package, here we propose a ceramic-
based solution (refer to Figure 21). The package is made of high-purity 99.8% 
aluminium oxide ceramic. The inner surface of the package is fully printed with 
electric conductive wires. The wires constitute a protection mesh. Once one wire is 
broken, the alarm system will be triggered. The ceramic has features of high hardness, 
fragility and electric isolation. It can stand many physical and chemical attack 
methods. 
Compared with the current resin-filled solution, this proposed ceramic package 
has many advantages: 1) It is more difficult to attack. 2) It is reusable. Since no resin 
filling is required, the ceramic package can be removed by the manufacturer to repair 
some security components. 3) It is cost-effective. Assembling the ceramic package 
on a printed circuit board is easier than assembling a traditional one. 
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Figure 21: Ceramic-based tamperproofpackage 
3.6.3 The Potential Electromagnetic Vulnerability 
In this section, we want to introduce a concern about the potential for high-
intensive electromagnetic attacks. As discussed in Section 2.2., the electromagnetic 
radiation of a security system can be measured by an attack to disclose security 
information. Actually, the electromagnetic radiation is a question with a dual 
character. On the one hand, electronic devices will emit electromagnetic radiation to 
the outside; on the other hand, the electronic devices are sensitiye to electromagnetic 
disturbances from outside, too. 
Radio Frequency Interference (RFI) can induce unwanted currents, which 
cause various disturbances. In addition, curre~t high-performance integrated circuits 
(Ies), such as microprocessors, have very small feature sizes and are clocked at 
fr~quencies well into the GHz range while operating at reduced voltage levels. 
Although this has improved the ability and performance of modem systems, it has 
also increased their susceptibility to RFI [42], Figure 22 shows an example. The 
transient spikes in the data input to the latch (the D signal in the diagram) are not 
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transmitted to the latch' s output. The latch's internal state and thus its output will be 
whatever data value is seen at the latch's input during the shaded window surrounding 
a rising clock edge. Setup and hold time violations cause the latch to become 
metastable, in which the latch's state becomes undefined for an undefined length of 
time [42]. 
Figure 22: Example of the CPU metastability caused by RFI 
Theoretically, this vulnerability can be utilised by the attacker to paralyse the 
security system by generating an extremely strong electromagnetic field, e.g. by the 
help of medical equipment such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging ,,(MRI). Under 
extreme electromagnetic conditions, the CPU and security program would not run 
properly, so the security alarm can be disabled. If this threat is true, it will be very 
dangerous to the whole security industry. 
To the author's knowledge, we are the first to explore these security concerns 
on payment security. No work has ever discussed this kind of attack, and it has not 
yet been specified in current terminal security requirements. Although we have not 
managed to prove this attack by experiments due to limitations to this research, we 
propose that some serious experiments and investigations need to be carried out on 
this issue. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
Many attacks to POS systems attempt to disclose PINs and keys. In this 
chapter, we have proposed a novel Supercard scheme to address threats on PIN and 
POS peripherals. By taking the advantages of encapsulating a PIN pad, display and 
fingerprint sensor into smart card, the sensitive information, e.g. PIN, fingerprint and 
prompt messages are acquired, transferred and processed in .securer channels. Thus, 
the Supercard offers a new platform for many security approaches. 
Four security approaches based on the Supercard scheme have been presented 
to defeat attacks tha~ exist in conventional POS terminals. They are the PIN Medium, 
Message Verifier, Detector of Fake Terminals, and Tool with Multimodal 
Authentication. The PIN Medium approach can prevent attacks of visual disclosure, 
non-intrusive attacks and intrusive attacks on PIN. The Message Verifier can defend 
against display manipulation attacks. The Detector of Fake Terminals can help the 
cardholder being cheated by a fake terminal. The Tool with Multimodal 
Authentication can offer a flexible platform of authentication to improve the overall 
security. 
To protect the crypto key unit thr~ugh hardware more effectively, two 
methods, namely the BOA package solution and ceramic-based tamperproof package 
solutions, are proposed as new approaches. The former solution exploits the 
semiconductor technology to encapsulate the crypto-processor and key unit into one-
chip, hide them and risk pins in the BOA package. Together with the currently 
available electronic detector circuits, the highly secure units and their pins become 
very difficult for adversaries to access. In cases where the crypto-processor and key 
unit cannot be integrated into one chip, the solution of a ceramic-based tamperproof 
package can be applied. It exploits the ceramic features of fragility, hardness and 
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electric isolation. With the protection of the printed protective mesh on the package, 
the secure units and their pins covered by the package become safer. 
The electromagnetic attack has been discovered as a potential vulnerability for 
security devices. We argued that threats exist if the security unit can be paralysed by 
the generation of an extremely strong electromagnetic field. The modem security 
CPU works in high GHz frequencies, and when operated at reduced voltage levels, 
their susceptibility to radio frequency interference is increased. Once the CPU stops 
working because of the strong magnetic interference generated by the adversary, it 
will not be able to detect normal access attacks and the security system will be 
subverted. 
On the subject of cryptography algorithms, we argued that the ECC and AES 
cryptography algorithms are more suitable than RSA and DES. The comparison 
study indicated that the ECC and AES algorithms use less memory. They have higher 
security levels at the equivalent key length and require a less complex computing 
process. 
To further study the Supercard, in the following chapters the channels in the 
Supercard will be investigated. The fingerprint biometric channel will be detailed in 
Chapter 4. The PIN pad channel and keystroke dynamics channel will ~e studied 
together in Chapter 5. The information fusion based on fuzzy logic will be studied in 
Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 4. Fingerprint for the Supercard 
In this chapter, the Supercard scheme will be further investigated, focusing on 
fingerprint biometrics and their feature extraction for security identification. 
Biometrics is increasingly integrated into POS systems. Biometrics refers to 
the automatic identification or verification of living persons using their enduring 
physical or behavioural characteristics. Biometric personal authentication uses data 
taken from measurements of a person's body, such as fingerprints, faces, irises, retinal 
patterns, palm prints, voice, signature, DNA, and so on [8]. Biometric systems also 
introduce an aspect of user convenience that may not be possible using traditional 
security techniques. For instance, in the PIN authentication method, the user might 
forget the password, requiring the system administrator to intervene and reset the 
password for that user. A Meta Group study reports that a password-related help desk 
call may cost as much as $30 in terms of support staff time and money [97]. 
Maintaining, recollecting, and remembering passwords can be a tedious and 
• 
expensive task in such a PIN-based system. By comparison, biometrics has features 
of "not be lost or forgotten, unique". It is widely used in security or devices that 
require privacy. 
In a Supercard, one fingerprint sensor is embedded which enables it to capture 
and process the fingerprint data inside of the card (see Figure 12). In the following 
section, we present more specifically how to integrate the fingerprint into the 
Supercard, i.e. the fingerprint channel into the Supercard. 
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4.1 Background 
As shown in Table 4-1, different biometric technology has its advantages and 
weaknesses [98]. For instance, retina scanning requires a laser to be shone onto the 
back of the eyes and the unique characteristics of the retina are measured. The retina 
is an extremely stable form of biometrics because it is 'hidden' and not subject to 
wear. The system is hard to fool because the retina is not visible and cannot be faked 
easily. However, it is a potential risk to health and the invasive nature is unattractive 
to customers. Face recognition is a quite natural method, but in practice, it is strongly 
affected by lighting, pose and expression. It also needs high computation power and 
the embedded system cannot meet this requirement. Therefore, thinking 
comprehensively based on the factors of accuracy, cost, convenience and marketing, 
fingerprint is convenient, proven, miniaturised and inexpensive, and it has the best 
potential for a mass-market authentication schema. Figure 23 is a POS terminal with 
a fingerprint sensor. 
Table 4-1: Comparison of common biometrics 
Type Merits Weakness 
Iris High accuracy, Large and expensive 
hard to fool equipment 
Face Non-invasive, no Low accurateness, 
physical interaction affected by lighting 
with sensor needed & face position 
Finger- Convenient, well- Accuracy depends 
print developed, on fingerprint 
inexpensive, high quality, 
potential for Finger subject to 
miniaturization wear 
Voice N on-invasive and Subject to wide 
natural variation, hard to 
detect recorded 
voice 
Retina Stable, hard to fool Invasive, not well 
tested, expensive 
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Figure 23: POS terminal with fingerprint 
The biometrics verification may be formally posed as follows: given an input 
feature vector XQ and a claimed identity I, determine if (L XQ) belongs to co, and {j)2' 
where (j), indicates that the claim is true (a genuine user) and co2 indicates that the 
claim is false (an impostor). Typically, XQ is matched against XI, the biometric 
template corresponding to user I, to determine its category. Thus, 
(4-1) 
where S is the function that measures the similarity between XQ and XI , and 1] 
is a predefined threshold. Therefore, every claimed identification is classified as co, 
and co2 based on the variables XQ, L XI and 1], and the function S. 
In a typical biometrics-based personal authentication, fingerprint 
authentication uses a four-step process including capture, extraction, comparison and 
matching [99]. The pre-stored minutiae for matching during an enrolment are also 
called the template. Two techniques are used to decide if the verification data really 
corresponds with the reference data. One is based on minutiae matching (local details) 
and the other is based on pattern matching (global structure). Minutiae matching is 
more commonly used. Figure 24 illustrates how to extract fingerprint minutiae. 
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Figure 24: Fingerprint minutiae extraction 
There are two common ways to implement a biometric system according to the 
different places of storing templates and matching: online and offline. Online means 
the fingerprint templates are stored and matched in a centralised server computer. 
This solution has advantages in terms of management and rapid system update; 
however, a stable communication is always needed and it will increase the cost and 
slow down the transaction. Offline means the authentication can be done locally 
because the template is stored and matching is finished locally. This solution can 
verify identity without complex communication infrastructures and can cut costs. It is 
especially important in mobile application and at sites away from the communication 
line. The vital question for offline solutions is how to store the template securely. A 
smart card can be an ideal solution to address these questions. It can operate both 
online and offline. 
The smart card has the capability to record and modify information in its own 
non-volatile memory and the security data can be well protected or 'hidden' by the 
operating system and hardware. These features make the smart card a powerful and 
practical tool against unauthorised data access and copy [1][3]. More and more 
technologies are integrated with the smart card. The PKI (public key infrastructure) 
has reinforced the smart card's security and makes the smart card an ideal place to 
carry varying degrees of sensitive information. In the past few years, biometric and 
smart card technology has been combined together in some applications [100]. As 
illustrated in Figure 25, a terminal with a fingerprint sensor captures the fingerprint 
84 
and extracts the minutiae, and then the extracted minutiae are sent to the smart card to 
match with the stored fingerprint templates in the smart card. The process is called 
match-on-card (MOC) and the card is called a biometric card [101]. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: the principle of fingerprint 
verification is described in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 analyses the general security of 
the fingerprint authentication system, namely attacks and countermeasures. Sections 
4.3,4.4 and 4.5 describes the proposed system, including architecture, protocol and an 
adaptive decision algorithm. Section 4.7 is a conclusion and future work description. 
I~H;::~~I·~ 
II I SIDr8d .11pIdas 
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Figure 25: Diagram of Match-oR-Card process 
Fingerprints are identified by their special fe&.tures such as ridge endings, ridge 
bifurcation, short ridges, and ridge enclosures, which are collectively called the 
. 
minutiae. The fingerprint administrator uses the method of greyscale ridge tracing 
backed up by a validating procedure to extract the minutiae of fingerprints.. In a 
fingerprint, each minutia is represented by its location (x,y) and the local ridge 
direction ffJ. Figure 26 shows the attributes of a fingerprint's minutiae. The process 
of minutiae detection starts with finding a summit point on a ridge, and then continues 
by tracing the ridge until a minutia, which can be either a ridge ending or bifurcation, 
is encountered [103]. 
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Figure 26: A minutia's attributes 
The direction angle rp at point x mentioned above is computed as follows. A 
9x9 neighbourhood around x is used to determine the trend of grey level change. At 
each pixel u = (u"u2) in this neighbourhood, a gradient vector V(U) = (vt (u) , v2(u» 
is obtained by applying the operator h = (hph2) with 
(4-2) 
to the grey levels in a neighbourhood of u. That is, 
(4-3) 
y y 
where y runs over the eight neighbouring pixels around U and g(y) is the 
grey level of pixel y in the image. The angle rp represents the direction of the unit 
vector t that is orthogonal to all gradient vectors v. That is, t is chosen so that 
I(V,t)2 is minimised [103]. 
u 
The primary purpose of the fingerprint recognising system is to calculate the 
matching degree of the target fingerprint with the images in a database and to decide 
if it belongs to a particular individual. One method of calculating this matching 
degree is based on fuzzy evolutionary programming technique and can be described 
below [103]. 
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Consider two fingerprints that are represented by their sets of minutiae, 
1::;; i::;; m, 1::;; j::;; n. The principal task is to find a transformation F = (s,B,Iix,8y) 
that transforms the set of minutiae A into the set B . 
Here, s represents a scaling factor, () an angle of rotation, and (1ix,8y) a 
translation in the xy-plane. Thus, the transform F (p) = (x' , y' , a) is defined by: 
[
X'] cos () - sin () 0 [X] [Iix] 
y' = s sin () cos B ~ y + 8y 
a' 0 0 - a () 
s 
(4-4) 
Based on above transformation, the matching degree of two fingerprints can be 
determined. 
4.2 Security Study of Fingerprint System in POS 
Besides the performance issues, people have been concerned with the security 
of biometric systems since the very beginning. Our discussions here will focus on the 
fingerprint system and its applications in smart cards. 
4.2.1 Fingerprint System Security 
A generic biometric data-processing model is shown in Figure 27. Within this 
model, following the data process from sensor until application, we identify nine basic 
biometric attacks (Attack 1; . . . ; 9) that plague biometric-based authentication 
systems. For simplicity, the enrolment of the fingerprint template is not included, 
although that is quite an important link of the whole biometrics security system. 
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Figure 27: l\Iustration of biometric attacks 
Typically, Attack 1 can be an impersonation attack where the attacker uses a 
fake fingerprint to fool the sensor. Attacks 2, 4, 7 and 8 belong to channel attacks for 
which the attacker can use line taping, intercept the biometric data or use previous 
recorded signal to replay attacks. Besides these direct channel attacks, some 
advanced crypt-analytical techniques, so called side channel attacks, also pose serious 
threats to biometric systems, even to the channels that are encrypted. For instance, by 
analysing the power dissipation or the timing of encryptions in d~vice, encrypted 
information inside can be deduced [104]. Attacks 3, 5, 6 and 9 fall into the categories 
which attack the inside software or secure keys (if the cryptographic technology is 
employed for secure data transmission). Below, more details about attacks and 
countermeasures will be examined. 
A fake finger attack is a serious threat to biometric authentication systems, 
since this type of attack directly exploits the intrinsic weakness of biometrics: easy to 
capture and hard to revoke. When fingers touch an object, the chemicals in finger 
sweat may be absorbed into that object, the work in [15] being a good example. 
There are new chemicals which can restore the absorbed sweat quite nicely. 
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Afterwards, a fake finger can be made to fool the biometric system. With the ongoing 
development of technology, a latent fingerprint can be detected and captured easily 
and a very sophisticated fake finger can be made; for example, a fake print made from 
gelatine, which is low-cost, electrically quite like real flesh, can already fool many 
optical, capacitive pressure-based sensors [15]. 
Theoretically, each data transfer channel is susceptible to channel and side 
channel attacks if it is not well protected. The typical attacks can be a replay attack, 
resubmission of an old digitally stored biometric signal, or an electronic 
impersonation. More specifically, like in Attack 2, after the features have been 
captured by the sensor, if the sensor and the extractor hardware have a long and 
exposed channel (e.g. connected with cables), this captured data can be replaced with 
a different synthesised feature set. In Attack 4 the minutiae can be replaced. In 
Attack 7, the templates from the stored database, which are sent to the matcher, can be 
altered before they reach the matcher. In Attack 8, the final decision of the matching 
module can be overridden. 
From a software perspective, the compiled source code stored in the system is 
susceptible to de-compilation and reverse engineering, which means the program can 
be read and analysed. Therefore, if the security mechanism is merely based on some 
tricks in the program, it will be easily subverted by analysing the program and 
designing some actions to avoid triggering the security mechanism. If the adversary 
can install a Trojan horse into the biometric system, some information will be 
disclosed to the attacker, etc. 
4.2.2 Countermeasures for Biometric Attacks 
Based on the above threat analysis, some countermeasures can be taken to 
improve security. 
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A multi-modal sensor can be an effective way to prevent a fake finger attack. 
In a multi-modal sensor, for example, in addition to capturing a fingerprint, the 
warmth and pulse can also be detected. Like some advanced sensors, instead of 
taking a static picture of the surface of the finger, it reads the fingerprint from the live 
layer below the surface of the skin. This method ensures that the device will acquire 
the fingerprint despite varying skin moisture levels; abrasio~ of the fingerprint from 
harsh chemicals or friction like rubbing; and common contaminants such as lotion, 
grease, or smoke. This subsurface-imaging approach thereby eliminates the surface-
based recognition failures common with surface-imaging fingerprint sensors based on 
capacitive, thermal, optical, or pressure-sensing techniques. 
Several solutions can improve the system security. 1). As proposed in the. 
paper by Nalini et al. [80], "Image based challenge/response method", the matcher 
unit generates a pseudorandom challenge for the transaction and the sensor unit 
acquires a signal at this point of time and computes a response to the challenge based 
on the new biometric signal. 2). WSQ (Wavelet ~calar Quantization)-based data 
hiding. This uses data-hiding techniques to embed additional information directly in 
compressed fingerprint images to guard against replay attacks. 3). Cancellable 
biometrics. This refers to the intentional and systematically repeatable distortion of 
biometric features in order to protect sensitive user specific data [81]. The methods 
fall into two categories of biometric salting and non-invertible transforms. The 
transform can be down in a way of keyless in some cases. However, such measures 
can hardly meet high security requirements or reach high recognition accuracies. 
Fundamentally, if the hardware of storing the encryption key or biometric template is 
not secured, the whole system cannot reach a high security level. 
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To prevent the fingerprint template from being revealed and to ease the match 
at less computation costs, Jin et al. [82] proposed a Biohashing method. In this case, 
the biometric template is stored in a non-original format. Indeed, the template is built 
through an irreversible hash function known as Biohashing. Even if the adversary can 
get a Biohashing template, he cannot obtain the original biometric template. 
Biohashing methodology can be decomposed into two components: (a) an invariant 
and discriminative integral transform feature of the fingerprint data, with a moderate 
degree of offset tolerance. This would involve the use of an integrated wavelet and 
Fourier- Mellin transform framework (WFMT) as reported in Ref [82]. In this 
framework, the wavelet transform preserves the local edges and noise reduction in the 
low-frequency domain after the image decomposition, and hence makes the 
fingerprint images less sensitive to shape distortion. In addition to that, the reduced 
dimension of the images also helps to improve the computation efficiency. FMT 
produces a translation, rotation in plane and scale invariant feature. The linearity 
property of FMT enables mUltiple WFMT features to be used to form a reference 
invariant feature and hence reduce the variability of the input fingerprint images. (b) 
" 
A discretisation of the data via an inner-product of tokenised random number and user 
data. The Biohashing progress is depicted in Figure 28 [82] . 
... . . . . . . . ... .. --.•.• --.. II. 
Figure 28: Biohashing progress 
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Indeed, the essential protection is to seal as many of the system components as 
possible into a tamper-proof device, including the data transmission channels. If 
some channels cannot really be sealed, then cryptographic technology shall be 
employed to ensure data integrity and confidentiality. The security key must be very 
well protected. Following these philosophies, the combination of biometrics, PIN and 
smart card can be an attractive solution. 
4.3 The Biometric CMOC Scheme 
As an extension of the Supercard, which we proposed in last chapter, here we 
examine our proposed biometric CMOC scheme in the Supercard. Purely from a 
hardware point of view, compared to the Match-On-Card (MOC) solution, which is 
developed by previous researchers, the CMOC solution has a fingerprint sensor with a 
smart card body so that the fingerprint can be acquired directly from the Supercard. 
Meanwhile, a Biohashing template, as previously mentioned, is stored in the 
Supercard. The template is derived from the original biometric template with wavelet 
transformation and irreversible hash functions. Based on that, a specific securer 
authentication protocol will be detailed in Section 4.5. 
The benefits of this proposal are listed as follows: 
(1) It will increase the difficulty for attackers. In practice, attackers only need 
to install an electric bug or apparatus to the attacked object. A terminal machine (card 
reader) normally has a spacious plastic housing; which contains many PCBs, electric 
components, etc. The wires linking the system components to each other can become 
potentially passive or active penetration routes. It is not difficult to find a small space 
in the terminal for installing an electric bug inside. However, if the fingerprint sensor 
is integrated with the smart card, all these electric elements can be packed into one 
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very thin plastic package, or even be integrated into one single chip and interlinks can 
be hidden. 
(2) Distribute the security risk. The adversary can get far more potential 
benefits from compromising a terminal security system than compromising a single 
card. If the biometric sensor in a terminal is compromised, it will jeopardise all its 
users, thus distributing the sensor to the cards can distribute the risk. 
(3) Protect the privacy and increase the flexibility. Nowadays, the sensor is 
installed with the terminal machine. Although the terminal providers as well as the 
merchants declare that "we don' t take your fingerprint images - only features", it is 
hard to believe when the customers see their fingerprints scanned by the terminal. 
Meanwhile, if the card has a biometric sensor itself, it can improve the flexibility and 
customers can use and benefit from the potential advanced biometric technology 
everywhere. Meanwhile, the Biohashing template protects the privacy very well. An 
embodiment of the biometrics Supercard is illustrated in Figure 29. Later in this 
chapter, the envisioned architecture and procedures will be presented. 
Figure 29: Supercard with fingerprint swiping sensor 
For our system experiments, a swipe-type fingerprint sensor AES2510 from 
AuthenTec Inc has been selected, not only for its small size and low cost, but for 
security. It uses a radio frequency (RF) imaging technique that allows the sensor to 
generate an image of the shape of the live layer of the skin that is buried beneath the 
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surface of the finger. Thus, it can better prevent attacks like a gelatine fake finger. 
AuthenTec promised to offer a smaller and cheaper version of swipe fingerprint later. 
, .------------
• 
Figure 30: Architecture of biometric Supercard 
4.4 Architectural Description 
The structure of the biometric supercard system is illustrated in Figure 29. 
Theoretically, since the fingerprint sensor has been integrated with the Supercard, the 
whole process of fingerprint capture, feature extraction and matching can be done 
.' 
inside the card. This is the best option from a security point of view. However, 
because the normal embedded processor of the smart card, as well as the memory, can 
hardly fulfil the requirements of complex image processing, it will be more realistic to 
remove the tasks of fingerprint minutiae extraction to the POS terminal side, which 
normally has a more powerful cpu. The swipe fingerprint sensor reads the finger 
line by line, generates a challenge and sends the data to FIFO (first in, first out) via 
parallel or DMA (direct memory access) communication. The data in FIFO will be 
encrypted and directly sent out to the memory of the POS terminal. After the image 
capture is completed, the image data will be decrypted and the minutiae will be 
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extracted before it is sent back to the smart card for verification. In addition, the 
display in the Supercard can change the role of the smart card from a passive and 
'dumb' card to an active one, e.g., it can indicate some serious edicts to improve 
security as well as user convenience. 
4.5 Authentication Scheme and Protocol 
The whole authentication procedure and protocol are outlined as below in six 
steps: 
1. Fingerprint feature extraction and biohash template generation: 
jingerprintTempfate=lf/{ WFMT(fingerprint)} 
Here WFMT denotes Wavelet and Fourier-Mellin Transformation. 1[/ denotes the 
discretisation operation. Before the cardholder gets the Supercard, the card issuer will 
first store the fingerprint biohash template in the Supercard, together with the PIN 
template. 
2. Insert the card into the card reader to get power. For the best security, if the 
hardware configuration of the Supercard (e.g. CPU speed and memory size) is strong 
enough, after the fingerprint is captured by the Supercard sensor, the feature 
extraction and the live Biohashing fingerprint template can be computed in a similar 
way to step 1 by Fingerprintlive=lf/{ WFMT(fingerprint)}, and the process can skip the 
steps 3 to 5 and directly go to step 6. In this case, no signal needs to be sent out the 
premier of Supercard. 
Considering the cost and implementation limitations, if the hardware 
configuration of the Supercard itself is not strong enough, the card reader, which has 
better hardware resources, can be utilised to undertake the computation task of 
fingerprint feature extraction. The below steps will be needed. 
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3. Mutual authentication using PKI technology between the Supercard and the 
POS reader [73]. 
The authentication protocol between the Supercard and the POS reader will 
start. The Supercard will send a nonce N sc ' i.e. random data to the POS card reader. 
The random data Nsc can be used through the communication to prevent replay attack 
(as shown in Figure 31). The card issuer uses its issuer private key S[ to certify the 
card public key Pc, and saves the certified Pc in a readable area of the smart card. The 
card private key Sc and the fingerprint template are saved in the 'hidden' area in the 
smart card. Therefore, they cannot be copied or read out by an external card reader. 
The issuer public key p[ is distributed to the card reader. Therefore, the card 
reader can use p[to verify that the card's Pc was certified by the issuer, and use Pc to 
verify the digital signature of the card data. Therefore, in this way the terminal can 
confirm that the card is original and has not been modified. On the other hand, to 
determine whether the card reader is genuine, the card can check the certification of 
the card reader. In case the above mutual authentication fails, the application will be 
cancelled and both the card reader display and the card will indicate the error message, 
i.e. the display on the Supercard will show a warning message. This is an important 
feature because it can detect a fake terminal, which is made by an adversary to cheat 
the user. 
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Figure 31: Diagram of dynamic data authentication 
4 Session key generation 
A session key can be used as a secure key for the encrypted communication 
between the card and the reader (e.g. AES encryption). The session key derivation 
function in both the card and the reader, generates a unique session key Ks for each 
ICC application transaction as per the following method. The system fust generates 
unique Master Keys KM from the user's primary account number and an Issuer Master 
Key, and then Ks can be derived from KM, ATC (Application Transaction Counter) 
using diversification data R. 
" K M : = F (Primary Account Number, Issuer Master key) (4-5) 
Ks: = F (KM,ATC) [RJ (4-6) 
The session key will be used through the whole communication. The nonce, 
session key and PIN will be encrypted and sent to the POS terminal. 
(4-7) 
5 Fingerprint capture and Biohashing 
The fingerprint sensor reads the finger image. The mixed data are sent to 
FIFO, and after AES-encryption, using the session Ks, they are sent out to the 
memory of the card reader. After fingerprint reading is complete, the stored image 
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can be decrypted. The live biohashing fingerprint template can be computed in a 
similar way to step 1 by Fingerprintuve=fjI{ WFMT(fingerprint)} 
It can be encrypted and sent back to the card for authentication. 
Supercard -7POS reader: {IINsc,jingerprinll}KS 
POS reader-7 Supercard: {IINsc,jingerprin/ivell}Ks 
(4-8 ) 
(4-9 ) 
6. The Supercard decrypts the received fingerprint biohash and matches it with 
the stored template. 
jingerprint/ive =jingerprinttemplate? 
7. Match the acquired jingerprint/ive with the hidden fingerprint template 
jingerprinttemplate in the smart card and generate a similarity score. The final decision 
comes from an adaptive algorithm. The decision is encrypted and sent to the card 
reader. The result will be indicated both in the card reader display and in the 
Supercard display. This is a special measure because the conventional way is just to 
send it either to the card or the card reader. In this way, even if the attacker faked a 
result in the card reader and the card reader display shows that the operation is right, 
the LED on the smart card will start to flash and give a warning. 
4.6 System Evaluation 
The security features of the aforementioned CMOC system and the proposed 
protocol are evaluated and discussed as follows. 
1. Strength of protection on the biometric template. In traditional schemes, 
the user's biometric template is directly stored into smart cards, thus they 
may be obtained by the adversary under attacks [69]. In our scheme, a 
biohash fingerprint template instead 9f the normal fingerprint template is 
stored in the Supercard. Even if the biohash template is revealed, the 
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adversary cannot obtain the real fingerprint due to the irreversibility of the 
biohash algorithm. In addition, the revealed biohash cannot be used in 
other biometric applications, because of the different applications which 
usually have different biohashes. Furthermore, by re-registering the 
Supercard, the user can generate a new biohash to cancel the revealed one 
easily. 
2. Channel attack resistance, guessing attack resistance and denial-of-service 
attack resistance. In Table 4-2 we have compared our solutions with 
previous schemes, which were proposed by other researchers of smart card 
security. 
Table 4-2: Security comparison of smartcard-based schemes 
Khan Our Scheme 
Channel attack no no Yes Sensor is integrated as 
resistance an internal component 
Session key no no Yes Each session has a 
unique key for AES 
Mutual Yes no Yes Before the seSSlOn 
authentication starts 
DoS attack Yes yes Yes Authentication IS 
resistance carried inside of card 
4.7· Conclusion 
Fingerprints and their features have been used as biometrics which can be 
integrated and which reinforce our Supercard solution. One of the main merits of our 
CMOC biometric Supercard is that the fingerprint image data can be transferred and 
processed insiqe of the closed secure channel and places of Supercard. 
The new authentication protocol has been developed by me in this chapter 
correspondingly. Compared to traditional biometric authentication in the remote 
server or "Match-on-Card", we do not need to store any fingerprint image in the 
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remote server nor in the smart card. Instead, we store a biohash template in the 
Supercard and the authentication is carried out inside of the Supercard between two 
biohash data. This solution has not only enhanced security and distributed the risks, 
but also shortened the time of authentication. Meanwhile, our protocol is a practical 
protocol and it has considered the potential limitations of card hardware configuration. 
The feature extraction is designed to be done securely insi~e of the POS terminal, 
which normally has a more powerful processor. 
Most of the smart-card-based schemes excessively depend on the tamper 
resistance of smart cards, so in these schemes biometric templates or passwords' hash 
values are stored directly onto smart cards, regardless of the information extracting 
attacks [68] on smart cards. Our scheme has remedied these security pitfalls. Since 
the fingerprint sensor is integrated in the Supercard, thus there is no space for an 
adversary to install electronic bugs to intercept data. It can effectively prevent the 
typical channel attacks and side channel attacks, guessing attacks and Dos attacks. 
The conducted system evaluation and security analy~is support the advantages of our 
scheme. 
100 
Chapter 5. Keystroke Dynamics to Strengthen PIN 
Authentication 
This chapter studies the feasibility and merits of adapting keystroke dynamics 
as behaviour biometrics to improve the hardness of PIN security. 
5.1 PIN Authentication 
A standard PIN pad layout of a POS terminal is illustrated in Figure 32 [73]. 
The PIN pad comprises the numeric and 'Enter ' and ' Cancel' command keys. If 
necessary, the command key for ' Clear' may also be present. The numeric layout of 
the PIN pad shall comply with ISO 9564. The key for ' 5' shall have a tactile 
identifier (for example, a notch or raised dot) to indicate to those whose sight is 
impaired that this is the central key from which all others can be deduced. 
The method of traditional PIN authentication is simple. The PIN is inputted 
through a keypad and then it is encrypted in the crypto-unit of the PIN pad. The 
encrypted PIN will be sent out to the remove server for authentication. In other words, 
before the PIN is encrypted, it is in plaintext and prone to being attacked. 
Q] 2 I~] 
[!] , 5 6 
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Figure 32: Standard POS terminal layout 
101 
The PIN authentication is stable but prone to being disclosed and forgotten; 
the biometric authentication is not forgettable but is sensitive to impostor attacks and 
is unable to reach a perfect recognition rate. If a hybrid system and an adaptive 
algorithm can be built based on the biometric and PIN fusion, a better trade-off can be 
reached between security and convenience. As illustrated in Figure 33, a high-level 
security system needs to be based on three factors: token factor (e.g. a card), 
knowledge factor (e.g. PIN) and features factor (e.g. a fingerprint or keystroke 
pattern). There is no possibility of replacing one with another entirely. Theoretically, 
even a perfect biometrics system can also not completely replace the knowledge-
based authentication method, e.g. PIN. Therefore, it is foreseen that biometrics 
cannot replace the PIN authentication completely in the short or medium term. A 
realistic solution can be to combine different authentication methods or to reinforce 
the PIN by biometrics. 
Figure 33: Three factors of a high-security system: token, knowledge and feature 
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The multimodal authentication decision system can strengthen the traditional 
PIN method and offer a flexible solution. For example, for a high value payment, 
100% PIN correspondence and high commensurate numbers of features of fingerprint 
are required. For a lower value payment, if specific numbers of fingerprint features 
have been commensurate, the payment can be done. This has the practical effect of 
reducing the number of legitimate users coming back to th~. bank asking for service 
because their cards are locked due to wrong input of the PIN more often than the 
allowed amount of times. Decreasing the possibilities of such accidents can save 
management cost for banks. 
5.2 Keystroke Dynamics 
Keystroke pattern is one type of behaviour biometric that identifies an 
individual based on their unique typing rhythm. The premise behind keystroke 
pattern is that each individual exhibits a distinctive pattern and cadence of typing. As 
early as 1980, researchers have been studying the use of habitual patterns in a user's 
-typing behaviour for identification. Gaines et al. investigated the possibility of using 
keystroke timings for authentication [117]. Later, more studies were done. Keystroke 
pattern is known by a few different names: keyboard dynamics, keystroke analysis, 
typing biometrics and typing rhythms [118][119]. 
Most studies have used durations between keystrokes (latencies) as features 
for user verification, but some have also used keystroke durations (the time a key is 
held down) [120], as shown in Figure 34 and Figure 35. The classification methods 
used include traditional statistic techniques, Bayesian classifiers, neural networks and 
fuzzy systems. Bleha et al. [121]tried detecting the keystroke pattern of users' 
"usernames" for user verification and reached FRR 8.1 % and FAR 2.8%. Obaidat 
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and Sadoun [123] made a comprehensive study of different classification methods 
that can be used with keystroke patterns. It was noted that keystroke durations gave 
better results than latencies between keystrokes, but using both measurements 
together gave the best results. The best results were achieved by neural methods of 
Fuzzy ARTMAP (a generalisation of adaptive resonance theory networks (ART) with 
fuzzy set theory operations), RBFN (Radial Basis Function Network) and LVQ 
(Learning Vector Quantization) [125] . 
Du -Qn 
Figure 34: Illustration of keystroke dynamic detection (duration and latency) 
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Figure 35: A graph to show the mean latency vector 
The main advantage of keystroke dynamic is the simplicity of implementation. 
Unlike other biometric systems, which may be expensive to implement, the attractive 
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advantage of a keystroke pattern is that it requires almost no extra hardware expense. 
The only hardware required is the keyboard. 
Nevertheless, user authentication through keystroke characteristics remains a 
difficult task. The reason is quite understandable: physiological features such as face, 
retinal and fingerprint patterns are strongly stable over time, unlike behavioural 
features such as writing and keystroke patterns [114]. One of the major problems that 
keystroke dynamics runs into is that a person's typing varies substantially during a day 
and between different days. People may get tired, or angry, or have a beer. A 
person's typing may bear little resemblance to the way he types when he is well rested. 
Because of these variations, there will be high error rates to almost any system, with 
both false-positives and false-negatives being produced. Thus, currently the main 
application of keystroke pattern is proposed as an auxiliary authentication technique 
in computer network security, rather than as the normal method for user 
authentication. 
Several observations can be made based <;>n previous research works on 
keystroke dynamics. 1) Keystroke authentication requires typing in a relatively long 
segment of text to get distinct features. 2) A person's typing may vary substantially 
from time to time. It is very hard to get a perfect verification rate. 3) For people 
working daily before a computer, and for well-known, regularly typed strings, better 
recognition results can be achieved. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. The method of how to adapt 
keystroke pattern into POS is studied in Section 5.3. The preliminary experimental 
system and test results are presented in Section 5.4. The conclusion and future works 
are summarised in Section 5.5. 
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5.3 Adapting Keystroke Pattern into POS Applications 
Our major objective is to apply keystroke dynamics to strengthen PIN 
authentication. Unfortunately, previous study results on keystroke dynamics that are 
based on computers and networks cannot be directly applied to POS systems due to 
some specialities of the PIN pad. 
POS devices and its applications have specialities. 'First, unlike a computer 
keyboard which has 26 alphabetic characters keys, 10 numerical keys and other 
character and function keys, the keypad of a POS device has only 10 numerical keys 
(0-9) and 3 command keys, namely Enter, Clear and Cancel. As a matter of fact, the 
layout and position of the numerical keys are strictly specified by standards (refer to 
Figure 32). The PIN is typically inputted by one finger with small movements within 
a highly limited pad boundary. Second, a typical strong password in computer, 
"tie. 5 Roanl", contains more than 7 characters, a capital letter, a number, and 
punctuation [115]. It offers more features for keystroke analysis. However, the 
typical length of a PIN in a POS system is 4-6 digits only. Thus the number of key 
strokes is highly limited, which means very few features are available for keystroke 
pattern analysis. Actually, this is the biggest challenge for pattern verification. 
Thirdly, the European Standard for Access Control (EN 50133-1) requires a 
commercial biometric system to have a 0.01 % miss rate and <1 % false alarm rate. A 
POS system expects even higher in some case because it is involved with payment 
transactions. Due to the reasons given above, applying authentication based on a 
natural or unintentional keystroke pattern will be much more difficult in the POS 
applications than in a normal computer network. 
To enable the keystroke dynamic to become a viable solution under the 
conditions of very limited keystrokes, 'features are expected to be more 
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distinguishable. Our approach to address this problem is explained below. Instead of 
casual or untrained key typing, we let cardholders intentionally build their special 
typing patterns. For example, the cardholder can type in the PIN "1234" with his 
predefined preferred typing pattern: Key "1" (hold 10ms)-(release for 80ms)-"2" 
(hold 60ms)-(release for IS0ms)-"3" (hold 6Sms)-(release for 80ms). This means he 
has built special pattern features with a very short press on Key "1" and a long 
interval between "2" and "3", and he tries to remember these features. Such 
deliberate typing patterns can be more consistent and distinguishable, thanks to the 
features of POS applications, namely a simple and fixed layout and limited number of 
keystrokes. 
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Figure 36: Deliberate keystroke is a combination offeature-based and 'knowledge-based 
factors 
Indeed, these deliberately built typing patterns actually do not purely belong to 
the traditionally defined biometrics any longer, which refer to natural features or 
behaviours. Users must intentionally memorise some special behaviour. Therefore, it 
is already a combination of feature-based security factors and knowledge-based 
security factors. Thanks to this hybrid feature, it offers the possibility to better 
replace the PIN method, which is a knowledge-based method. In practice, to make a 
better trade-off between security and user convenience, a prompt (message) can be 
shown on the display to help to memorise the keystroke pattern. The prompt can be 
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defined by the user themselves, as they prefer. The prompt can have direct or indirect 
connections with the real keystrokes pattern. A timer progress bar can be shown to 
help the user better follow his own pattern. 
The user will be authenticated by both the PIN and keystroke dynamics. 
Assume the impostor knows the PIN shall be "1234". Due to the wrong typing 
pattern, the impostor still will not be able to access the payment system. 
This procedure is similar to traditional PIN inputs, thus it can be quite 
acceptable. However, remembering some simple behaviours is easier than to 
memorise a real, more complicated PIN, especially with the assistance of prompt 
messages. Additionally, in case the keystroke pattern is disclosed, it can be updated 
(a feature which normal biometrics lack). 
5.4 Experimental Studies 
The profiles collected over the course of the experiment were represented as 
N-dimensional feature vectors. The similarities and differences were calculated using 
the normalised Euclidean distance and non-weighted maximum probability measures. 
5.4.1 Data Collection 
The performance results reported here are based on a database of profil~s 
collected over a period of four weeks. After a prototype system was built, 15 people 
were invited to join preliminary keystroke pattern tests. They were divided into two 
groups: group A (five members) and group B (10 members). Group A were regarded 
as genuine users and group B were regarded as impostors. 
In our experiment, we only tested the extreme cases: we assumed that the 
impostor already knew which keys to press and ~he sequence that needed to be stroked, 
but the impostor did not know the user-typing pattern. Meanwhile, the prompt 
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message was identical for all users. A progress bar, which was controlled by a 100ms 
timer, was shown on the display as a reference to help the user manage the duration 
and latency time. An example is given in Figure 37. 
Figure 37: Example of prompt, timer bar and real keystrokes 
Table 5-1: Sample of tested keystrokes 
Total Designed Feature Designed Features 
Attempts Keystrokes Dimension 
675 222 7 Simple short keystrokes, the same position and the 
same key 
675 123 7 Neighbouring and consequent keys 
675 649 7 Keystrokes in a clutter, short 
675 55555 II Long but simple keystrokes, the same 
position and the same key 
675 12345 II Long neighbouring and consequent keys 
strokes 
675 67853 11 Keystrokes in a clutter, long 
During enrolment, group A members were asked to input numbers according 
to our given tables, which were also public to group B (thus members of group B also 
knew what to input). However, group A members had to design individual typing 
patterns, which would not be told to the others. After they had 10 different keystroke 
patterns, a typing pattern template was built. Testing data were recorded in 15 
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different sessions separated by at least three days. Each participant in each session. 
inputted three different keystroke patterns as in Table 5-1. The "Feature dimension" is 
counted by each key duration and latency, plus the Enter key. For example the 
keystrokes "222" consist of 3 durations, 2 latencies and 1 latency and duration of the 
Enter key, so totally it is 7 features. The data collected from other members of group 
A were used to attack each other. Thus, more than 4,075 dam. sets were created. 
5.4.2 Classification Algorithms 
Initially the Euclidean distance measure, as per equation 5-1, was used and 
then the Non-weighted Probability was applied, as per equation 5-2, similar to the 
experiment in [126]. Both the keystrokes' latencies and duration are acquired to build 
N-dimensional feature vectors for keystroke pattern analysis. Let R =~.;r2t3; ... ;rN] 
and U= [u.;U2;U3;···;UN], with R representing the reference vectors (template) and U 
representing unknown feature vectors. Then the following classifiers are used for 
recognition. 
- Euclidean distance measure 
"Similarity" is based on the~ Euclidean distance between the pattern vectors 
[116]. The Euclidean distance between the two N-dimensional vectors U and R is 
defined as per equation 5-1 : 
I 
D(R,U) = [t. (rt -: uyY 
(5-1) 
i = 1, 2,3, ... , N, where N= number of pattern vectors. 
- Non-weighted probability 
Let U and R be N-dimensional pattern vectors as defined previously. 
Furthermore, let each component of the pattern vectors be the quadruple (J.lj, (Jj, OJ, Xj), 
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representing the mean, standard deviation, number of occurrences, and data value for 
the ith feature. The score can be calculated between a reference profile R and an 
unknown profile U as equation 5-2 [8][126]: 
N 1 [ou, X~,u) -u, ] 
Score(R,U) = ~ Ou, ~prob( !I u
r
, ") 
(5-2) 
Oui - number of occurrences of Ui 
Xij(u) - value of/h occurrence OfUi 
J..li - mean of the i1h of Ui 
5.4.3 Results Analysis 
Our findings are reported in Table 5-2. False acceptance rate (FAR) and false 
rejection rate (FRR) are both presented. 
Table 5-2: Test results after applying Euclidean Distance Measure and Non-weighted Probability 
Item Designed Feature Euclidean Non-weighted 
Keystrokes Dimension Distance Measure , Probability 
FAR FRR FAR FRR 
1 222 7 3.6% 1.8% 3.2% 1.7% 
2 123 7 2.4% 2.2% 2.1% 2.0% 
3 649 7 1.9% 1.8% 1.9% 1.8% 
4 55555 11 2.6% 2.5% 2.3% 2.4% 
5 12345 11 2.2% 2.3% 2.3% 2.0% 
6 67853 11 1.5% " 2.9% 1.3% 2.7% 
We observed that the keystrokes "222" of item 1 have relatively high FAR at 
3.5%, and the keystrokes "67853" of item six have relatively low FAR at 1.5%. This 
can be explained by the fact that keystrokes "222" have only three keystrokes, thus 
the imposters can relatively easily guess the keystrokes style. Meanwhile, all 
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keystrokes are on the same position, and no finger movements between keys are 
necessary. Therefore, the genuine user can concentrate more to perform his designed 
typing style and get lower FRR at 1.8%. As a comparison, the keystrokes "67853" 
have five irregular movements, thus the user can concentrate less on his style and get 
higher FRR 2.9%. On average, the probability classifier performs better than the 
Euclidean distance classifier, with a slight increase in compu,tation. 
Previous studies [114][117] indicate that keystroke durations give better 
results than latencies between keystrokes. In accordance with that, the equation 5-2 
can be modified to a weighted probability as in equation 5-3. We gave higher weights 
on keystroke duration than that of keystroke latencies. In our experiment, we 
assigned the preliminary weight of keystroke duration Wdu = 0.6 and the weight of 
keystroke latency ~a = 0.4. The score was calculated as equation 5-3 where 
i=1. .. N. 
2 
(5-3) 
The comparisons between non-weighted probability and weighted probability 
are depicted in Figure 38. The performance is improved by about 3.12%. Our results 
support the suggestion that keystroke durations give more recognisable features and 
latencies. 
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Comparison of Euclidean distance and non-
weighted probabality 
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Figure 38: The comparison of FAR & FRR between non-weighted probability and 
weighted probability 
To take the experiment further, we considered using other methods. Bayesian-
like classifiers [126] were also tried in our experiment. The approach aims to 
characterise the performance of the feature-based technique as a function of the 
number of classes to be discriminated. It is assumed that the feature vectors are 
distributed with the person who maximises the probability of the measurement vector. 
The classifier is defined as follows: 
Let X j be the feature vector, O"j the interclass dispersion vector and OJj the 
weight vector, and then the distance of two feature vectors X j and x j ' are expressed 
as: 
(5-4) 
The feature vectors, XI' x2 , ••• , x ll ' are derived from keystrokes. The value of 
a can be adjusted to achieve more robustness - the net effect is a slight improvement 
in recognition for values of close to one rather than two, as justified by the Gaussian 
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assumption. The performance using the Bayesian-like classifier was approximately 
1.8% over the weighted probability classifier. 
It is difficult to give an objective comparison of each approach, as there is no 
large unified data set under which the approaches can be compared. Meanwhile, the 
data were not collected in a high-performance real-time system. The accuracy of the 
data is therefore not very accurate. 
5.5 Conclusion 
Keystroke dynamics is studied in this chapter in consideration of the special 
features of a POS PIN pad. We argue that although the use of a behavioural trait 
(rather than a physiological characteristic) as a sign of identity has inherent limitations, 
when implemented in conjunction with traditional PIN schemes, keystroke dynamics 
allows the design of more robust authentication systems than traditional PIN-based 
alternatives alone. 
Compared to its applications in a computer, the major difficulty to adapt 
keystroke dynamics to a POS terminal is that too few features can be collected. Since 
• 
the typical PIN is very short, the number of keystrokes is highly limited, typically four 
to six keystrokes, which means very few features are available" for keystroke pattern 
analysis. This obstacle can be overcome through our proposed approach, which is to 
let the user intentionally build his special preferred pattern, e.g. by long pressing on 
specific keys, or by making long intervals between two specific keys. In this way, the 
limited features of keystroke dynamics become more distinguishable, hence the 
performance of authentication can be improved. 
Different classifiers in pattern recognition of keystroke dynamics achieve 
correct identification in diverse ways. Compared to the classifier of Euclidean 
distance measure, probability classification performs better overall. The weighted 
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probability classification has about 3.12% better performance than non-weighted 
probability. The results of weighted probability were concluded in the case of 
assigning 0.6 for key duration and 0.4 for key latency. The performance using the 
Bayesian-like classifier was approximately 1.8% over the weighted probability 
classifier. Our research results are not limited to the case of the Supercard scheme. 
They can also be extended to normal POS terminals an4 all PIN authentication 
through a keypad. 
Overall, our results validate and suggest that it is possible to use keystroke 
dynamics to improve the security of payment. . Our experiments are based on the 
hypothesis that the impostors know the PIN. If the PIN is unknown and the keystroke 
pattern is used as an additional authentication method, the security level of the 
payment system can be much higher. 
To address the issue that keystroke patterns change gradually and 
unintentionally, e.g. due to the user growing older or becoming more and more 
familiar with the key layout, an adaptive algoritlml is required to have a gradual 
learning function, which can modify the keystroke dynamic template gradually. The 
. 
learning ability is the advantage of the neural networks. Building a hybrid neuro-
fuzzy logic system could be a very interesting method to use to extend our research. 
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Chapter 6. Fuzzy-Logie-Based Decision System 
Correct decision making in the security sector mainly depends on information, 
which is received from multiple sources. Often, the information is insufficient, 
unreliable and contradictive. For example, in the Supe~card scheme, fingerprint 
authentication suggests that the cardholder is a genuine one but the keystroke 
dynamics authentication suggests the cardholder is a fake one. In such cases with 
multiple information from different modalities, what kind of decision should be made? 
To answer this question, this chapter will study information fusion by applying 
different methods, namely weighted average fusion and fuzzy logic fusion. 
6.1 Introduction 
Security in payment is becoming more and more complicated. Different 
applications and different authentication methods are applied, e.g. PIN, biometrics, 
and multibiometrics. As we have discussed in chapter 4, a multibiometric system 
refers to the fusion of multiple biometric features, e.g. detecting "face, voice and 
signature together to identify a person. Multibiometric systems have also been 
approved to be able to help achieve an increase in performance that may not be 
possible using a single biometric indicator [126][128]. On the other hand, diverse 
information increases the difficulty of making the right decisions. 
The same challenges are posed on our proposed multi biometrics Supercard, 
which we have discussed in the previous chapters. How to fuse information in the 
Supercard becomes an unavoidable topic. The typical Supercard authentication 
procedure is illustrated in Figure 39. It works as follows: depending on different risk 
levels of transaction (e.g. amount of transaction), different authentication scenarios 
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can be applied. In a typical high-security scenario, to authenticate whether the user is 
legitimate, the traditional PIN will be checked first. If the PIN does not match, the 
normal PIN-authentication mechanism, without consulting the biometrics component, 
will reject the user. If the PIN does match, the biometrics component will provide a 
supporting recommendation that verifies that the user is legitimate; that is, the user 
will be required to swipe through a fingerprint sensor on the card. Furthermore, 
keystroke patterns during PIN input will also be checked. A keystroke pattern is a 
biometric that identifies an individual based on their unique typing rhythm (the stop 
time on a key and the interval between two successive keys). Finally, the system 
performs an information fusion to give a comprehensive match score . 
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Figure 39: Multiple-modal authentication system based on multiple biometric features 
and the risk level of transaction 
6.2 Levels and Schemes of Information Fusion 
Generally, there are various levels of fusion for combining multiple biometric 
systems: (a) fusion at the feature extraction level, (b) fusion at the matching score 
level, (c) fusion at the decision level [129]. The fusion at the matching score level can 
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be conducted as follows: each system provides a matching score indicating the 
proximity of the feature vector with the template vector. These scores can be 
combined to assert the veracity of the claimed identity. These techniques attempt to 
minimise the FRR for a given FAR [13]. Since the match score is the most important 
indicator for the final decision (accept or reject), this kind of fusion technology plays 
a critical role in the whole biometric system. 
A variety of fusion schemes have been described in the literature to combine 
these various scores. These include majority voting, sum and product rules, k-NN 
classifier, SVM (Support Vector Machine), decision trees, Bayesian methods, and 
fuzzy logic. 
The weighted average scheme is a simple and popular approach in information 
fusion. Usually the weights are proportional to the accuracy of sensors or to the 
credibility of sensor information. In our case, each biometric trait provides a 
matching score based on the input feature set provided and the template against which 
the input is compared. These scores are weighted, according to the biometric trait 
used, for example, WI for fingerprint, W2 for keystroke and W3 for risk level of 
• 
transaction. Weighting the matching scores can be done in the following ways: 
1) Weighting all traits equally and using a user-specific threshold. Equal weights are 
assigned to the fingerprint, keystroke and transaction risks and a new score is obtained 
as 
3 1 
S fosion = L -Sk 
k=! 3 
(6-1) 
2) User-specific weights. In order to reduce the importance of less reliable biometric 
traits and increase the influence of more reliable traits, here we assign each user 
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different weights for different traits as equation 7-2, WI + W2 + W3 = 1 (where WI is 
for fingerprint, W2 for keystroke and W3 for risk level of transaction). 
(6-2) 
The SVM (Support Vector Machine) scheme is based on the principle of 
Structural Risk Minimisation [130]. Classical learning approaches are designed to 
minimise the empirical risk (i.e. error on a training set) and therefore follow the 
empirical risk minimisation principle. This principle states that better generalisation 
capabilities are achieved through a minimisation of the bound on the generalisation 
error. We assume that we have a data set D of M pints in a n dimensional space 
belonging to two different classes, + 1 and -1. 
(6-3) 
A binary classifier shall find a function f that maps the points from their data 
space to their label space. 
f:Rn ~{+1,-1} 
Xk ~ Yk 
The optimal separating surface can be expressed as: 
(6-4) 
where K(x,y)is a positive definite symmetric function, b is a bias estimated on the 
training set, and a j is the solution of the following Quadratic Programming problem: 
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min A W(A) = _At I +.!.At DA 2 
L ;a;y; = O·and ·a; ~ 0, where 
(i,j) E [l...M] x [l...M] 
(A); =a; 
(/); = 1 
(D)ij =Y;Yj}()(;')(j) 
(6-5) 
There are some advanced schemes known as artificial intelligence (AI). 
Neural networks, fuzzy logic and genetic algorithms are regarded as the main types of 
AI. AI exploits the tolerance for imprecision, uncertainty, and partial truth to achieve 
tractability, robustness, and low solution cost. In many systems, the information from 
different sources is insufficient, unreliable and contradictive. Commercially available 
equipment using fuzzy logic is proliferating tremendously. 
Fuzzy logic is being applied in many and varied fields, from a washing 
machine to mission-critical train control. Fuzzy logic uses multivalued logic to model 
problems that deal with ambiguous data. It is a' generalisation of the traditional 
bivalent logic, which states that any premise can be either true or false, but not both. 
The statement "The result of fingerprint match is good" is ambiguous, because where 
can the line for "good" be drawn? Fuzzy logic holds that everything is a matter of 
degree; for example, the match score "3.1" of keystroke biometrics belongs 50% to 
the set of bad and 28% to the set of moderate. 
In this chapter, we will focus on the scheme of fuzzy-logic-based information 
fusion in the application of the Supercard. Section 3 describes the implementation of 
fuzzy logic. Section 4 presents the fuzzy function, membership and the definition of 
fuzzy rules. Our experimental prototype is demonstrated and comparisons of different 
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information fusion schemes will be discussed in Section 5. Conclusions and future 
works are summarised in Section 6. 
6.3 Apply the Fuzzy Logic into Super card Information Fusion 
Fuzzy logic is a powerful tool due to the fact that most of human reasons a 
concept formation to the use of fuzzy rules. Fuzzy logic can simplify implementation 
and reduce hardware costs. In addition, conventional techniques in most real-life 
applications require complex mathematical analysis and modelling, floating-point 
algorithms, and complex branching. They typically yield a substantial size of object 
cost, which requires a high-end DSP chip to run. Fuzzy logic enables you to use a 
simple rule-based approach, which offers significant cost savings, both in memory 
and processor class. 
The fuzzy expert system consists of different processes. The first is 
fuzzification, which converts the crisp values into a fuzzy linguistic level by the 
definition of fuzzy sets and membership functions. If-then rule statements are used to 
formulate the conditional statements that comprise fuzzy logic. Following that, the 
fuzzy rules are applied and Mamdani or Sugeno' s fuzzy inference method is executed, 
which will lead to an output. After aggregating all outputs, the def~zification 
process will be executed to extract a numerical value for the final output. 
6.4 Definition of Variables, Membership and Fuzzy Rules 
Three inputs have been defined for our fuzzy system. See Figure 41. The first 
input is the fingerprint_match_score, which comes from the result of 
fingerprint match. It is mapped to a scope [0,10]. Three linguistic level terms are 
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defined as fuzzy sets: {bad, moderate, good}. For example, for score=3.5 is 
0.27 bad, 0.5 moderate and 0.0 good. 
The second input is keystroke_match_score, which comes from the 
result of keystroke pattern match. The data are also mapped into the scope [0,10]. 
Our experiment and previous researches suggested that keystroke recognition is less 
precise, thus we only use two sets: {bad, good}. The risk level of transaction is 
the third input, transaction risk level, with two sets: {low, high}. 
- -
The system output is the final match score, which is the most important 
indicator for the final decision (accept/reject). It has four subsets: {very bad, 
bad, good, very good}. 
To fuzzify inputs to a degree of membership between 0 and 1, membership 
functions must be defined. The fingerprint_match_score can be represented 
by 
(6-6) 
where 1';-3 are the three subsets of this variable i.e'-bad, moderate and good. 
For example, the F; member function can be defined as 
N 
1'; = L,uFI (x;) I(x;) (6-7) 
;=1 
where x; is the element of fuzzy subset F; and ,uI) (x;) is its corresponding 
membership value with respect to the fingerprint_match_score. For the 
purpose of simplicity, triangular shape trimf is selected to describe this membership 
function. The other inputs can be defined with similar methods as above. 
Before applying the fuzzy operator and implication method on inputs, If-Then 
rules must be defined. 
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Considering a set of rules, R I , R2 ... Rn: 
where the A" B" C, , D, represent the subsets of f ingerpr int _rna tch _ score , 
keystroke_match_ score , transaction_riskLevel 
final match result respectively. 
- -
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Figure 40: The output of the fuzzy fusion system: final_matchJesuIt 
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Overall, 16 fuzzy rules have been selected to associate the inputs with the 
output. Example rules extracted from our definitions are: 
If (Fingerprint_ match _score is moderate) and 
(Keystroke_ match_ score is bad) and (transaction_ risk Level is low) 
then (final_ match _Result is good) 
If (Fingerprint_ match _score is . bad) and 
(Keystroke_ match _ score is good) and (transaction _ riskLevel is high) 
then (final_ match _ result is very bad) 
IF( ~A =0.8) AND ( ~B =0.4) AND (~c =0.45) THEN 
Figure 42: Implication operator AND to the consequent part of the rule 
A general fuzzy operation can be demonstrated as: 
m = {(Fll , ~) EB (F21 , ~) EB ·· -(FNI'~)} 
® {(F; 2' P2) EB (F22 , P2) EB·· -(FN2' P2)} 
® .. ·{(F; M ,PM) EB (F2M , PM) EB·· -(FNM , PM)} 
I 
( ~D =0.40) 
(6-8) 
where the symbols EB and ® represent fuzzy aggregators of union and intersection 
type, respectively. Fij (1 ~ i ~ N,! ~ J ~ M) represents the j'h feature extracted from 
the i 'h signal and PJ its admissible position on the waveform [131] . In our application, 
we just applied the MIN and MAX operations to replace them, as depictured in Figure 
42. 
Finally, to finish the defuzzification and get a numerical value of 
final_match _ reful t, the centroid method is used by applying equation 7-6: 
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\ 
J xf(x)dx 
X=-=-=- -J f(x)dx 
where.f{x) is the vertical extent of the object at abscissax. 
6.5 Experiments and Results 
(6-9) 
The experimental database of our information fusion experiments consisted of 
matching scores obtained from three different modalities - fingerprint, keystroke 
pattern and risk level for transaction. Among them, the fingerprint and keystroke 
pattern are biometric data which belong to scope [0, 10], and the score " 10" means a 
perfect match. As a comparison, the risk level is an artificial score, which is defined 
by us according to the transaction amount. To keep the compatibility with other data, 
the score of the risk level is controlled in the same scope [0,10], where the "0" means 
that there is no transaction risk. The mutual non-dependence of the biometric 
indicators allows us to assign the data of one user to another. 
The database itself was constructed as follows: for the fingerprint experiment, 
we use an FMV2004 fingerprint database [118] , which contains 880 impressions from 
30 volunteers, together with the Grfinger development kit. The experiment 
equipment is shown in Figure 43. The keystroke data were achieved from the system 
as described in Chapter 5. The transaction risk was defined according to the 
transaction amount. 
Figure 43: Photo of the test system 
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Our experiments try to identify the different performance between single 
biometrics (fingerprint or keystroke), equal and individual weighted fusion schemes. 
The value of Equal Error Rates (EER) will be measured as a comparison benchmark. 
The value EER indicates that the proportion of false acceptances is equal to the 
proportion of false rejections as shown in Figure 44. The lower the equal error rate 
value, the higher the accuracy of the biometric system. 
11 .. 0 .,.-------------... 
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Figure 44: Explanation of EER point 
The results of the equal error rates, which we obtained from our tests, are 
shown in Table 6-1. Items 1 and 2 are the results when fingerprint or keystroke 
verification is applied alone. Item 3 is the result from equal weighted factors with a 
combination of fingerprint and keystroke verification, as per equation 6-1. 
Item 4 in Table 6-1 was achieved according to equation 6-2. The values of the 
individual weights are given in Table 6-2. The values were optimised according to 
the user's personal characteristics. For example, WI is assigned to the user No.6 as 
0.2, a very low value. The main reason is that we note that the ridge details of this 
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user are not very clear, and therefore the minutiae-matching algorithm of the 
fingerprint cannot provide correct matching scores. Similarly, the user No.2 has a 
very small weight attached to the keystroke biometric, because this aged user has an 
unstable keystroke style, but she has a clear fingerprint. These demonstrate the 
importance of assigning user-specific weights to the individual biometric trait. The 
resulting performance is indicated by the ROC curve in Figure 45. By the equal 
weighted fusion of the fingerprint and keystroke, the system shows a marked 
improvement of 18.4% relative to the fingerprint verification only. By the fusion of 
fingerprint and keystroke with individual weights for each user, the system 
performance can be improved 21.6% relative to the equal weight fusion scheme. 
Table 6-1: Results from different verification methods 
r Item Verification method EER 
1 Fingerprint verification 3.80% 
2 Keystroke verification 17.36% 
Fingerprint+Keystroke 
3 (equal weighted) 3.10% 
Fingerprint+ Keystroke 
4 (individual weighted) .' 2.43% 
Table 6-2: Weights for different traits of ten users 
Weight for Weight for 
fingerprint keystroke 
User # wI w2 
1 0.6 0.4 
2 0.8 0.2 
3 0.7 0.3 
4 0.3 0.7 
5 0.7 0.3 
6 0.2 0.8 
7 0.4 0.6 
8 0.5 0.5 
9 0.6 0.4 
10 0.8 0.2 
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Figure 45: Comparison of equal weights and user-specific weights 
It seems that the weighted individual fusion scheme has good performance_ 
However, the disadvantage of this fusion is that we must know the characteristics of 
each individual clearly in advance, and his/her behaviour must be stable. Obviously, 
it is not very practical since each bank: gets new customers daily, and normally 
customers want to start to use their payment card immediately. Meanwhile, in 
complicated situations, the performance of the weighted solution is not good enough. 
Our fuzzy logic system has been described in Section 3 and Section 4. We 
used threefold cross-validation based on the verification data to optimise the 
parameter values of the Gaussian combination membership functions in the fuzzy sets. 
The verification set is divided into three equal portions. Each portion is used in turn 
for testing while the other two are used for optimising the system. The fuzzy system 
achieved an equal error rate (EER) of 2.62%, and it corresponded a further 
improvement of 8% relative to fusion with the weighted average scores. The 
influences of fingerprint and keystroke biometrics have been given in Figure 46. 
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Figure 46: Influence of fingerprint and keystroke biometrics to the match result 
Meanwhile, it is observed that our proposed fuzzy-logie-based system does a 
better trade-off of security and user convenience. For instance, in a case where the 
fingerprint_match_ score is 8.83 , the ke ystroke_match_ score is 1.54, 
and the transaction _ riskLevel is 9.87, this means that the fingerprint 
verification is good; however, the keystroke verification IS very bad and the 
transaction risk is high (e.g. 5000EUR). The fuzzy system generates a 
final match result of 0.38, which will prevent this transaction from finishing. 
This mechanism will prevent a scenario where the impostor fakes a fingerprint and 
gets the PIN number of a legitimate user, as he/she still cannot finish a big transaction 
because he/she does not know the right keystroke pattern. In another case 
(fingerp rint_match_ score is 4.21 , ke ystroke_ match_ s core is 2.75, 
transaction _ riskLevel is 1.54), both biometrics scores are not very high 
which will result in a "rejection" in a traditional system. However, our system 
considers that the risk level of this transaction is low (e.g. 100EUR), and the system 
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will still generate a final_match_result of 0.74 which will still grant for finish 
the transaction. This will provide convenience for the legitimate user who has 
unintentionally changed hislher keystroke pattern and just wants to make a low-value 
transaction. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter presented information fusions of a multi-biometric verification 
system. Compared to the equal weights . information fusion, using user-specific 
weights to different factors gave about 21.6% improvements. 
Fuzzy logic fusion generated a further improvement of 8% relative to fusion 
by weighted average scores. The fuzzy logic approach can enhance the consistent 
information, and at the same time, attenuate the conflict information extracted from 
all match scores. It is based on three factors: (1) feather of fingerprint, (2) feather of 
keystroke, and (3) the risk level of the transaction. Member functions and 16 fuzzy 
rules were defined. We proposed the use of fuzzy logic decision fusion, in order to 
account for the complex user characteristics. 
A trend is growing in visibility related to the set of fuzzy logic in combination 
with neurocomputing and genetic algorithms. Among various combinations, the one 
that has highest visibility is a so-called neuro-fuzzy system. In a neuro-fuzzy system, 
the explicit knowledge representation of fuzzy logic is augmented by the learning 
power of simulated neural networks. Actually,· in our system, the learning function is 
also essential. For instance, compared with fingerprint, the keystroke pattern is a 
much less discernible biometric because of its lack of consistency. As the customer 
becomes more and more familiar with the layout of the PIN input device (PIN-pad), 
his or her typing style will be gradually and unintentionally changed. To address this 
issue, an adaptive algorithm is required to have a gradual learning function, which can 
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modify the keystroke pattern template gradually. Thus, our further work will try to 
build a hybrid neuro-fuzzy logic system to further improve the performance of our 
system. 
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Chapter 7. Development of Supercard 
Demonstration system 
To build a real prototype of the proposed Supercard requires the involvement 
of semiconductor industries. Many new components, e ~ g. the slim and flexible 
display or the slim fingerprint sensor, are still in the development stage and the 
manufacturers are reluctant to offer detailed information and support. Due to such 
constraints, it is almost impossible to build a real prototype during this study. Thus 
we set the target of this simulation to simulate and demonstrate the Supercard 
operation. 
7. 1 Demonstration Setup 
In this section, we first define the design requirements. Afterwards, the 
software structures are described in Unified Modelling Language (UML). 
Figure 47: Picture of our prototype and experiment system 
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The system consists of a computer, fmgerprint sensor and smart card reader as 
in Table 7-1. 
Table 7-1: Main equipments in experiments 
Items Description Specification 
Fingerprint sensor Microsoft Optical 
Fingerprint Reader Resolution: 512 DPI 
connection: USB 1.0, Image size: 355x390 pixels 
1.1 or 2.0 Colours: 256 levels greyscale 
Smart card reader ACR38 - Read and write all microprocessor cards 
USB 2.0 full speed with T=O or T=1 protocols 
interface to PC - IS07816-1I2/3 compatible smart card 
interface 
- Support 1.8V. 3V and 5V MCU cards 
Notebook SonyVAIO Intel Pentium 1.73G, 512M RAM 
VGN-FS415M Windows XP Version 2002 
We assume that studying the Supercard carr last many years and the concept 
can be proven by many people and aspects. Thus, we want to build a flexible and 
portable demonstration system. The Microsoft .NET framework provides the ability 
to quickly build, deploy, manage, and use connected, security-enhanced solutions 
with web services. As an important member of .NET, C# is a modernised object-
oriented language-taking benefit of the .NET Framework. A major benefit of C# is 
that it is able to bring the rapid development paradigm of VB to the world of C++ 
developer [133][134]. It is type-safe and solves some of the traditional problems for 
C and c++ programmers: memory leaks, difficulty writing multithreaded applications, 
static linking, illegal pointer references, overly complex multiple-inheritance rules, 
and so on. 
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C# implementation has the above-mentioned advantages and it can also be 
integrated in other systems more rapidly and in a more agile manner. Moreover, the 
author had some experience in this language before this project. Therefore, we 
selected C# as the simulation language. 
7.2 Analysis of the Demonstration System 
The basic requirements of the Supercard demonstration program are: 
• A friendly and easy-to-understand user interface. The interface shall be close 
to the envisioned Supercard. 
• Able to simulate basic functions, e.g. PIN enrolment, PIN verification, issuing 
error and warning messages. 
• The fingerprint can be acquired from the fingerprint sensor. Minutiae can be 
extracted and depictured clearly in the interface. The fingerprint enrolment 
and verification function can be dealt with by many experimenters. The 
verification finally can generate a similarity score in the scope of 0-100. 
• The keystroke pattern recognition can be demonstrated. It can record each 
keystroke and analyse the style of the keying. The different level of 
difficulties can be set by the user. The keystroke recognition can b~ integrated 
with the PIN function. Finally, a keystroke match score between 0-100 can be 
shown. 
• Most application scenarios and advantages of the Supercard can be 
demonstrated clearly based on this simulation. 
Additionally, the following requirements are considered during the simulation 
program design. The design is driven by several key concerns: reusability, portability 
and safety. 
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Reusability: software reuse is the key to significant gains in productivity. 
Software assets, or components, from requirements and proposals, to specifications 
and designs, to test suites - anything that is produced from a software development 
effort can potentially be reused. 
Portability: application must be portable across many machines and compliers. 
Reliability: the IEEE defines reliability as "The ability of a system or 
components to perform its required functions under stated conditions for a specified 
period of time". The simulation program must be robust and stable under the required 
. specifications. 
Flexibility: the degree of correctness of a system may decrease as time passes. 
The user requirements or the system environment can instantly change, affecting the 
system. The Supercard system modules must therefore be designed to be as flexible 
as possible, so that they are easy to change and adapt. The developer must always 
anticipate new requirements later on. 
Software safety: software hazards can be identified, tracked and controlled. 
Hazardous functions (data and commands) can be prevented to ensure safe operation 
within a system. 
Simplicity: the Supercard implementation should be simple, not complex. It 
must be easy to learn and use. 
The Unified Modelling Language (UML) is developed as a graphical language 
for visualising, specifying, constructing, and documenting the artefacts of a software-
intensive system. The Unified Modelling Language offers a standard way to write a 
system's blueprints, including conceptual things such as business processes and 
system functions, as well as concrete things such as programming language 
statements, database schemas, and reusable software components [135]. UML is a 
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widely recognised and used modelling standard. Thus, we try to use some UML 
concepts to design our simulation system. 
7.3 GUI Design and Use Case Diagram 
Use case diagram of UML is used to represent an external view of the whole 
Supercard simulation program. A use case is a set of scenarios combined together by 
a common user goal. It is a description of a system's behaviour as it responds to a 
request that originates from outside of that system [136] (see Figure 48). A user can 
simulate it to input the numerals and commands through the card keypad. 
Input numeral and 
commands through card 
keypad 
Start the 
fingerprint 
applets 
Configration 
Close the 
application 
Figure 48: Use case diagram of a Supercard 
Figure 49: Interface design 
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The user interface handles the user interaction. It should be very concise and 
easy to understand. The minimum components present on the interface can be one 
numerical keypad plus several command keys like OK or Cancel, one small display 
and one symbol of a fingerprint sensor. To enable the user to make some basic 
configuration, a small "Config" button can be presented on that, too. 
Figure 50: Class design principle 
Class diagrams are widely used to describe the types of objects in a system 
and their relationships. Class diagrams model class structure and contents using 
design elements such as classes, packages and objects. Figure 50 describes the class 
design principle [138]. Mutable fields, which can be modified, always belong to the 
implementation; immutable fields can belong to the interface. The public interface 
can be accessed and the internal data operations cannot be accessed. 
The conceptual class diagram is depicted as Figure 51. The main classes in 
Supercard are Config , DecisionCenter , PINanalysis , 
StrokeAnalysis, plus class Forrnl , forrnMain and forrnOption which control 
the user interfaces. The fingerprint implementation part includes class 
ImageConverter, DBClass, and Util. Relative methods are gathered in the 
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corresponding class. For example, the class Util includes methods Enroll () , 
ExtracTemplat() and Verify(int , ref int) . 
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Figure 51: Class diagram 
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7.4 Sequence Diagram 
The sequence diagram also plays an important role in software analyses and 
design. A sequence diagram (also called interaction diagram) is a UML construct of a 
Message Sequence Chart. It shows how processes operate with one another and in 
what order [137]. A sequence diagram shows, as parallel vertical lines ("lifelines"), 
different processes or objects that live simultaneously, and, as horizontal arrows, the 
messages exchanged between them, in the order in which they occur. 
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Figure 52: Supercard sequence diagram 
The sequence diagram of the Supercard is illustrated as Figure 52. After the 
main user interface is initiated, the user can decide what kind of authentication to start. 
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Typically, it will start with a PIN enrolment which is controlled by method 
PIN_Enrolment () to get a PIN template. Afterwards, the system can perform the 
simple PIN authentication by math with the later-inputted PIN and with the template 
in method PIN_Analysis () . 
. In the case of keystroke pattern simulation, all the keystroke information 
(number, duration, latencies) will be recorded by method StrokeRecordO. The 
recorded information can be used by method Extract () to get the keystroke 
pattern. A template of keystrokes can be accordingly built. For the later keystroke, 
the keystroke pattern can be matched by method PIN Analysis (). After calling 
the DecisionCenter () and StrokeAnalysis (), a match score for the 
keystroke recognition can be generated. 
If fingerprint authentication is necessary, the fingerprint interface can be called 
by a double mouse click on the sensor symbol on the card. After a user (Actor3) 
prints a finger on the external sensor, which is connected with a USB port, the 
fingerprint image will be acquired and shown on the window. In the fingerprint 
interface, there are three basic function buttons. The Enrolment butten can trigger the 
method Enrol () to build a template. The Extract button can trigger the 
ExtractTemplate () to find the fingerprint minutiae (ridges, valleys) and 
afterwards depict them with a special colour. By clicking the Verify button, the 
method Ve r if y ( ) can be trigged to match the minutiae of the latest input fingerprint 
image with the template. It can automatically call the DecisionCenter () and 
FingerAnalysis () to make a calculation for the similarity, to give a match score 
of 0-100. If an "Automatic" option is enabled, the fingerprint acquiring, extraction, 
verification and score generation will be finished at once. 
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It is also possible in the DecisionCenter () to combine the different 
match methods of PIN, keystroke and fingerprint to generate a final comprehensive 
score (information fusion). 
7.5 Implementation and Verification of the Demo 
Corresponding to the software designs, in the coming sections, the 
implementation will be discussed. 
A graphical user interface has been developed as the main interface of the 
Supercard (see Figure 53). The user interface seems like a smart card held in one 
hand. The background of the interface is transparent and the interface can be dragged 
freely, thus it looks very close to a real application. The Supercard has a small LED 
display, keypad, and a sweeping fingerprint sensor. All application functions are 
behind this interface. Some implemented classes are shown in Figure 54. 
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Figure 53: Graphical user interface to simulate the Supercard 
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Figure 54: Class diagram 
The fingerprint "Catch&Match" function has been implemented as follows. 
The fingerprints can be input through the Microsoft fingerprint reader. Another 
possibility is to read images from the FVC2004 Fingerprint database, which was used 
as a benchmark for different algorithms [118]. Mainly we use the DB3 from the 
database. The images in the DB3 database were acquired from a tp.ermal sweeping 
sensor (Atmel FingerChip), and the image size is 300x480, 512dpi. This is quite 
close to the situation of our application. 
The database comes from ninety people as volunteers for providing 
fingerprints. Volunteers were randomly partitioned into three groups of 30; each 
group was assigned to a DB and therefore to a different fingerprint scanner. Each 
volunteer was invited to present him/herself at the collection place in three distinct 
sessions, with at least two weeks' time separating each session. The forefinger and 
middle finger of each hand (four fingers total) of each volunteer were acquired by 
interweaving the acquisition of the different fingers to maximise the differences in 
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finger placement [118]. This database includes some impressions to simulate extreme 
skin distortion and rotation, and dried and moistened fingers. 
The development is based on the component of the Griaule GrFinger 
Fingerprint SDK Recognition Library [140] . The interface of fingerprint simulation 
can be called by double clicking on the symbol of sweeping fingerprint sensor on the 
Supercard, to invoke the buttonl_MouseDown(object sender , 
System . Windows . Forms . MouseEventArgs e) . The interface has the function 
buttons "Enrol", "Identify", "Verify" and "Extract" (refer to Figure 55). The Enrol 
button is used to record a user fingerprint template and Verify is used to verify a new 
input fingerprint with the specific template, which was recorded during the enrolment. 
The minutiae can be automatically extracted and depicted. 
Figure 55: Fingerprint simulation interface 
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The extracted features (minutiae) can be depicted with different colours, which 
can be set up by the user. The verification functions are governed by two important 
parameters: threshold and rotation tolerance. The threshold is the minimum score 
needed to state that two fingerprints do match. The default value is 45 for the 
identification process and 25 for the verification process, ensuring a 1 % FRR. The 
rotation tolerance defines the maximum acceptable angle variation (in degrees) 
between two fingerprints being compared that will result in a match. This value is 
valid in both clockwise and counter-clockwise directions, so the maximum value that 
can be set is 180. Depending on the verification results, finally a match score in the 
scope of 0-100 will be generated. 100 means perfectly matched and 0 indicates 
nothing is matched. 
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Figure 56: Configuration interface of the fingerprint recognition 
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The "keystroke dynamics" function has been implemented as follows. In 
order to check the style of the PIN input, each key pressed time and the interval 
between the two keys shall be recorded. This can be realised by calling the function 
buttonl_ Click(object sender , System . EventArgs e) . F or convenience 
purposes, at least two small information windows shall appear in the graphic user 
interface. The down window shows the recorded template - the time interval of the 
key pressed and the next key. The up window shows the new pattern. 
I 
'XU 
ft12 65 312 
Figure 57: Keystroke dynamic simulation and information windows 
The configuration interface can be called by clicking the text "Control" which 
IS located on the left side of the card. In this interface, the " enrolment and 
enable/disenable of the key pattern recognition can be controlled. Meanwhile, the 
security level (0-10) can be set by the user, too. The setting of a security level will 
affect the score of the keystroke pattern match. The same keystroke input, the match 
score, would be lower than that of the low-security-Ievel case. 
These keystroke patterns will be verified and will finally generate a match 
score between 0-100. 
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Figure 58: Configuration interface of the keystroke dynamic pattern recognition 
An example source code is given, 
pl1!llhl.ic static ltrlrayLis,t stlroke_t,emplate2 = :meN! tl\rlrayLis ,t l(~; 
F orm~ myF orm ; 
Ilpublic int[] i aS t r oke_Template = new int[20] ; 
~ic StlrokeAnalysis() 
{ 
} 
II 
II TODD : Add constructor logic here 
II 
Ilmatch the t yping pattern and generate a score of match result 
li the scroe scope is 0--100, 0 : no match, 100 :perfect match 
Ilreturn : 0 : OK 1 : failed 
111!lI1Jilic:: int flUzzyStlrokeAnaiLys!s Q\rlrayL!sll st~okelnpuil) 
{ 
int StlrokeScore=O; 
Il if the template is empty, use the default template 
if (stlroke_template . Count ==0) 
'{ 
} 
fo!!" Gint ]=0; j < stlrOke3'empla:te_dehullt.Lengt1h; ]ltlt~ 
st~o'ke_ temphile . il\d.d. (srU-oke .. J',empiJ..ail e_aefaul t [ j 1) ; 
if (stlroke[nput . Count != sillroke_tempiJ..ate.Count ~ 
r~t1llrlliL ffi; 
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Since software implementation is not the main target of this thesis, we will not 
elaborate on it here. The system diagram is shown in Figure 59. 
Fingerprint 
Decision 
Figure 59: Implementation and function diagram 
The envisioned Supercard will work in a special smart card environment with 
many unusual components which are not commercially available yet. Meanwhile, 
some common technologies like encryption/description have been widely 
implemented in smart card industries. It is not very meaningful to make a big effort 
to repeat such implementation in this thesis project. Thirdly, our prototype was 
developed based on a Pc. The differences between a PC and the new smart card are 
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huge in terms of CPU and memory. Therefore, due to the specialities of this project, 
the developed prototype is primarily for demonstrating the functionalities and the 
security structure, instead of for real performance measurement. 
The following functions have been successfully implemented and verified. 
(I) PIN verification. A PIN can be enrolled in the card and compared with a 
PIN that is inputted later. A new PIN fuzzy-match function is still in development. 
(2) Fingerprint acquisition, minutiae extraction and verification. Depending 
on different security applications, the threshold value of verification can be modified. 
The fingerprint system can finally issue a match score of 0-100. In the example that 
is given below, the match score is 73. 
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Figure 60: Fingerprint system configuration 
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(3) Keystroke pattern recognition. Detailed keystrokes can be recorded and 
the pattern can be extracted successfully. In the graphic interface, we have created 
two small fields to show the values of the template and the current inputs. Finally, the 
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keystroke pattern will be analysed to issue a match score of 0-10 as shown in Figure 
61. 
Figure 61: Keystroke information windows 
The user can make the configuration to decide whether the different 
authentication methods of PIN, keystroke and fingerprint shall be combined together 
or separately. Typically, the system first verifies the PIN, then analy:>es the keystroke 
pattern and fingerprint pattern to give a final match score. 
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Chapter 8. Conclusion and Further Work 
After investigation of several proposed techniques for Supercard and system 
integration, in this chapter we summarise the conclusion of the research and propose 
further work based on the study. 
8.1 Conclusions 
The goal of this research project was to explore how to improve the security of 
POS terminals at system and application level. We analysed its security in depth 
mainly on hardware security implementations. We investigated the anti-tampering 
mechanism of the current POS terminal and showed that the most critical 
vulnerabilities arise because of poor integration of physical, cryptographic and 
procedural protection. Based on the current security structure, the PIN pad, the PIN 
-transmission channel and the storage unit of the keys were identified as the 
fundamental weaknesses. The current tamper-evidence and tamperProof designs are 
not sufficient to protect them. The major conclusions of the thesis are summarised in 
the paragraphs below: 
1. The proposed Supercard scheme is based on the concept of minimising the POS 
terminal and combining it with the smart card. This can address many critical 
security issues of the POS terminal. The Supercard can work as a mini trustable 
security interface to acquire sensitive information. The scheme also distributes 
the security risks. The scheme can be represented as four specific approaches to 
defeat some common but hard-to-prevent attacks. 
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(i) The "PIN medium" approach can replace the conventional method of PIN 
inputting through the terminal PIN pad. This method has several advantages. 
Firstly, it can avoid the PIN being inputted from a fixed POS device, where it 
could be peeked or recorded by the camera of an adversary. The features of 
mobility of the Supercard scheme enable the cardholder to input hislher PIN 
on the Supercard in a safe and private space other than the fixed payment 
machine location. The PIN can be encrypted before it is sent out of the 
Supercard. Secondly, since the keypad and the crypto unit are located 
together in the Supercard scheme, the connection cable between them is very 
short and protected by the very slim body of the Supercard «O,8mm). 
Thirdly, the Supercard is normally always in the possession of the cardholder 
and the adversary hardly gets a chance to manipulate it. Another big 
advantage is that the Supercard scheme can be implemented in the current 
POS system by just modifying the authentication protocol. 
(ii). The "Message Verifier" approach was designed to prevent the cardholder 
from being fooled by manipulated messages. The typical. "display" attack 
scenarios can be prevented. The' crypto-unit in the Supercard can 
authenticate the message and show the right message on the display of the 
Supercard. Once the cardholder is aware of the difference, he can stop the 
transaction and avoid being cheated. 
(iii). The "Detector of fake or compromised POS terminals" approach has been 
devised to defeat fake terminal attacks. This type of attack can be carried out 
through building a fake device, which looks like a POS terminal to cheat and 
steal the PIN as well as card information. The Supercard scheme can prevent 
such attacks because its crypto-unit can authenticate the legitimacy of the 
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POS terminal and give. a wanung message on the Supercard display 
immediately. 
(iv). The "Tool with multimodal authentication enhanced with biometrics" was 
designed to meet high-level authentication through a combination of 
different factors. Through this security tool framework, the PIN and 
keystroke dynamics have been combined for furth~r development. 
2. The security of the fingerprint system can be improved by applying the proposed 
Supercard scheme. The CMOC approach is based on the Supercard to address 
vulnerabilities in a biometric payment system. The integrated sensor and 
encapsulated channel can respond to the threats of channel attacks. The applied 
biohash template can better protect the privacy as well as prevent the adversary 
. from revealing the real biometric. According to the new authentication protocol 
based on the Supercard, the fingerprint acquisition, data transferring, feature 
extraction and patter match etc are all conducted inside the secure Supercard 
channels. In the case of computing demanding tasks, e.g. feature extraction which 
cannot be done inside of the Supercard, they can be encrypted and sent out to POS . 
• 
In all cases, secure communication between Supercard and POS terminal can be 
built. Thus the CMOC scheme can defeat most biometric channel attacks (the 
attacker uses line taping, intercepts the biometric data or uses previously-recorded 
signals to replay attacks) and side channel attacks (by analysing the power 
dissipation or timing of encryptions in the device to disclose the encrypted 
information) which exist in a conventional POS terminal. 
3. Keystroke dynamics can be used as a behaviour biometric to strength the PIN security 
in the Supercard or POS terminal. Our studies on keystroke dynamics to reinforce 
authentications have led to the following conclusions: 
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(i) Implementing keystroke dynamics in a POS system is feasible and no extra 
hardware needs to be implemented. The main obstacle lies in the highly 
limited number of keystrokes and low distinguishability. These difficulties 
are caused by the specialities of PIN pad, e.g. the typical PIN is short and 
inputted through a numerical pad. We argue that the distinguishability of 
features can be improved by users intentionally, building specific typing 
patterns. 
(ii) The rates of FAR and FRR are relative to the difficulties of selected PIN, e.g. 
length and complexity of finger movement over the pad. The best results 
from our experiment are FAR 1.3% and FRR 1.7%, which are still far too 
poor to meet the high accuracy requirements of payment authentication. 
Keystroke dynamics can only be used as an auxiliary authentication method. 
(iii) The weighted probability classification (in case of assigning 0.6 for key 
duration and 0.4 for key latency) has about 3.12% better performance than 
the non-weighted probability between non:weighted probabilities. 
4. The multimodal authentication resources in Supercards or terminals can be integrated 
) . 
through fuzzy-logic information fusion. We have investigated the fusion of 
fingerprints, keystroke patterns, PIN and risk levels through' fuzzy logic. Different 
match results are first mapped to a score of 0-10, and afterwards, 16 fuzzy-logic 
rules are defined. Following that, the fuzzy rules are applied and Mamdani's fuzzy 
inference method is executed, which will lead to an output. After aggregating all 
outputs, the defuzzification process will be executed to extract a numeric value for 
the final authentication result. Meanwhile, information fusion by weighting 
individual biometric traits has been investigated. The improvement has been 
observed by this method. 
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5. Disturbing the core security unit by generating extremely strong electromagnetic fields 
can be a potential vulnerability of the tamperproof design of a key unit in POS. 
This issue is first raised by this thesis research. Under extreme electromagnetic 
conditions, if the security CPU is out of order even just for a very short time, or the 
security software cannot run properly, the security alarm can be disabled and the 
encryption keys or sensitive data can be read out, In terms of hardware 
implementation, preliminary investigations have been conducted on how to protect 
the key store unit. New approaches are proposed which exploit the features of the 
BOA package, or features of ceramic fragility, hardness and electric isolation. 
As a summary, the attacks or threats which have been addressed by the 
proposed approaches in this thesis are listed below in Table 8-1. 
Table 8-1: Security threats addressed by our proposed approaches 
Description of Addressed Approach and Remark 
Attacks or threats Degree (5* is well 
addressed) 
PIN visual disclosure through peek or ~ PIN medium 
camera record ***** (refer to Section 2.2.1) (refer to Section 3.4.1) 
PIN disclosure through remote monitoring, 
electromagnetic radiation, noise, beep ***** PIN medium sounds, or by putting transparent 
membrane on keypad to record PIN (refer to Section 3.4.1) 
(refer to Section 2.2.1) 
Build a fake terminal to steal PIN, ***** Detector of fake terminal biometrics and card information (refer to Section 3.4.3) 
(refer to Section 2.2.1) 
PIN disclosure through line tapping ***** PIN medium (refer to Section 2.2.1) (refer to Section 3.4.1) 
Cardholder is cheated by manipulated Message Verifier 
messages shown in terminal display ***** (refer to Section 3.4.2) (refer to Section 2.2.1) 
Intrusive attacks on core security BOA package and 
tamperproof package 
***' 
ceramic-based package 
(refer to Section 2.3.1) (refer to Section 3.6.1 
0' and 3.6.2) 
Potential high-intensity electromagnetic * Discovered by us attacks on core security (refer to Section 3.6.3) 
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(refer to Section 3.6.3) 
The weakness of cryptography algorithms ** Update to ECC and AES (refer to Section 2.5.1) (refer to Section 3.5.3) 
Biometric channel attacks: use line taping, ***** CMOC scheme intercept the biometric data (refer to Section 4.3) 
(refer to Section 4.2.1) 
Biometric replay attacks: use previously **** CMOCscheme 
recorded signal to replay "" (refer to Section 4.3) 
Attacks on biometric templates **** CMOCscheme Concerns on customer privacy (refer to Section 4.3) 
(refer to Section 4.2.1) 
PIN authentication alone is not strong Reinforced with 
enough *** fingerprint (refer to Section 5.1) Jrefer to Section 4.31 
PIN authentication alone IS not strong **** Reinforced with 
enough keystroke dynamics 
(refer to Section 5.1) (refer to Section 4.3) 
Fingerprint authentication alone is not *** Reinforced with 
strong enough keystroke dynamics and 
PIN to build multimodal 
(refer to Chapter 6) system 
(refer to ChaQter 6) 
Difficulty in making the right decision **** Fuzzy-logic-based based on multimodal authentication information fusion 
(refer to Chapter 6) ~ lrefer to ChC!Qter ~ 
. 
8.2 Future Research 
Our research has investigated POS security in the context of more secure 
protocols, tamperproof boxes and biometrics. In spite of this attention, the problems 
of POS security continue to harbour plenty of challenges for modem society. I 
conclude this thesis by suggesting possible ways in which the research presented here 
may be expanded in order to bring the Supercard from concept to a successful product. 
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1. The Supercard requires more software and hardware resources than the current 
smart card. The most suitable microprocessor, memory type and size need to 
be specified. Power supply and power management can be hard issues. We 
have made some preliminary investigation from hardward and system level on 
this topic in APPENDICES A: Feasibility Study of the Supercard on Industrial 
Implementation. Meanwhile the software operation system must be enhanced 
to meet the challenges of the Supercard. 
2. For the keystroke pattern recognition in payment systems, the typing style of 
the user will be gradually and unintentionally changed (e.g. after the customer 
becomes more and more familiar with the key layout). To address this issue, 
an adaptive algorithm is required to have a gradual learning function, which 
can modify the keystroke pattern template gradually. The learning ability is 
the advantage of neural networks. Building a hybrid neuro-fuzzy logic system 
can be very interesting work to extend our research. 
3. For the t~aditional terminals, an electromagn~tic attack can be a very dangerous 
threat. In Section 2.3, we posed the risk that if attackers generate a very strong 
electromagnetic field to paralyse the CPU of the security unit, they can break a 
tamperproof box without triggering the alarm. Due to the limitations of 
equipment, we have not carried out this research. However, after discussions 
with several senior security engineers in POS security, we feel this threat is 
real and very dangerous. To the author's knowledge, most people still ignore 
this risk and there are no official requirements against such 'attacks. Thus, 
research on this topic shall be set up. 
4. We used fuzzy logic to perform the information fusion. The result meets our 
original target. However, the parameters as well as the profile curves need to 
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be further optimised. Fusion at the matching score level is the most popular 
approach to multibiometrics due to the ease in accessing and consolidating the 
scores generated by multiple matchers. Fusion at the feature extraction 
(representation) level is expected to be more effective due to the richer source 
of information available at this level. However, it would be difficult to 
concatenate two incompatible feature sets like the keystroke pattern and 
minutiae points of fingerprints. Therefore, more studies are required. 
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APPENDICES A: Feasibility Study of the Supercard 
on Industrial Implementation 
To evaluate how realistic my proposed Supercard is, a preliminary feasibility 
study needs to be conducted. This is critically important, especially because our 
research was initialised by Ingenico Group, the terminal provider I worked for. This 
section investigates the feasibility of building a smart card with embedded display, 
keypad and power based on current available technologies and new technologies in 
the near further. Mainly, the embedded power supply and display are studied. The 
differences between silicon-based and organic polymer-based technologies are shown 
and the latter is concluded as the future of card development. The whole investigation 
is conducted comprehensively in terms of technical concept, manufacture and 
marketing factors. Current availabilities and limitations and possible future solutions 
are also explored. 
To turn the Supercard concepts into products, there are still many obstacles in 
both marketing and technical terms. A successful realisation is constrained by: 
• The computation ability of the micro CPU and power supply. 
• The limitations of the smart card's mechanical characteristics: Physical 
and electrical characteristics of smart cards are defined in ISO 7816. 
• Anti-bending and lifetime. The cards are supposed to be carried in a 
wallet and work for longer than three years. 
• Cost. This is a crucial issue. The degree of acceptance IS largely 
dependent on the price. 
The rest of the document is organised as follows: Section A.l and Section A.2 
study the currently available methods and the limitations of embedding displays and 
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power supplies on a smart card. Section A.3 investigates the possibility of embedding 
a fingerprint sensor in a smart card. Section A.4 observes the developments of organic 
technology relative to smart cards. The last section is the conclusion. 
A.I Embedded Display 
Obviously, the major difficulties of the Supercard mainly reside In the 
integration of display and power. 
.. 
The requirements for a display to be included in a smart card are thinness, 
flexibility, robustness, lightness and low power consumption. Conventional displays 
use glass as a substrate, hence they are heavy, fragile and thick. Obviously, they are 
not suitable to be embedded. The recently developed organic display, however, is a 
promising technology to address these requirements. Organic material is relatively 
low cost and can be deposited onto almost any substrate, both rigid and flexible. Since 
discovery of conductive polymers by Heeger, MacDiarmid and Shirakawa in the 
1970s [85], which earned them the 2000 Nobel Prize in chemistry, much progress has 
been made on polymer semi-conducting technology. It is possible to build the whole 
-device on flexible plastic foils to get a thin, light and flexible display. 
The key material of an organic display is the organic emitter layer. This 
semiconducting organic layer must contain a material with conjugated 1t-bonds, but 
can be either a small molecule crystalline phase (small molecule OLEDs or 
SMOLEDs) or a polymer (polymer OLEDs or POLEDs). In 1990, Friend and co-
workers at the University of Cambridge created Jl low-voltage electroluminescence in 
an organic device with a polymer, poly (p-phenylenevinylene), as the organic emitter 
[86]. Rapid advances in materials and manufacturing technology are making organic 
light-emitting diodes (OLEDs) the leading technology for a new generation of 
displays. The main players in this field include Cambridge Display Technology, E Ink, 
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Philips, Sony, DuPont, and Eastman Kodak. An informative review paper regarding 
OLED has been done by John K. Borchardt [86]. 
The typical smart card application requires only segmented 8-digits, about 
4cm2, and a monochromic display with a lifetime of about five years. Applying 
POLED on smart cards has the lowest technical risk compared with E-paper or TV 
display applications that require large, full colour and high resolutions. Several 
companies have developed prototypes. In the 2004 Carte exhibition (Paris), Philips 
showed a prototype card with a bi-stable organic display (refer to Figure A-I). A bi-
stable display needs power only when the state is changing, and the state can be kept 
for a quite long time without power, thus the power consumption can be very low. In 
addition, OLED panels emit light only from the necessary pixels rather than the entire 
panel. Therefore, power consumption is 20-80% of that of LCDs [86]. It is forecasted 
that when sufficient OLED production volume is achieved, prices shall drop to 10-
40% less than LCDs. The company MicroD developed one prototype in 2005. See 
Figure A-2. 
Figure A-I: A colour polymer flexible OLED from Philips 
Figure A-2: A prototype card with display from MicroD 
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There are still important areas in which POLED technology needs to improve 
before it is mature enough for mass production, including increased 
electroluminescence efficiency and longer operating life. The limited lifetime is 
largely due to its reactions with the ambient oxygen, C02 and moisture. Therefore, 
industrialisation and encapsulation is a key issue. 
A.2 The embedded power supply 
Below we study another major challenge of the integration solution: power 
supply in the Supercard. The candidates for an embedded power supply are: 
• Solar cells. Currently limited to low efficiency, this technology 
requires that the object be used in full light, unless it is used in 
combination with a rechargeable cell. 
• Primary lithium. The power density is about 15mW/cm2. Ultra-thin 
vapour-deposited lithium rechargeable battery. Very low power density 
but possible integration directly on several substrates (even silicon) 
[88]. 
• Paper-printed battery. This is developed by Power Paper Ltd. The 
. 
combined battery materials of zinc and manganese dioxide are like 
printer's ink, which can be printed on many materials, and it does not 
require a hard metal case [89]. The cost of basic materials is very low 
but the deliverable energy is highly limited. It is more suitable for 
applications like Smarter Luggage Tags. 
The power supplier from a photovoltaic (PV) cell is preferred. Single crystal is 
. the original PV technology that was invented in 1955 [90]. It can supply endless 
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energy. It is environmentally friendly and needs almost no maintenance. Therefore, it 
has attracted great research interests. 
The current photo voltaic market IS dominated by single crystal silicon, 
polycrystalline silicon, and inorganic thin film. The efficiencies range from about five 
percent for low-cost thin film materials to about 24 percent for high-quality silicon 
crystal. Photovoltaic cells based on single crystal silicon or polycrystalline have high 
efficiency and durability; however, they are very fragile as well as expensive and they 
cannot be directly deployed on a smart card. Although the thin-film photovoltaic can 
be flexible and relatively cost effective, it has the features of low efficiency and quick 
degradation. Even for a low-end 8-bit microcontroller in smart cards, e.g. PIC 
16F84CPU, it typically needs 2mA at 5V, 4MHz. A flexible thin-film photovoltaic 
cell with an area of 0.79" x 0.4" (20mm x 10mm) has an approximate output of 0.45 
Volts @ 50 rnA, 0.01" thick. Here, the rated current 50mA is under the conditions of 
outdoor sunlight. When indoors or under office light, the performance of photovoltaic 
cells is very poor. Theoretically, photovoltaic cells can have series or parallel 
connection to offer a high voltage as well as a big current; nevertheless, the available 
area that can be used for this is highly limited. Therefore, normally if cannot supply 
sufficient energy for smart card application. The combination of a photovoltaic cell 
and a mini rechargeable battery is possible but the cost is unacceptable. 
Figure A-3: A thin-film flexible solar cell 
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An interim conclusion can be made: based on current smart card and 
conventional PV technology, the PV cell is not a suitable solution [91]. The system 
power consumption must be dramatically decreased. The market requires a less 
expensive technology. 
There have been notable advancements in terms of decreasing the cost of thin-
film solar cell (refer to Figure A-3). One reason why a conventional solar cell is 
expensive is that it requires complicated processes, e.g. deposition of other inorganic 
materials, as well as expensive manufacturing technologies (vacuum deposition, 
photolithographic, etc) like normal silicon IC. Through a combination of fundamental . 
research and development programs and external contractual efforts, there are two 
techniques for flexible solar cell designs, which have a low fabrication process: one is 
based on an all-polymer/organic material approach and the other is a dye-sensitised, 
organic/inorganic material hybrid approach. In the all-polymer approach, the 
researchers combined two organic materials - an electron-donating material and an 
electron-accepting material - to make a percolating structure with two 
interpenetrating networks [92]. 
The solar cell has been successfully employed in calculators for many years 
because the low-end calculator needs less power. For example, with a calculator 
system (CPU: KI1724A LCD: 10+2 7-segment LCD display, 128byte RAM and 22K 
ROM), the power consumption is about O.7m W at operating. Hence, to realise 
dynamic password generation, such a "simple~' function on a smart card with high 
energy limitation, a proposal as outlined in Figure A-4 can be made which integrates 
the calculator circuit into smart cards. In addition to the conventional smart chip that 
contains a CPU, RAM, EEPROM itself, the card has a dedicated low-end calculator 
processor (e.g. KI1724A) which is low-speed but optimised for power consumption. 
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The processor contains a small-size RAM and a power management circuit, among 
other components. The solar cell power will only supply to the calculator circuitry 
(1.5V, 200-300J.lA) to accomplish some limited tasks like dynamic password 
generation. The conventional smart card chip (with a powerful CPU and peripherals) 
need not be powered unless the card is connected to a card reader for a transaction. 
Nevertheless, the weak system described above cannot support a strong 
mechanism (a secure OS and hardware) against sophisticated attacks. The 
fundamental way out for concept realisation lies in dramatically and systematically 
decreasing power consumption and cost. The rapid developments in organic material 
and physics appear to make this the most promising technology to address these 
requirements. In the previous part of this paper, organic developments in flexible 
displays and photo voltaic cells have been covered. More organic applications around 
smart cards will be investigated in the next section. 
Calculator CPU 
Power maJ;lagement 
Smart chip 
display keypad 
Figure A-4: Combing smart card circuit and calculator circuit 
In recent years, much progress has been achieved in miniaturisation and 
increasing the lifespan of extremely thin lithium batteries. In the short term, the super-
slim lithium battery is the most realistic solution. There are several companies that 
can offer commercially available products, especially integration with cards. 
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Figure A-5: A lithium card battery from V ATRA 
Figure A-5 is a special slim card battery from VATRA (non-rechargeable). 
The material is manganese dioxide and lithium, wrapped with a copper package and 
sealed. Typical capacity is 25mAh (@O.03mA, cut off: 2V @20DC). The thickness is 
OAmm and the dimensions are 29mm x 25mm. There already exist rechargeable 
super-slim lithium batteries. Charging can be done while the card is in use in a card 
reader for other applications; however, the recharged energy is quite limited in a short 
transaction period (about 40s). The development of quick charging technology is still 
under way. There are two major problems: the first is high cost. Such a battery alone 
needs I-2€. It is not suitable for a price-sensitive massive market. The second 
problem is self-discharge and limited energy, e.g., capacity retention is 90% after 45 
days of storage. 
A.3 Embedded fingerprint sensor in card 
In this section, we will briefly investigate the feasibility of integrating a 
fingerprint sensor on the Supercard. The feasibility of this solution relies on two 
issues: (1) whether the physical shape of the sensor allows it to be integrated into a 
card, and (2) the cost of such a sensor. 
A biometric sensor, or a fingerprint sensor to be specific, also known as a 
fingerprint reader, is a fingerprint image capture device. The types of fingerprint 
sensor available are static capacitive type 1, static capacitive type 2, dynamic 
capacitive, optic reflexive, optic transmissive with a fibre optic plate, acoustic 
(ultrasound), pressure sensitive, thermal line, and capacitive and optical line. All the 
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types of fingerprint sensors are generally known as optical, semiconductor, and 
ultrasound sensors. Among all these sensors, semiconductor sensors are considered to 
be low cost, optical sensors are considered to have a high degree of stability and 
reliability, while ultrasound sensors are very precise and fraud-free, though expensive 
to implement. 
Thanks to the ever-evolving research and improvements in biometric sensors, 
especially the new silicon swipe fingerprint sensor, this proposed work becomes more 
realistic than ever. These sensors when embedded in compact systems like laptops, 
mice and cellular phones provide a small contact area for the fingertip. For example, a 
company called AuthenTec [105] has published a one-swipe fingerprint sensor 
EntrePad1510 as a comical product. Figure A-6 shows its size and Figure A-7 shows 
a typical application in a block diagram. Physically, it uses a 48 Ball Grid Array 
(BGA) package with a size of 5mmx13.8mm. The thickness is 1.2mm. It is close to 
the requirements of being integrated into the smart card, with a thickness of O.8mm. 
The cost of such a sensor is already less than four US dollars. The fragile sensor can 
be protected by a thin metal sheet that goes around it.' 
. On another side, such sensors sense only a limited portion of "the fingerprint. 
This complicates the problem of matching impressions due to the lack of sufficient 
minutiae information [105]. Generally, pattern-based matching algorithrris give a 
better performance than minutiae-based algorithms. 
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Figure A-6: EntrePad1510 swipe fingerprint sensor 
I Power MJnJg€ment 
o 
Figure A-7: EntrePad 2510 Application Block Diagram 
Seiko Epson has developed a paper-thin fingerprint sensor measuring 0.2mm 
thick [106]. The fingerprint sensor' s ultrathin profile means it can easily be 
incorporated into a Supercard. When touched, the sensor reads fingerprint patterns 
based on the faint electric current emanating from the user' s fingertip. The company 
aims to commercialise the sensor by 2010. The prototype is illustrated in Figure A-8. 
Figure A-8: Prototype of the thin and flexible fingerprint sensor from Seiko Epson 
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A.4 Implementation based on organic polymer electronics 
Today's generation of smart cards depend on conventional silicon chips 
(processor, memory, etc.). Despite many advances in silicon chip technology, the 
cost-saving space is limited. Not only is the silicon wafer expensive, but also the 
fabrication process needs vacuum and photolithographic, high temperature, etc. 
Parallel to the classical development in microelectronics, a new promising and 
growing area within microelectronics is polymer/molecular electronics. This new area 
is an outcome of the discovery in the 1970s that a plastic can, after certain 
modifications, can be made electrically conductive [93]. Conductive plastics are used 
in, or being developed industrially for, anti-static substances for photographic film, 
and shields against electromagnetic radiation for computer screens. In addition, semi-
conductive polymers have recently been developed in light-emitting diodes, solar 
cells and as displays in mobile telephones. During the last few years, a surprising 
number of new devices using organic materials or conjugated polymers as an active 
component (e.g. a transistor) have been reported. Thus, polymer can be a material for 
isolation, conductors as well as semiconductors. These very interesting electrical and 
mechanical properties enable an electronic device completely based on cheap and 
flexible polymer substrates. 
Another important feature is that the polymer material has high solvability 
like ink. High-yield fabrication processes such as reel-to-reel, inkjet printing and spin 
casting can be carried out under normal room temperature. That means that organic 
electronic components and circuitry can be printed as we print a book, while the low 
price of the raw materials and low-cost fabrication can dramatically decrease the cost 
of the device. In addition, the organic electronics can work in low voltage with very 
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low power consumption. The coming decade may indeed become the age of organic 
electronics. 
Actually, the organic polymer electronics can be extended to the field of 
transistor, electric circuit and memory field. A transistor is the basic component of 
electronic circuitry. Moore's prediction over 27 years ago that the semiconductor 
industry would be able to double the number of transistors per chip every 18 months 
still holds today. As alternative methods to reach low cost"'much progress has been 
made in organic thin film transistors [87]. 
Although the mobility of polymer thin film transistors (PTFTs) is 1 order of 
magnitude lower than the mobility of small molecule based TFTs (motilities of 
~ 1 cm2N s were achieved for pentacene TFT by several groups, it is interesting 
because spin casting and printing methods can be employed for low-cost fabrication 
based on polymeric materials. A few groups and companies such as the group of Prof. 
Jackson from Penn-State University, Philips, Infineon, and Plastic Logic have 
presented integrated systems on flexible substrates. For example, the group of Dr. De 
Leeuw at Philips has presented integrated circuits based on several hundred TFTs. 
The realisation of large-scale integrated circuits requires a stable process 
technology, so that TFTs with identical properties can be produced. Second, the 
process has to be uniform over the entire substrate. Third, the thermal expansion of 
the polymeric substrates leads to additional constraints, which has to be considered 
during the device design and the manufacturing process. Very little has been 
published about the issue of reliability and stability of organic and polymeric TFTs. 
Large integrated circuits using inkjet printing of the active material have not been 
presented. 
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There is still a long way to go before a high-end processor or large-scale 
complex control circuit can be built, but polymer electronics can satisfy the simple 
logic as the application of dynamic generation card soon. 
Conventional RAM memory is expensive and volatile while Flash memory is 
slow and has a limited number of read/write cycles. The memory of the future shall be 
low cost, low power, easy to integrate and non-volatile. Various companies are 
working on a polymer-based memory using a polymer material sandwiched between 
two metal electrodes. The memory cell behaves like a Ferroelectric memory. The 
storage element can be combined with CMOS-based read-out electronics. Memory 
devices like organic bi-stable elements have been developed. 
Existing RF identification tags use a silicon die interconnected with an antenna 
on paper or a flexible foil. The price of existing crystalline silicon-based RF tags 
ranges from 0.3-0.5 US dollar. 50% of the cost of the systems is determined by the 
interconnection between the silicon die and the antenna [96]. By using organic 
materials and processing technologies, the price of the RF tag can be distinctly 
reduced, and the same technology can be integrated into smart cards. 
We strongly believe many advanced application concepts based on smart cards 
will finally be realised with the maturity of polymer technology in the near future. We 
believe that, in the near feature, the Supercard can be realised as in Figure A9. The 
processing circuit and memory element, display, photovoltaic cell and RF circuit are 
all made from plastic organic material. Since the system power consumption is very 
low in this case, the organic photovoltaic cell is efficient enough to recharge during 
the short periods when the card is removed from your wallet. The final price can be 
even cheaper than today's simple calculator can. 
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Figure A-9: An organic polymer Supercard 
The further work in organic polymer microelectronic moves in two directions: 
. the fundamental physical properties and fabrication process [93]. Despite an explosive 
growth in practical advancement, the fundamental physical properties of organic 
semiconductors are only poorly understood. Organics resist description by the simple 
band theory that so successfully explains the optical and electrical properties of 
inorganic materials. Organic semiconductors do not fit comfortably in a molecular 
picture that considers electronic states of individual molecules but ignores the 
formation of extended states. Therefore, some research institutes, e.g. the Princeton 
Center for Organic Electronics (P-COE), aim at achieving a fundamental 
understanding of optical and electronic processes in organic semiconductors. On the 
other hand, with the major objectives of high-volume production and low-cost 
processing of organic polymer technology, a project called PolyApply has been 
conducted since 2004 by 20 leading European industrial enterprises as well as 
renowned academic and research institutes. 
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A.5 Summary 
To summarise, the major observations of feasibility are to build a prototype of 
Supercard is realistic today. The document indicates today's feasibilities and 
constraints. The display, power supply and fingerprint sensor are discussed in relative 
detail. The thin flexible polymer OLED display appears to be the best candidate of the 
Supercard display. The super-slim lithium battery has been identified as the most 
mature technology to be integrated into a Supercard. A better solution can be a 
combination of a lithium battery and a thin-film flexible solar cell. In the field of 
fingerprint sensors, the mini swipe sensor from AuthenTec and the big slim sensor 
from Seiko Epson are suggested. 
In the near future, we believe, the cost obstacle will be removed when organic 
electronic technologies become ripe. Today's generation of smart cards and electronic 
devices depend on conventional silicon technologies (processor, memory, etc.). 
Despite many advances in silicon chip technology, the cost-saving space is limited. 
Not only is the silicon wafer expensive, but also the fabrication process needs vacuum 
and photolithographic. The new organic-based -(especially the polymer-based) 
electronics offer the possibility that the components and circuit can,be 'printed' (or 
inkjet printed) under low-requirement conditions, similar to the way we print on paper. 
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